Reports published by The New York Times, Axios and The Times have revealed a broad, multi-track US diplomatic effort aimed at reviving some of the most complex files in the Middle East, foremost among them the future of Gaza and the Israeli-Palestinian war, while simultaneously seeking to keep channels of communication open with Iran.
Although the issues differ, the three reports paint a similar picture of President Donald Trump’s administration: one that relies heavily on back channels, unconventional intermediaries and direct contact with the real centres of power rather than limiting itself to formal diplomatic channels.
The New York Times places Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and close adviser, at the centre of US efforts to rescue the president’s Gaza plan. Kushner met leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, in Egypt in an attempt to revive the stalled agreement, particularly on the issues of disarmament, Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.
The Times presented a broader version of the same effort, reporting that Kushner was joined by former British prime minister Tony Blair and Nikolay Mladenov, the representative of the “Board of Peace”.
Kushner at the Centre of the Gaza Effort
Following the Cairo meetings, Kushner and Blair were expected to travel to Jerusalem to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
This is where the central crisis emerges.
Hamas says it is committed in principle to disarmament and to handing the administration of Gaza to a Palestinian technocratic government, but it has not clearly specified the quantity or types of weapons it would surrender.
Israel, meanwhile, insists on effective disarmament before any military withdrawal.
According to The Times, Kushner tried to convince Hamas that it must take concrete steps because Israel does not trust commitments alone. He reportedly explained that the United States would seek to push Israel towards reciprocal measures if Hamas demonstrated genuine progress.
Both newspapers identify the same central obstacle in the Gaza plan.
The agreement is supposed to move from a ceasefire into a political phase involving the disarmament of armed factions, the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the establishment of a new Palestinian administration and the launch of reconstruction.
Israel and Hamas, however, disagree over the sequencing of those measures.
According to the reports, Israel does not want a gradual withdrawal that would allow Hamas or other armed groups to retain their weapons inside Gaza.
Washington’s proposed formula instead involves a gradual and parallel process in which Hamas takes steps towards disarmament in exchange for Israeli measures, particularly on withdrawal.
Kushner’s visit, therefore, is not simply an attempt to hold talks with Hamas. It forms part of a broader effort to find a formula under which each side can make concessions without believing it has lost politically or militarily.
Netanyahu Represents the Other Major Obstacle
The New York Times and The Times also identify Netanyahu as the other side of the difficult equation facing Trump’s plan.
He rejected the revised version of the proposal, but left the door open to discussing some elements of it with the United States.
The reports suggest that his position is shaped not only by security considerations but also by domestic political calculations, particularly as Israeli elections approach.
The Trump administration therefore faces two simultaneous tasks.
The first is to convince Hamas that it must move first and demonstrate that it is serious about disarmament.
The second is to convince Netanyahu that reciprocal Israeli steps would not endanger Israel’s security.
This explains why the Cairo talks with Hamas and the planned meetings with Netanyahu were part of the same diplomatic effort.
Washington Seeks the Real Decision-Makers in Iran
Axios, meanwhile, revealed an apparently different diplomatic track that nevertheless reflects the same underlying approach.
During negotiations with Iran, the Trump administration sought to determine whether Iran’s official negotiators actually represented the position of the country’s most influential power centre, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
When Washington began to doubt whether parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi had sufficient authority to conclude a final agreement, the administration turned to a direct back channel with the Revolutionary Guard leadership.
The problem facing Trump’s strategy is not the absence of communication channels, but the difficulty of turning those contacts into enforceable agreements.
Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, emerged as an intermediary with close relations with both sides.
According to Axios, Tulsi Gabbard, who was serving as Director of National Intelligence, contacted Barzani with the approval of Trump and Vice President JD Vance.
She asked him to determine the position of Revolutionary Guard commander General Ahmad Vahidi towards the negotiations.
The Barzani Channel
Barzani succeeded in reaching Vahidi, who confirmed his support for negotiations and his desire to resolve the crisis through diplomacy.
Barzani then relayed the response to Gabbard, who in turn informed the White House.
The importance of the Axios report lies in what it reveals about the method being used by the Trump administration across the region.
In Iran, Washington concluded that the official negotiator was not necessarily the real decision-maker, so it searched for a direct line to the actual centre of power.
In Gaza, the administration is doing something similar through different means.
It is not relying solely on traditional mediators. Instead, it is using Kushner, Blair, Egypt, Qatar and the Board of Peace to communicate directly with Hamas’s leadership before moving on to Netanyahu.
The emerging principle of US policy is therefore straightforward: reach the person or institution capable of making the actual decision, even if that means operating outside normal diplomatic channels.
The central problem facing Trump’s strategy is not the lack of access.
Washington can reach Hamas, the Revolutionary Guard, the Israeli government and regional intermediaries. But reaching those actors does not necessarily mean being able to persuade them to compromise.
In Gaza specifically, the next phase will depend on a particularly sensitive question: can Hamas provide practical evidence of disarmament, and can Washington in return persuade Netanyahu to make parallel concessions without those measures being portrayed as a threat to Israel’s security?
If both sides fail to resolve that equation, Trump’s plan will remain suspended between a fragile ceasefire and an unfinished political settlement.
If the back channels succeed in building sufficient trust, however, the meetings in Cairo and Jerusalem could become the starting point for the second phase of the Gaza plan rather than another attempt to rescue an agreement approaching collapse.
