Debate is growing within Iranian political and strategic circles over whether the country should continue limiting itself to the threshold of nuclear weapons capability, as Tehran increasingly reassesses the deterrence doctrine it has relied on for decades against regional and international adversaries.
According to a research report by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, strikes that damaged several of Iran’s allies and proxies across the Middle East, together with the resulting decline in the effectiveness of Iran’s deterrence network, have prompted circles inside Tehran to reconsider the nuclear strategy pursued over recent decades.
The institute said the debate inside Iran has become deeper and more public than before, with growing questions over whether remaining at the “nuclear threshold” still provides Tehran with sufficient protection and deterrence.
From Nuclear Threshold to Nuclear Weapon?
Israeli researcher Raz Zimmt wrote in the report that Iran has for years pursued a strategy of developing advanced nuclear and technological capabilities that bring it close to possessing a nuclear weapon without taking the final step of openly producing a bomb.
The policy is based on building a broad foundation of knowledge, expertise, infrastructure and technical capabilities that would allow Tehran, if a political decision were made, to move relatively quickly towards producing a nuclear weapon.
At the same time, Iran has maintained a degree of separation from openly declaring possession of a bomb, giving it political and diplomatic room to avoid the consequences that could follow a formal transition to nuclear weapons status.
According to the Israeli report, however, recent regional developments have reopened debate over whether this strategy can remain viable.
Weakened Deterrence Changes Iran’s Calculations
The report links the intensifying nuclear debate inside Iran to what it describes as a decline in the effectiveness of Iranian deterrence following strikes against Tehran’s allies and proxies in the region.
The Institute for National Security Studies argues that weakening this regional network may lead some Iranian decision-makers to reassess the assumptions underpinning the country’s nuclear policy, particularly the belief that possessing the capability to reach nuclear weapons status without actually acquiring a weapon can be sufficient to deter adversaries.
Under this view, the question being discussed inside Iran is no longer limited to how Tehran can preserve its position at the nuclear threshold. It increasingly extends to whether actually possessing a nuclear weapon could become necessary to compensate for the weakening of more conventional deterrence tools.
A Decades-Old Strategy Under Review
These discussions come against the backdrop of Iran’s long-standing strategy of developing domestic nuclear capabilities while avoiding an open declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons.
This approach has allowed Tehran to strengthen its scientific and technical capabilities while preserving the option of changing course in the future if the political leadership decides to do so.
The Israeli institute’s report suggests that increasing security pressures and changes in the regional environment could prompt a reassessment of this equation, particularly if Iranian circles conclude that latent nuclear capabilities alone are no longer sufficient to prevent adversaries from striking Iran or reducing its regional influence.
At the same time, the growing debate does not mean, based on the information presented in the report, that Iran has made a final decision to move towards producing a nuclear weapon. Rather, it reflects an internal reassessment of Iran’s nuclear strategy and the continued usefulness of remaining at threshold status.
The Israeli assessment warns that if Iran’s deterrence continues to weaken, the option of acquiring a nuclear weapon could become more prominent in strategic discussions in Tehran, after decades in which maintaining the capability to reach that point without crossing the threshold remained the preferred policy.
