Pakistan’s military spokesman, Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, has said his country would “go to any extent” to defend its ally Saudi Arabia “for the security of the Two Holy Mosques and the Kingdom”.
The statement has raised fresh questions over whether Islamabad could become directly involved in defending Saudi Arabia as attacks by Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement intensify, and whether the recently signed Makkah Joint Defence Agreement could now move from political commitment to military implementation.
What Has Changed?
This is the first time Pakistan has signalled the possibility of becoming directly involved in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation after repeated questions over the role of the Makkah defence alliance in the ongoing conflict.
The statement could indicate that Pakistan is preparing for a role beyond issuing condemnations of attacks carried out by Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement.
Until now, Islamabad’s public position had remained focused on diplomatic support and condemnation rather than indications of possible military involvement.
What Has Pakistan Said Recently?
A spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry said last week that the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Pakistan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia last month, was a “defensive alliance”, adding that there were currently no plans to expand it.
The comments came in response to a question about Islamabad’s obligations towards Riyadh under the Makkah Agreement.
The position indicates that Pakistan and Türkiye are not committing themselves to attacking Ansar Allah inside Yemen, although they could potentially participate in defending Saudi territory against attacks.
What Have Officials Said?
Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif said the time had come to implement the Makkah Agreement amid escalating Houthi attacks targeting Saudi Arabia.
Türkiye had earlier “strongly” condemned Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and reaffirmed its support for the Kingdom’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also condemned Houthi attacks targeting civilian and energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, describing them as a “cowardly attack”.
The Financial Times reported that Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, had urged Iran to work to restrain Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, referring in his discussions to the mutual defence agreement with Riyadh.
What Does the Makkah Agreement Provide?
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan signed a joint defence agreement in August, bringing Türkiye into an earlier Saudi-Pakistani defence arrangement signed in 2025.
The agreement does not specify exactly what military action the other two countries must undertake if one member is attacked.
It does not, for example, explicitly require the deployment of ground forces, fighter aircraft or strikes against the source of an attack.
This leaves significant ambiguity over what activating the agreement would mean in practice and gives each state room to determine the nature and extent of its military contribution.
Has Pakistan Defended Saudi Arabia Before?
Saudi-Pakistani military cooperation predates the Makkah Agreement by decades, although the relationship has also experienced periods of disagreement and Pakistani reluctance to become involved in regional conflicts.
The military partnership dates back to 1967, when the two countries signed their first security cooperation agreement, allowing Pakistan to provide military advisers and pilots to Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan’s subsequent record shows a recurring pattern: Islamabad has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to contribute to Saudi defence while remaining much more cautious about joining offensive regional wars.
The 1969 Al-Wadiah War
Pakistan sent combat forces to Saudi Arabia after fighting broke out between the Kingdom and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1969 over the Al-Wadiah border post.
The conflict began after Yemeni forces attacked the post and ended with a Saudi victory and Riyadh retaining control of the border position.
The 1979 Juhayman Siege
Pakistan also sent an elite military unit to assist in efforts to end the siege of the Grand Mosque in Makkah by the group led by Juhayman al-Otaybi in 1979.
The episode remains one of the clearest historical examples of Pakistani military involvement linked directly to the security of Saudi Arabia and the holy sites.
The Iran-Iraq War
After the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980, Islamabad sent tens of thousands of soldiers to Saudi Arabia for security and training purposes.
Those forces, however, refused to fight alongside Iraq against Iran despite pressure from both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The decision illustrated the distinction Pakistan has historically attempted to maintain between protecting Saudi territory and entering conflicts against other regional states.
The 1990 Gulf War
Pakistan later participated in the multinational coalition formed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and Baghdad’s refusal to withdraw its forces.
Pakistani troops were assigned security and defensive responsibilities and did not participate in offensive combat operations.
Again, Pakistan supported Saudi and Gulf security while limiting the scope of its direct involvement in the war.
The 2015 Turning Point
That distinction became particularly clear in 2015.
Saudi Arabia requested Pakistani participation with aircraft, naval forces and ground troops in the military campaign known as Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen.
Pakistan refused.
The Pakistani parliament rejected the Saudi request and called on Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s government to respect its decision, while reaffirming Pakistan’s commitment to defending Saudi territory without becoming a participant in the Yemen war.
Parliament stated: “Pakistan should maintain neutrality in the Yemen conflict so that it can play an effective diplomatic role in ending the crisis.”
The decision demonstrated that Islamabad considered the defence of Saudi Arabia fundamentally different from participation in Saudi-led military operations inside Yemen.
Relations Under Imran Khan
Saudi-Pakistani relations experienced significant tension in 2020 during the government of Imran Khan.
The dispute followed what Pakistan viewed as Saudi reluctance to support Islamabad over Kashmir after India revoked the special constitutional status of Indian-administered Kashmir in 2019, amid concerns in Riyadh over its economic and political interests with New Delhi.
Pakistan’s then foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, warned the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation that if it failed to convene a meeting on Kashmir, Islamabad would no longer wait and would organise a conference outside the organisation’s framework.
As relations deteriorated, Saudi Arabia demanded that Pakistan repay $1 billion from a concessional loan ahead of schedule.
Pakistan subsequently confirmed that it had returned another $1 billion instalment from a $3 billion concessional Saudi loan, while Islamabad sought a commercial loan from Beijing to ease what was described as Saudi financial pressure.
Saudi economic support for Pakistan was later restored, still during Imran Khan’s government.
Observers at the time argued that the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan and growing cooperation between India and China were among the factors that prompted Riyadh to reassess its calculations.
The 2025 Mutual Defence Agreement
In 2025, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed a strategic mutual defence agreement.
According to a statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency, the agreement was intended to strengthen the security of both countries, contribute to regional and global peace, develop defence cooperation and reinforce mutual deterrence against aggression.
The agreement stated that “any aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both”.
Türkiye’s subsequent inclusion through the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement expanded this framework into a trilateral arrangement.
The question now is how far those commitments extend as Saudi Arabia faces renewed Houthi attacks.
Pakistan’s previous military record suggests that Islamabad has traditionally been more willing to defend Saudi territory, strategic facilities and the Two Holy Mosques than to participate in offensive campaigns inside Yemen.
The latest statements from senior Pakistani officials therefore do not necessarily indicate that Pakistani forces are preparing to attack Ansar Allah directly.
They do, however, suggest that if Saudi Arabia formally invokes its defence commitments and requests assistance, Islamabad may be moving closer to translating the Makkah Agreement from a diplomatic pledge into an operational military commitment.
