The possibility of Iran targeting undersea internet cables in the Gulf has returned to the forefront of regional tensions, after senior Iranian figures publicly advocated using critical telecommunications infrastructure as leverage against mounting US pressure, sanctions and the blockade imposed on Tehran.
Reports warn that Iran, having imposed a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, could now seek to assert control over submarine communication cables, an often overlooked but essential component of the global digital economy.
Open-source submarine cable maps show that seven internet cable systems pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway whose importance extends beyond energy shipments and maritime trade to the digital infrastructure connecting the Gulf, Asia and Europe.
The prospect of deliberately damaging these cables has raised questions about the scale of potential disruption to international communications, banking, artificial intelligence infrastructure and regional economies, as well as the consequences for Iran itself.
Iranian Official Defends Targeting Undersea Internet Cables as a Legitimate Right
Hossein Shariatmadari, managing editor of the Iranian newspaper Kayhan and representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader at the publication, has endorsed recent threats by Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, describing the targeting of fibre-optic cables in Gulf waters as a “legitimate right” of Iran.
Speaking on Monday, Shariatmadari said approximately seven major international internet cable systems run along the seabed of the Strait of Hormuz.
He claimed that even minor damage to these systems could disrupt more than 80 per cent of commercial, banking, military and artificial intelligence communications, potentially throwing the global internet network into disarray.
The figure was presented as Shariatmadari’s assessment rather than an independently established estimate of global connectivity at risk.
Shariatmadari criticised Iranian officials for what he considered a failure to recognise the strategic value of this infrastructure as a means of pressuring the country’s adversaries.
“The use of this card and its decisive role in subduing our country’s enemies in the war we are facing has been ignored by the relevant officials in our country, or at least has not received sufficient attention,” he said.
Defending the proposal to use submarine cables as a pressure instrument, Shariatmadari questioned why Iran should refrain from exploiting their presence beneath the strategic waterway.
“If you consult your consciences and your sense of honour, would you not reach the definite conclusion that we should use the passage of international fibre-optic cables as a card against the United States and its allies?” he wrote.
He went further, personifying the cables as participants in Iran’s confrontation with its adversaries.
“The global internet cables extending beneath the waters of the Strait of Hormuz are waving at us and saying with a thousand tongues: Why have you forgotten our role in this war? We too, on this battlefield, are among those who sacrifice themselves for the late Imam, the martyred Sayyid and our current Imam,” Shariatmadari wrote.
Iran Threatens Regional Data Centres and AI Infrastructure
The latest warnings follow statements made on 11 October by Mohsen Rezaei, who threatened that telecommunications cables, data centres and artificial intelligence facilities across the region could become Iranian targets if war resumes.
Rezaei estimated the combined value of the infrastructure at more than $2 trillion.
“We had not included these facilities among our targets until now, but if war breaks out, many cables, data centres and artificial intelligence centres, which have extremely high financial value, will come within our line of fire,” he warned.
Following his statements, the Iranian newspaper Farhikhtegan, affiliated with Islamic Azad University, and the Tasnim News Agency published a list of companies and facilities in the United Arab Emirates under the heading “Potential New Iranian Targets”.
The publications reflected a widening discussion within Iranian political and media circles about whether digital infrastructure could become an additional instrument of pressure in the confrontation with Washington and its regional allies.
Iranian Proposals to Control Internet Cables Are Not New
The latest statements are part of a broader debate within Iran over the strategic and economic significance of submarine telecommunications infrastructure crossing the Gulf.
On 9 May, Tasnim News Agency published an analysis of fibre-optic cables running through the Strait of Hormuz, calling for fees to be imposed on foreign operators using the route.
The agency also proposed requiring major international technology companies, including Meta, Amazon and Microsoft, to comply with Iranian legislation.
Between 11 and 17 May, the Iranian parliament discussed draft legislation that would compel foreign cable operators to pay transit fees, similar to charges currently imposed on ships passing through the strait.
The proposals suggested that Tehran was considering extending its claims of regulatory and economic authority over the waterway beyond maritime traffic to the telecommunications infrastructure beneath it.
On 19 August, the British newspaper Financial Times, citing sources close to the Iranian establishment, reported that Tehran was examining the possibility of attacking submarine fibre-optic cables if regional confrontations intensified.
The more recent statements by Rezaei and Shariatmadari have brought that possibility back into public discussion, this time with explicit references to the economic value of the infrastructure that could be targeted.
Why Are Submarine Internet Cables So Important to the Global Economy?
Submarine fibre-optic cables carry enormous volumes of internet traffic and financial transactions between Europe, Asia, the Gulf and East Africa.
These networks support essential digital services, including international banking, military communications, cloud computing, artificial intelligence infrastructure, remote working, online streaming and gaming.
Disrupting them could produce substantial economic losses, particularly in countries with limited alternative routes for international connectivity.
A study discussed by members of the European Parliament warned that damage to submarine cable infrastructure could generate losses reaching trillions of dollars and disrupt internet connectivity internationally.
The risks are not entirely theoretical.
In 2024, three submarine cables were severed after a vessel targeted by Houthi fighters dragged its anchors across the seabed, reportedly disrupting approximately 25 per cent of regional internet traffic.
Concerns about cable security have already influenced the routes selected by infrastructure operators.
According to researchers at the Al Habtoor Research Centre, cable operators have sought to avoid Iranian waters and have concentrated routes along the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz.
Nevertheless, telecommunications specialists say two important cable systems, Falcon and Gulf Bridge International (GBI), pass through Iranian waters.
Their location illustrates the vulnerability of infrastructure that cannot easily be relocated once installed.
How Could Iran Carry Out Its Threats?
Questions remain about how Iran could enforce its demands against multinational technology companies or translate political threats against submarine cables into practical action.
Dina Esfandiary, head of Middle East research at Bloomberg Economics, believes the threats reflect a broader Iranian strategy aimed at demonstrating control over the Strait of Hormuz and ensuring the survival of the Iranian political system.
According to Esfandiary, Tehran’s objective is to burden the global economy with sufficiently high costs to deter another attack against Iran.
Specialists have pointed to the maritime capabilities of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including combat divers and unmanned underwater vehicles, as assets that could potentially be used against submarine cable infrastructure.
Such an attack, particularly if multiple cables were affected, could trigger what experts describe as a cascading digital disaster extending across several continents.
However, the scale of any disruption remains uncertain.
Esfandiary argues that Iran understands the theoretical influence it possesses over the Strait of Hormuz but remains unsure how effective that leverage would be if exercised in practice.
Available data also indicate that submarine cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz accounted for less than 1 per cent of total global internet capacity as of 2025.
This suggests that while a major disruption could have serious consequences for particular Gulf economies and regional digital services, its impact on overall global internet capacity would be considerably more limited than some Iranian statements suggest.
Why Cutting the Cables Could Damage Iran’s Own Economy
The proposal to damage submarine fibre-optic infrastructure presents Iran with a significant strategic contradiction.
Although such attacks could impose economic costs on neighbouring countries and international businesses, Iran itself is connected to the same regional telecommunications network through the Gulf Bridge International cable system.
Any disruption affecting that network could therefore damage Iranian communications and economic activity alongside those of its intended targets.
This makes the threat a double-edged instrument, particularly in a region where financial services, government communications and digital infrastructure are increasingly interconnected.
Another complication concerns the difficulty of establishing responsibility for submarine cable damage.
According to the International Cable Protection Committee, submarine cables experience approximately 150 to 200 faults worldwide each year.
Around 80 per cent of these incidents are attributed to accidental human activities, including fishing operations and anchors dragged across the seabed.
Against this background, proving that a particular cable failure resulted from deliberate sabotage can be extremely difficult.
That uncertainty creates an opportunity for an actor seeking to damage telecommunications infrastructure while presenting the incident as an accident.
Researcher Meredith Jones has warned that this ambiguity could open the door to an unintended military escalation, particularly if damaged infrastructure is interpreted as evidence of hostile action without a clear determination of responsibility.
The Greater Danger May Be the Time Needed to Repair Damaged Cables
According to telecommunications research company TeleGeography, the most serious consequences of submarine cable damage may arise not from the initial interruption but from the time required to restore service.
Cable failures are relatively common internationally, with approximately 200 incidents occurring annually, according to figures cited from the International Cable Protection Committee.
Under normal circumstances, operators can dispatch specialised vessels to locate damaged sections, retrieve the cable and carry out repairs.
During an armed confrontation, however, the process becomes considerably more difficult.
Repair vessels require permission to enter territorial waters and must remain stationary above the damaged section while technicians complete their work, leaving them exposed in a potentially dangerous environment.
TeleGeography reported that only one of five operational cable vessels was located inside the Gulf, while the remaining four were positioned in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.
If the Strait of Hormuz became inaccessible, repair capacity within the Gulf would therefore be severely constrained.
The global supply of specialist vessels is also limited.
According to the Stimson Center, only 63 submarine cable repair vessels are currently operating worldwide.
Before undertaking repairs, these vessels must obtain the necessary permissions to enter territorial waters.
Even after receiving authorisation, mobilising a vessel, repairing the damaged cable and reburying it can take at least 40 days, at a cost of up to $3 million.
Extended delays experienced during the repair of damaged Red Sea cables in 2024 and 2025 suggest that restoration could take considerably longer under conditions of regional instability.
Consequently, a relatively limited initial attack could result in a much more prolonged disruption if access restrictions, military activity or logistical shortages prevented repairs.
How Much Could Gulf Economies Lose if Internet Cables Were Cut?
Economic estimates indicate that the financial consequences of cable disruption would vary considerably depending on the number of systems affected, the availability of alternative routes and the duration of the outage.
A study attributed to Deloitte provides a basis for estimating the economic impact of connectivity disruptions, particularly in highly connected economies.
For the Gulf states most directly exposed to a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, with a partial impact on the UAE, the estimated losses associated with damage to a single cable range from $2 million to $8 million per day.
Under this scenario, the disruption would be more comparable to a serious connectivity bottleneck than a complete internet shutdown.
Deloitte’s findings indicate that a 30 per cent reduction in internet speed corresponds, on average, to an economic loss equivalent to approximately 0.09 per cent of daily gross domestic product.
A 50 per cent reduction in speed raises the estimated loss to 0.15 per cent of daily GDP in highly connected economies.
Two Cable Failures Could Raise Losses to $20 Million a Day
The economic consequences would become more severe if multiple submarine cable systems were damaged simultaneously.
If two cables were disrupted, or a major cable landing station was affected, estimated losses could rise to between $8 million and $20 million per day.
TeleGeography explains that Gulf countries do not depend entirely on submarine cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz.
Alternative terrestrial communication routes provide some resilience and could absorb a portion of diverted traffic.
However, the company warns that available land-based capacity may be insufficient to handle the full volume of redirected data if maritime systems in the Gulf experienced extensive damage.
This means that even countries with alternative connections could face substantial reductions in network performance, affecting banking operations, cloud services, commercial transactions and other internet-dependent activities.
A Severe Outage Could Cost Up to $50 Million Daily
The most damaging scenario considered involves the simultaneous failure of three submarine cables crossing the Strait of Hormuz, combined with an inability to complete rapid repairs.
Under these conditions, projected economic losses for Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE could reach between $25 million and $50 million per day.
The figure could approach $60 million daily if the economic consequences spread more widely to Saudi Arabia or affected regional business activity linked to data centres in the UAE.
The estimates draw on Deloitte’s assessment that a complete connectivity shutdown in highly connected economies could result in losses equivalent to approximately 1.9 per cent of daily GDP.
The study also provides an average economic loss of $23.6 million per day for every 10 million residents in highly connected countries.
According to the latest World Bank population figures cited in the analysis, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE have a combined population of approximately 20.3 million.
Applying the population-based estimate produces a potential daily economic loss of roughly $48 million in the event of a severe, widespread disruption.
These figures illustrate the scale of financial exposure facing Gulf economies if submarine cable infrastructure were extensively damaged and repairs significantly delayed.
They also reveal the limits of Tehran’s potential leverage: while cutting cables could impose substantial costs on regional economies and complicate international digital services, the relatively small share of global internet capacity passing through Hormuz and Iran’s own dependence on the network could constrain the wider impact of such action.
