In a military assessment of developments on Lebanon’s southern front, retired Brigadier General Elias Hanna told Al Jazeera that the Israeli army’s announcement that it had taken control of the Ali al-Taher Heights falls under the concept of “operational control” rather than full tactical occupation.
Hanna explained that operational control means isolating the hill and the surrounding high ground, including the nearby Dabsha Hill, across an area of approximately five square kilometres, while cutting it off by fire from Hezbollah’s supply lines and preventing movement into or out of the area. This effectively removes the position from the equation of direct battlefield influence.
He said the central challenge lies in what exists “beneath and inside the hill”, including tunnel networks and command centres whose true extent may still not be fully known to the Israeli army.
According to Hanna, the ultimate test of actual control would require Israeli forces to physically penetrate deeper into the position and engage at “point-blank range” with anyone remaining inside.
The Strategic Weight of Ali al-Taher
Hanna said the Ali al-Taher Heights had represented a major stronghold within what Hezbollah calls its “Badr Sector”, providing a vital connection with the Khiam Plain.
The position also offers commanding oversight of the Galilee Panhandle and settlements including Kiryat Shmona, while exposing villages in the Nabatieh district such as Kfar Remman, Kfar Tibnit and Mayfadoun.
Hanna said Israel is seeking to connect Ali al-Taher with the heights surrounding Shaqif Castle to create an integrated security system combining observation posts, surveillance and interception capabilities, and the ability to deliver fire into surrounding areas.
The objective, he argued, is to push the battlefield deeper into Lebanese territory.
A “Systemic War” Against the Entire Environment
Hanna described the ongoing military campaign as a form of “systemic warfare”, a doctrine based on destroying the entire environment that sustains an opponent’s ability to operate.
He said the level of comprehensive destruction has exceeded 95 per cent within a 600-square-kilometre buffer strip, while destruction in the area between that zone and the Litani River has reached approximately 75 per cent.
According to Hanna, the objective is to deprive Hezbollah of the infrastructure and environment required to rebuild its capacity to fight.
From Hezbollah’s Old Model to “Hezbollah 2.0”
Hanna also linked the growing geopolitical importance of Ali al-Taher to Iranian threats concerning the position, while pointing to the timing of battlefield developments alongside intensified US diplomatic activity and visits by American envoys to Israel.
He concluded that Hezbollah’s conventional battlefield capabilities have significantly declined and that the movement is increasingly transforming into what he called “Hezbollah 2.0”, a model relying almost entirely on guerrilla warfare tactics.
Under this new asymmetric warfare model, Hanna said the loss of Ali al-Taher would constitute a major blow to Hezbollah, although it would also fit the emerging pattern of combat in which the group increasingly relies on decentralised guerrilla operations rather than conventional defensive positions.
