The repercussions of Israel’s failure on 7 October 2023 continue to reverberate through Israeli political circles and Hebrew-language media, where recent debate has increasingly focused on the theory of “betrayal from within” and claims that Israeli insiders either helped Hamas carry out the attack or obstructed the military response.
Israeli writer Uri Tal Tena said the narrative began as fringe discourse on social media before spreading and expanding through government spokespersons and pro-government media. Politicians from the governing coalition, far-right activists appearing on television networks, Channel 14 presenters and, indirectly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s wife Sara Netanyahu all contributed to entrenching a broader conspiracy theory about internal betrayal.
Writing for Zman Yisrael, Tena argued that the theory developed into “false and malicious accusations” against specific figures in the opposition, serving to divert attention from the disaster and distance Netanyahu from responsibility for the failure.
According to Tena, the theory emerged from the sheer scale of the collapse and the stark contrast between the strength of Hamas’s assault and the absence of an effective Israeli response during the first hours. Within hours, claims began circulating on social media that the events could not be explained merely by intelligence and operational failures, and that Israeli officials must have deliberately assisted Hamas or allowed the attack to happen.
Among the earliest claims were allegations that a “traitor” or “spy” occupied one of the highest levels of the Israeli military or the Shin Bet. Supporters of this narrative argued that the entire system could not have failed without deliberate internal involvement.
The rumours moved from WhatsApp groups to X and Telegram channels before filtering into mainstream media. At the heart of the theory was the assumption that the scale of Hamas’s success could not have resulted from institutional failure alone.
Different versions alleged that the Israeli Air Force deliberately avoided stopping the attack, that elements within the military or security establishment assisted Hamas, or that senior officials knew about the assault in advance and chose not to prevent it.
Tena said these claims ultimately proved to be speculative ideas unsupported by reliable information, or even fragmented evidence. This does not necessarily mean Hamas never used Israeli spies, he added, but since the conspiracy theory began spreading, no information has been published or discovered that substantiates its central claims.
The “Betrayal From Within” Narrative Expands
The theory quickly grew beyond the narrow claim that a single individual had betrayed Israel. It evolved into allegations of coordinated complicity among senior officials.
At the same time, a political version of the conspiracy began circulating. According to claims promoted online and through pro-government mainstream media, senior figures within the security establishment, judiciary, protest movement and opposition were supposedly involved in a conspiracy to cause the catastrophe and then exploit it against Netanyahu.
Tena said no evidence supports such a conspiracy, arguing that the narrative was constructed and disseminated according to the political needs of those promoting it and adapted to developments in the news cycle.
The allegations were not confined to anonymous social media posts. On 16 November 2023, five weeks after the attack, Channel 14 aired claims about “traitors from within” as an explanation for how the attack had been possible.
During the same broadcast, political activist Smadar Shmueli claimed it was no coincidence that posters had been circulating since March warning of an approaching disaster comparable to the Yom Kippur War.
She argued that when the day came, those responsible would have to explain how they had known about it. The suggestion effectively promoted a conspiracy theory involving activists who had protested against the judicial coup, implying that they had advance knowledge of the expected attack despite the absence of evidence supporting such an accusation.
Since then, conspiratorial terminology has been repeated in different forms. Sometimes it appears as a question, sometimes as an insinuation, and sometimes as part of a broader theory alleging that elements inside the security establishment, judiciary, media or political system acted against the state.
Tena stressed that asking questions about the events of 7 October is not itself conspiratorial. It is legitimate to ask whether evidence supports a particular explanation. But there is a clear distinction between examining a possibility and repeatedly presenting that possibility in a way that makes it appear firmly grounded.
There is also a major difference between asking in general whether Israelis might have assisted Hamas and directing unsupported accusations at specific individuals in pursuit of a political objective.
According to Tena, this discourse relies on a familiar mechanism. It is not necessary to explicitly declare that the conspiracy is true. It is enough to repeatedly “ask questions”.
Who knew? Who concealed the information? Who prevented action? Who benefited? Who was involved?
Repeated often enough, such questions can gradually create the impression that the volume of unanswered questions itself proves there must be a hidden explanation behind them.
Over time, an unsupported theoretical possibility involving a handful of traitors, combined with accusations against figures in the security establishment, judiciary, political system and protest movement, developed into a narrative that appeared plausible to some audiences despite the lack of evidence.
In the first days after the attack, specific names and institutions were drawn into the “betrayal from within” theory even though none of those named had been implicated, suspected or charged with treason, and no evidence existed against them.
Israeli Generals Targeted by Accusations
In September 2024, Channel 14 broadcast an accusation by retired Major General Peretz Ratson against reserve Major General Yisrael Ziv, claiming Ziv had known about the attack between 4:00 and 4:30 am.
The allegation relied on an edited video clip that removed Ziv’s words from their original context. An apology was broadcast on the programme the following day.
Tena argued that the episode illustrated how Channel 14 had provided a platform for proponents of the internal betrayal theory, allowing false information to become presented as supposed “evidence” of a wider conspiracy.
The same channel also aired allegations targeting former deputy chief of staff and Democratic Party leader Yair Golan, who volunteered on the day of the attack and rescued people from the Nova music festival.
Likud Knesset member Nissim Vaturi said he would not be surprised if Golan had betrayed Israel on 7 October. Several Channel 14 programmes also alleged that Golan “did not rescue anyone at all”.
Both claims, Tena said, contradicted documentation showing that Golan reached areas where armed fighters were operating and rescued Israelis during the attack.
Sara Netanyahu also indirectly repeated suspicions about Golan, pointing to the fact that he was dressed and prepared unusually early on the morning of 7 October and suggesting he had known about the attack while the prime minister had not yet been informed.
The implication was that Golan had received advance information, although she did not state the allegation explicitly.
Golan described the accusation as an outrageous lie and filed a defamation lawsuit against Sara Netanyahu seeking 2.55 million shekels in compensation. Opposition leaders also publicly attacked her over the allegation.
Following the publication of information showing that warning signs of a possible surprise Hamas attack had accumulated within the military establishment during the night of 7 October, conspiracy theories spread across social media and sympathetic media outlets claiming senior military commanders had deliberately avoided waking Netanyahu in order to entrap him politically.
In June 2025, Channel 14 published an article by Professor Moshe Cohen titled “The Cover-Up and Betrayal of the Shin Bet”.
While Cohen did not claim there was actual “evidence of betrayal”, the article presented a long series of questions, combined numerous facts and constructed a narrative strongly suggestive of such betrayal.
What the Timeline Shows
Tena argued that this is how conspiracy propaganda functions when there is no solid factual foundation.
The promoter cannot directly confirm an allegation without risking legal consequences, but can instead frame it as an open question. In doing so, fragments of information can reinforce the belief that a conspiracy must have existed.
The documented timeline, however, contradicts the allegation that senior military and intelligence commanders deliberately concealed information from Netanyahu. According to the available sequence of events, information was passed during the night to officials in Netanyahu’s office and to the National Security Council.
As indications began accumulating that Hamas might be preparing an incursion into Israeli territory, senior military and intelligence officials passed information to the office of the prime minister’s military secretary at the time, Major General Avi Gil, as well as to the National Security Council.
Shortly after 2:00 am, the chief of staff of the Research Division in Military Intelligence briefed the intelligence officer in the Prime Minister’s Office, identified as Colonel “S”, about the indications available at that stage. The officer confirmed receiving the information.
At 2:57 am, most of the information was transferred to the National Security Council.
At 4:00 am, additional updated information was sent to Colonel “S”.
At 6:19 am, the head of the Shin Bet office directly contacted Major General Avi Gil and updated him on the latest developments.
The chief of staff also reported directly to Netanyahu, while the prime minister’s military secretary operated under Netanyahu’s authority on matters related to his role.
The information was therefore transmitted with the intention that it reach those closest to the prime minister, contradicting claims that senior military commanders deliberately concealed it.
Whether Netanyahu himself was awakened depended on the nature of his relationship with his military secretary and the instructions Netanyahu had issued.
According to Tena, the documented timeline therefore does not support the claim that military and intelligence chiefs deliberately hid the information from Netanyahu that night.
Senior Israeli military and Shin Bet officials, along with prominent figures in Arab states, had also repeatedly warned Netanyahu in the months before the attack that Hamas in Gaza intended to launch a major assault. Senior Hamas officials had themselves issued explicit threats of an attack.
Netanyahu, Tena wrote, ignored those warnings.
Under the version of the betrayal theory promoted by sections of the Israeli right, anti-government protest activists were not merely accused of weakening the state before and after the attack, but of involvement in activities that directly harmed national security.
Hamas’s Intelligence-Gathering Offers a Different Explanation
Investigations conducted after the attack instead pointed to deep structural failures rather than evidence of collusion between Israeli officials and Hamas.
Hamas, according to the findings cited by Tena, had spent years gathering intelligence about the Israeli military and obtained extensive information on forward positions, defensive measures, surveillance cameras, emergency response teams and troop deployments.
Those facts provide a concrete explanation for at least part of Hamas’s ability to execute the attack without requiring the assumption that Israeli officials cooperated with the movement.
Military investigations and extensive examinations involving hundreds of officers uncovered serious failures, some stretching back years.
These included a fundamental misunderstanding of Hamas, failures in intelligence collection and assessment, inadequate operational preparedness and the breakdown of the military response during the first hours of the attack.
The allegation that Israeli officials had “betrayed from within” or collaborated with Hamas therefore received no factual confirmation, and investigators found no evidence supporting the theory.
Tena nevertheless stressed that this does not necessarily prove Hamas never used Israeli spies. Rather, no evidence has been found establishing that it did, either generally or, more importantly, in relation to the specific individuals targeted by conspiracy theories.
Investigations have identified numerous serious failures across Israeli state systems, but a comprehensive examination of the disaster will only take place once a state commission of inquiry is established.
From “Who Failed?” to “Who Betrayed?”
The problem, Tena argued, is not the act of asking questions.
After what he described as the greatest disaster in the state’s history, difficult questions are necessary. The problem begins when a question becomes an assumption and that assumption becomes an all-encompassing explanation.
Instead of asking why the military was insufficiently prepared, the question becomes: “Who wanted the military to be unprepared?”
Instead of examining why intelligence assessments were wrong, the search turns to who supposedly ensured that intelligence would be misused.
Instead of examining the responsibility of decision-makers, attention shifts towards finding “traitors”.
If the attack resulted from structural failures, the debate centres on the responsibility of decision-makers and the effectiveness of institutions. If it is instead portrayed as the product of an internal conspiracy, attention moves from the question of “who failed?” to “who betrayed?”
That shift is more than semantic. It changes where responsibility is placed.
Instead of focusing public attention on why Israeli leaders spent years believing Hamas had been deterred, why insufficient forces were deployed along the Gaza boundary, why warnings were not acted upon and why the entire system collapsed on the morning of 7 October, the public can instead be directed towards searching for enemies within.
Institutional failure can then be transformed into a story of sabotage, while responsibility for the collapse is transferred to “others”.
