Israel is continuing to send messages to both Damascus and Ankara through the Syrian arena.
After Israeli officials openly said that last Tuesday’s strike on Abu al-Duhur military airport in eastern Idlib countryside, north-western Syria, near the Turkish border, was intended as a message to Ankara, Israeli media reported on Thursday that security officials were threatening further attacks on Syria if Damascus “does not understand the Israeli messages from the latest strike”.
Israel’s Channel 12 quoted the officials as saying that Israel had set “clear” limits for both Damascus and Ankara through its strikes on Abu al-Duhur airport.
The Israeli strikes on the airport, which has been out of service for more than a decade, have raised further questions after Tel Aviv claimed that Syria was preparing to allow Turkish forces to deploy there.
Israeli officials subsequently escalated their rhetoric against Ankara, saying they would not permit any Turkish military presence in Syria.
This has brought renewed attention to the limits of confrontation for both Ankara and Damascus, which continue to stress that they do not want to be drawn into escalation.
Türkiye denied on Thursday that it had any military presence at the airport and stressed that its military cooperation with the Syrian government would continue.
Syria, meanwhile, appears to have more limited options. Axios reported on Wednesday evening that Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani had told the administration of US President Donald Trump that Syria’s primary objective was to communicate its position and concerns while preventing escalation.
Amid these developments, Washington’s increasingly open posture towards Damascus and the developing relationship between Ankara and Washington have also become significant factors.
Tom Barrack, the US envoy to Syria and Iraq and Washington’s ambassador to Ankara, previously held Israel responsible for the attack on the airport and described the strikes as an “unnecessary escalation” that could obstruct efforts to establish stability.
Ankara’s Interest in Avoiding Escalation
Although Turkish responses have so far remained within diplomatic norms, stronger rhetoric from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan may follow.
Political disputes and mutual escalation between Türkiye and Israel have continued for months, but attention remains focused on developments on the ground as Israel adopts increasingly hardline positions and Türkiye insists that it will continue military cooperation with Damascus.
Despite Ankara’s repeated emphasis on avoiding escalation, Erdoğan outlined the boundaries of Türkiye’s approach to Israel more than two months ago when he said that Ankara’s security begins in Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has also repeatedly argued that Israel needs an enemy in order to sustain itself and views Türkiye as a future adversary.
Nevertheless, Ankara’s interests remain tied to stability and the avoidance of escalation.
Türkiye has sought to support that objective through alliances, including its membership in NATO and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia at the end of last month, amid efforts to bring additional countries into the pact.
Even so, current developments reveal limits to an Israeli confrontation with Türkiye.
There have already been Israeli reservations about potential roles for Turkish forces in the Gaza Strip, while Syria increasingly appears to be the direct arena in which competition between the two sides is playing out.
This is particularly significant because, after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in late 2024, Israel left Syria without air defences.
Among a series of Israeli strikes since then, the occupation targeted the T4 airbase in Homs province in central Syria in April 2025, amid reports that the strikes hit military equipment supplied by Türkiye and air-defence radar systems.
At the same time, Türkiye has been pursuing a major military build-up centred on its defence industries.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has previously called on the United States not to sell F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, in order to preserve Israel’s air superiority in the region.
Marwa Suna Özal Özcan, a faculty member in the Department of International Relations at Kırıkkale University in Türkiye, told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Ankara’s response was highly significant, particularly because the Turkish Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the attack.
She also pointed to the importance of Washington describing the attack as an escalation of tensions, while the Trump administration’s new policy towards Syria was becoming increasingly aligned with Ankara’s core objectives.
“Deterrence does not always depend on the direct use of force,” she said. “It also involves demonstrating the ability to use it when necessary.”
Özcan added that if Israel were to move in a direction that directly threatened Türkiye’s security, Ankara could invoke Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which provides for emergency consultations with other members.
Such a step, she said, could push allies to adopt political positions and strengthen defensive measures on NATO’s south-eastern flank.
She argued that, in addition to NATO, Türkiye’s role as a stabilising force in the region, as well as the new regional balance and security structure formed with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia under the Mecca Agreement, required careful consideration.
Competition Without Direct War
Syrian People’s Assembly member for Aleppo Tariq Slo Jawzi told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that the recent increase in hostile Israeli rhetoric towards Türkiye, particularly regarding Syria, was driven by two main factors.
“The first is Israel’s unwillingness to see a stable and strong Syrian administration emerge, and the second is its discomfort with the Turkish military and political presence in Syria,” he said.
Jawzi expected competition and tension between Türkiye and Israel in Syria to continue in the coming period.
However, he said that this did not necessarily mean the two countries would slide into direct military confrontation because both were aware of the risks of an open conflict.
“In my view, the competition will remain within the framework of managing influence and deterrence balances rather than developing into a comprehensive military confrontation,” he said.
He added that Türkiye maintains that its presence in Syria is linked to its national security, combating terrorist organisations, and supporting Syria’s stability and territorial unity.
At the same time, he said, the Syrian state does not want to become an arena for conflict or a collection of spheres of influence divided among foreign powers, but instead seeks to extend its sovereignty.
According to Jawzi, Türkiye could help Syria rebuild, while a strategic cooperation and defence agreement could strengthen Syrian defensive capabilities and act as a deterrent against violations or military operations targeting Syrian territory.
Turkish journalist Ismail Göktan also told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that he did not believe the current international political system would allow a direct Turkish-Israeli clash.
He argued that after the fall of the Assad government, which he said had long served as a wall between Türkiye and Israel, “the criminal government in Tel Aviv began to feel more strongly the arrival of Turkish influence in the region”.
Göktan said Israeli statements were aimed at creating a form of deterrence towards Ankara.
He added that Türkiye possesses almost all of the military equipment needed to defend itself against regional or international threats, including from Israel, and continues to develop its military capabilities.
Syria Faces a Complex Dilemma
Khaled Khalil, an expert on Syrian-Israeli relations, told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Syria faces a complex, multi-dimensional security dilemma because of Israeli violations.
The challenge, he said, is simultaneously security-related, military, economic, political and even existential.
According to Khalil, Syria entered negotiations with Israel on the basis of political realism, clarity and clearly defined red lines.
These include a full Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before 8 December 2024 and a return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, which he described as the international legal framework governing relations between Syria and Israel.
He said this had led Syria to activate political, diplomatic and legal pressure.
Israel, by contrast, relies on tense and military approaches while disregarding geopolitical, economic and other considerations, Khalil argued.
He said this approach was in conflict not only with regional consensus but even with US regional visions.
Syrian politician Ayman Abdel Nour, who is based in the United States, said Israel’s recent actions and the bombing of Abu al-Duhur airport were not limited to containing Syrian military capabilities.
He told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Israel does not feel secure, particularly in relation to air power, despite the age and technological limitations of Syrian aircraft.
Abdel Nour also linked the escalation to the Israeli elections due in October, arguing that Netanyahu wants to enter the election campaign claiming that his government has preserved Israeli security.
He added that “Israel could not have carried out the strike on the airport without American approval”.
Abdel Nour said the Syrian government should strengthen its position by building relationships with friendly countries, particularly the United States, while also strengthening the economy.
Could Russia Play a Balancing Role?
Looking back to the situation before the fall of Assad’s government, Syrian political analyst Mahmoud al-Hamza told Al-Araby Al-Jadeed that Syria’s relationship with the Israeli occupation remains highly sensitive and requires careful judgement.
He said the Syrian leadership had so far adopted a wise and appropriate policy because it did not seek to provoke Israel while continuing to issue statements that expressed a clear and explicit political position.
On Russia’s potential role in balancing relations between Syria and Israel, Hamza said the opening between Syria’s new administration and Moscow had been positive.
Russia, he argued, remains indispensable as a major power whose presence in the region helps preserve a strategic geopolitical balance with the West in the Middle East and Syria.
He said Russia could potentially play a role in Syrian-Israeli relations, including by deploying military patrols in southern Syria, given its open and strong relations with Israel.
