A newly revealed Israeli document has raised concerns over a scenario that could disrupt the operation of major Israeli Air Force bases in the Negev and restrict their ability to launch sorties at the height of a multi-front war.
The right-wing Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom said the document, titled “The Nevatim Perimeter: Reference Scenario”, was prepared with the involvement of former senior security and military officials. It outlines what the newspaper describes as a “nightmare scenario” capable of threatening a significant component of Israeli air power.
The warning is built around the possible convergence of three factors that, according to the document, have previously appeared separately:
- The widespread presence of unlicensed weapons in the Negev, based on Israeli estimates cited by the document.
- The possibility that a minority of local residents could become involved in unrest that the document characterises as nationally motivated.
- Intelligence activity and direction that Israel attributes to Iran.
Under this Israeli assessment, the danger does not lie in any one of these factors individually. Rather, it lies in their possible convergence during a wider regional confrontation, potentially cutting access roads to air bases and disrupting part of their operational capacity at a critical moment.
Disabling the Base Without Capturing It
At the centre of these concerns is Nevatim Air Base, which hosts F-35 fighter squadrons, heavy transport aircraft and Israel’s official government aircraft, known as the “Wing of Zion”.
The document also discusses other bases in the Negev, including Hatzerim Air Base and the areas surrounding Ramon and Tze’elim. According to the assessment, a substantial part of Israel’s air power is concentrated in the region.
The scenario does not require an armed force to storm the base or seize it militarily.
Instead, the document argues that blocking access roads, firing at aircraft while they are on the ground or deploying drones could be enough to remove aircraft from the sortie cycle for hours or even days, reduce the base’s operational capacity and slow the rate of air missions during the peak of a multi-front war.
In this calculation, the danger is measured not simply by physical destruction but by the amount of time Israel is deprived of the aircraft’s use.
An aircraft that sustains even limited damage may require inspection and maintenance before returning to service. At the same time, blocked access roads could prevent pilots, technicians and other crews from reaching the base in the first place.
During wartime, the document argues, a single hour in which aircraft are unable to take off could have consequences greater than the material damage itself.
Previous Events Behind the Warning
Israel Hayom says the document’s authors do not present the elements of the scenario as entirely theoretical.
In May 2021, during Israel’s assault on Gaza and the protests and unrest that accompanied it inside the Green Line, major roads in the Negev were disrupted. Reserve pilots travelling to Nevatim reportedly had to reach the base under security protection, while the nearby community of Nevatim was effectively cut off for around 24 hours.
The document does not claim that Iran directed those events. Instead, it cites them as evidence that access routes leading to a sensitive military facility have already been disrupted in practice.
An Israeli State Comptroller report published on 28 April 2026 also examined governance and security problems in the Negev. The document cited incidents in which gunfire reportedly reached inside Nevatim Air Base, including one case in which a bullet struck an aircraft wing, as well as drone incursions into the base.
At the same time, Israeli police estimates cited by the document put the number of unlicensed weapons and other arms in the Negev at around 130,000. The Rifman Institute estimates the figure at around 100,000.
An Iranian Eye on Nevatim
The document says Israeli concerns become more serious when Iran is factored into the scenario.
Nevatim was targeted during Iran’s direct missile attacks in 2024. Israeli authorities have also announced the discovery of alleged espionage networks whose members were accused of photographing military bases and other sensitive facilities on behalf of Iranian intelligence.
In 2025, Israeli authorities charged a Bedouin teacher living near Nevatim with allegedly working for Iranian intelligence and gathering information on the base. According to the Israeli indictment cited in the document, she was tasked with collecting intelligence that included photographing fighter aircraft taking off from Nevatim.
These remain allegations made by Israeli authorities and contained in Israeli legal proceedings.
The document also points to Israeli reports alleging Iranian attempts to smuggle weapons across the Jordanian border with assistance from smugglers in the region.
It does not claim that Iran is responsible for the entire stockpile of unlicensed weapons in the Negev. Instead, it warns that an existing infrastructure could potentially be exploited if a broader confrontation were to erupt.
According to the document, Iran “does not need an army in the Negev”, but rather “eyes on the bases, readily available weapons in the area, and a population of which some are willing to act”.
A Scenario Built on Timing
The core concern is therefore not any single threat but their convergence at the same moment.
The document imagines a war involving Iran or forces aligned with it, accompanied by unrest on major roads. Police resources would be drawn towards dealing with those disturbances, while an armed cell could exploit the situation to fire towards aircraft on the ground and operate drones near the base perimeter.
Under the scenario, Iran could then exploit the resulting disruption to launch an external attack.
According to the report, what makes the scenario different is not the individual methods involved but their “combination and timing”: blocked roads, a major air base functioning below capacity, aircraft damaged while still on the ground, an internal threat around the base perimeter and an external attack occurring simultaneously.
A temporary reduction in Israeli air capability during such a moment could have repercussions extending beyond the Negev to military fronts in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran, according to Israel Hayom.
The scenario is therefore less concerned with the conventional capture of Nevatim than with temporarily denying Israel the ability to use the base effectively at the moment it needs it most.
The Document Limits the Threat to a Minority
Despite the severity of its warnings, the document explicitly avoids assigning collective responsibility to the Bedouin community in the Negev.
It identifies what it describes as an “armed minority” operating in an area where, according to the document, state authority is weak.
This distinction is central to the scenario presented by its authors. The warning is not that the Bedouin population as a whole represents a threat, but that a smaller armed element could exploit existing weapons, geography, blocked roads and a broader regional confrontation.
The document’s conclusion is that the area surrounding Nevatim can no longer be viewed merely as the civilian hinterland of a military base.
Instead, it describes the area as the Air Force’s “internal front line”, where the disruption of Israeli air power could begin on the roads and around the perimeter fences before any battle reaches the skies.
