In the six years following the signing of the normalisation agreements in September 2020, military cooperation between the United Arab Emirates and “Israel” progressed from the establishment of formal channels between arms companies to joint military exercises, development projects and maintenance programmes.
After the Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, that cooperation accelerated towards air defence, long-range reconnaissance, communications interception and electronic warfare.
Leaked internal emails from Elbit Systems, one of the largest Israeli defence companies, have exposed part of this phase of cooperation, which largely unfolded outside official announcements.
Details relating to the UAE were first made public on 22 July 2026 through an investigation by Drop Site News. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz then published an additional investigation on 3 August, expanding the scope of what the documents revealed.
The correspondence included Emirati requests and proposals involving Hermes 900 drones, wide-area aerial surveillance systems, communications interception and electronic warfare payloads, crewed and uncrewed intelligence aircraft, loitering munitions and bunker-busting bombs.
The projects ranged from preliminary marketing approvals and commercial proposals to drafts reportedly ready for signature, contracts publicly announced in the name of the UAE Armed Forces, and air defence systems that informed sources and satellite imagery suggested had been deployed inside the country.
Taken together, the documents reveal an integrated network involving surveillance, early warning, interception, data analysis, maintenance, training and industrial localisation, with functions extending from the Gulf and Yemen to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
What Do the Leaks Reveal About Emirati Requests?
The leaked materials were published on 12 April 2026 by Distributed Denial of Secrets, known as DDoSecrets, a US-based non-profit platform that archives leaked documents and datasets.
The archive was titled “Vered Haimovich Emails” and, according to the platform, contained nearly 55,000 emails exceeding 14 gigabytes in size. They were linked to a personal account belonging to Haimovich, who became head of Elbit’s unmanned aircraft systems business unit in January 2021.
DDoSecrets said it received the material from the Handala hacking group, which security reports have linked to Iranian cyber operations.
Elbit said the published material “does not accurately reflect the company’s commercial activities” and declined to discuss the identities of clients or details of negotiations.
Drop Site News said it verified cryptographic signatures connected to the email address, compared non-public contact information and examined internal files relating to Elbit Systems Emirates.
These steps support the authenticity of key parts of the correspondence. However, confirmation that the projects were implemented still depends on independent evidence such as contracts, purchase orders or delivery records.
The Hermes 900 Project
The Hermes 900 project occupied a central place in the documents.
The correspondence began with preliminary approval in November 2021 allowing Elbit to market a reconnaissance version of the drone. By March 2022, this had developed into an urgent Emirati request that included the SkyEye wide-area aerial surveillance system.
The proposals ranged from an initial package of six aircraft to a broader vision involving 45 drones.
The successive stages explain the differences in numbers and prices.
A March 2022 memorandum referred to five systems comprising 15 aircraft. An April proposal covered two systems comprising six aircraft, with a base value of $154 million, rising to approximately $225 million with options.
A later proposal envisioned 15 systems and 45 aircraft.
The available information contains no final purchase order, shipping record or serial numbers proving that Hermes 900 drones were delivered to the UAE.
Descriptions of the draft as ready for signature, or of the project as an “urgent operational requirement”, establish the stage reached in Elbit’s internal negotiations but do not confirm that the project moved into implementation.
The correspondence linked the project to monitoring areas beyond the UAE’s borders, detecting signs of missile and drone launches, observing large areas for extended periods and protecting sensitive facilities.
The proposed configurations included day and night electro-optical sensors, laser designators, ground control stations, cellular communications interception payloads, electronic warfare systems and self-protection equipment.
Among these was the Light SPEAR system, which is designed to protect unmanned aircraft against radar, missiles and jamming.
The emails also discussed the possibility of marketing the SkyStriker loitering munition, which searches for a target before attacking it, and the MPR-2000 bunker-busting bomb.
No contracts, invoices or delivery documents connected to the UAE appeared in relation to either weapon.
Project Johan and Other Intelligence Programmes
The requests expanded to include an airborne intelligence programme codenamed “Johan”.
The proposal involved two crewed aircraft and two uncrewed aircraft for collecting communications, signals and imagery intelligence.
Its intended capabilities included intercepting cellular and satellite communications, conducting electronic attacks, cyber surveillance and artificial intelligence-assisted analysis.
The programme remained within lists of requirements and exchanged technical responses, with an initial schedule extending 42 months from the possible signing of a contract.
In March 2023, Elbit submitted a proposal to the UAE involving the Hermes 650 drone, nearly a year before the aircraft was publicly unveiled.
The drone could be equipped with signals intelligence and electronic warfare payloads and linked to SkyStriker munitions and Orbiter drones produced by Aeronautics, an Israeli company owned by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.
Another project, named “Yasmin 3”, referred to the production of 6,000 “kits” within three months, without explaining the nature of those kits or identifying the end user.
Some media interpretations linked them to conversion kits used to turn conventional bombs into guided munitions.
How the Houthi Attacks Accelerated Air Defence Cooperation
Institutional cooperation had begun before the attacks on Abu Dhabi.
In March 2021, the Emirati state-owned defence group EDGE, through its electronic warfare subsidiary SIGN4L, signed an agreement with Israel Aerospace Industries, known as IAI, to develop a counter-drone system.
The system was designed to combine radar, optical sensors, frequency interception, jamming, electronic deception and direct interception capabilities.
In the following months, Emirati artificial intelligence company G42 and Rafael launched a data analysis project.
The commander of the UAE Air Force visited “Israel” to observe the Blue Flag exercises, while naval forces from Abu Dhabi, “Tel Aviv”, Manama and the US Fifth Fleet participated in an exercise in the Red Sea.
Cooperation acquired a permanent local structure in November 2021 with the establishment of an Elbit branch in the UAE.
EDGE and IAI also agreed to develop an uncrewed surface vessel and establish a maintenance centre for electro-optical payloads.
On 3 January 2022, Elbit Systems Emirates announced a $53 million contract to protect the UAE’s Airbus A330 MRTT aerial refuelling and strategic transport aircraft.
The package included the J-MUSIC directed infrared countermeasure system, known as DIRCM, alongside a missile warning system and electronic warfare equipment.
On 17 January 2022, fuel storage facilities near Abu Dhabi and an area under construction at the airport were attacked in an operation claimed by the Houthis.
Three people were killed and six others were wounded.
According to an analysis published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British research centre specialising in security and defence, the attack wave involved a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft.
This placed the existing cooperation framework under immediate operational pressure.
Gaps in the UAE’s Defensive Architecture
The principal defensive gap concerned the simultaneous handling of threats with different altitudes, speeds and radar signatures.
The US-made THAAD system is designed to intercept ballistic missiles at high altitudes, while Patriot systems provide an additional interception layer.
Cruise missiles and small, slow-moving drones, however, require radars, interception systems and jamming equipment capable of detecting targets flying close to the ground.
The day after the attack, then Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett offered security and intelligence support to the then crown prince of Abu Dhabi and current president, Mohammed bin Zayed.
Israeli military officials subsequently visited the UAE to discuss its requirements.
Several weeks later, Elbit correspondence described the Emirati client as being under pressure and seeking to close the Hermes 900 project quickly.
The Green Pine radar, which is linked to the Arrow ballistic missile interception system, entered discussions concerning long-range early warning.
Rafael’s SPYDER system, IAI’s Barak system and Skylock systems also emerged as part of efforts to counter drones, cruise missiles and low-flying targets.
The chief executive of Skylock said the UAE had purchased and deployed one of the company’s systems before the attacks, then requested additional equipment rapidly afterwards.
He did not disclose the number of systems, their value or deployment locations.
On 22 September 2022, Reuters cited four informed sources as saying that “Israel” had approved an Emirati request for the SPYDER system.
Satellite imagery later showed equipment near Al Dhafra Air Base that Tactical Report, a defence intelligence service, interpreted as two Barak system launchers accompanied by an EL/M-2084 radar.
The available evidence suggests the presence of two separate defensive pathways or layers.
However, the number of batteries, their ownership, duration of deployment and operating authority were not officially disclosed.
The slow initial US response to the attacks also reinforced Abu Dhabi’s effort to diversify its suppliers and add Israeli and South Korean systems to its existing American defence architecture.
From Individual Deals to an Arms, Intelligence and Industrial Network
The accumulated projects reveal a network that begins with surveillance and intelligence gathering through Hermes drones, SkyEye, radar systems, electro-optical sensors and communications interception.
It then moves to the analysis of imagery, signals and radar data using artificial intelligence, followed by jamming, self-protection and interception through systems including SPYDER, Barak and Skylock.
The establishment of Elbit Systems Emirates became a central element of this structure.
It provided a permanent channel for negotiation, customisation, maintenance, training and cooperation with local companies.
This structure also includes the electro-optical payload maintenance centre, the uncrewed vessel project, technology transfer plans, local production and marketing to third-country markets.
Cooperation became more public during the International Defence Exhibition and Conference, IDEX, in Abu Dhabi in February 2023.
The Israeli Ministry of Defence opened its first pavilion at the exhibition, with more than 30 companies presenting air defence systems, radars, drones, electronic warfare equipment and cyber technologies.
In January 2025, EDGE announced a $10 million investment for a 30 per cent stake in ThirdEye Systems, an Israeli company developing artificial intelligence-powered electro-optical sensors for detecting drones and other targets.
The agreement included an additional $12 million investment in a joint venture controlled by EDGE and targeting markets in the UAE and other countries.
Completion of the deal remained subject to Israeli approvals and institutional procedures.
The $2.3 Billion Elbit Contract
On 17 November 2025, Elbit announced that it had signed a $2.3 billion contract with an unnamed international customer to provide a “strategic solution” over eight years.
Intelligence Online, which specialises in intelligence and defence affairs, and Israeli financial reports identified the UAE as the customer.
The confrontation with Iran in 2026 provided an indication that the relationship had moved towards direct operational cooperation.
On 26 April, the US news site Axios cited Israeli and American officials as saying that “Israel” had sent an Iron Dome system and operating crews to the UAE and had shared real-time information with it during the war.
No official details were published regarding the duration of the deployment or the rules governing its operation.
Cooperation Across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa
The relationship also extends to the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.
A publicly announced naval exercise brought together the UAE, “Israel”, Bahrain and the US Fifth Fleet.
The jointly developed uncrewed vessel was designed for reconnaissance, coastal protection, mine countermeasures and anti-submarine warfare.
On 6 July 2026, the French newspaper Le Monde published an investigation into the expansion of military facilities in Berbera, in the separatist territory of Somaliland.
The investigation linked the facilities to Emirati cooperation with the United States and “Israel”.
Other reports addressed the appearance of an Israeli EL/M-2084 radar in Bosaso during 2025.
Internal Surveillance Capabilities
Some of the proposed capabilities also carry functions relevant to domestic surveillance inside the UAE.
Technologies capable of intercepting cellular communications, analysing wide-area surveillance recordings and combining imagery with mobile phone data can be used to monitor borders, facilities and armed networks.
Technically, these systems can also be extended to monitor residents and communications within cities.
The phrase “internal security” appeared in some Hermes-related materials, while the Emirati authority responsible for the Johan programme remained unidentified.
Arms Exports Following Normalisation
Figures from the Israeli Ministry of Defence illustrate the size of the market opened to Israeli arms companies by the normalisation agreements.
The combined value of export agreements with Abraham Accords countries, including the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco, reached approximately $790 million in 2021.
It then rose to nearly $3 billion in 2022, fell to $393 million in 2023, climbed to around $1.775 billion in 2024 and reached $2.88 billion in 2025.
The total value of these agreements between 2021 and 2025 was approximately $8.83 billion.
No official breakdown identifies the UAE’s individual share.
The $53 million aircraft protection contract remains the clearest publicly announced agreement made in the name of the UAE Armed Forces.
The Hermes 900 proposals, however, remain outside the category of confirmed contracts, while the values of the SPYDER, Barak and Skylock systems remain unknown.
Elbit’s $2.3 billion contract represents the largest unresolved element in the figures.
If the UAE was the customer and the amount was recorded under 2025 exports to Abraham Accords countries, the contract would represent approximately 80 per cent of the group’s exports to those countries that year.
The customer’s identity and the accounting method used for the multi-year contract remain undisclosed.
A Long-Term Military and Intelligence Partnership
The overall picture shows that Emirati-Israeli relations have moved beyond formal agreements and joint companies into a structure combining reconnaissance, communications interception, air defence, maintenance, investment and operational cooperation.
The Houthi attacks accelerated this process and tied it to specific requirements, particularly monitoring launch areas beyond the UAE’s borders, protecting sensitive facilities and countering drones and cruise missiles.
A considerable gap remains between the scale of the programmes discussed internally by companies and the projects confirmed as implemented.
However, publicly announced contracts, local branches, military exercises, investments and the apparent deployment of air defence equipment visible in satellite imagery indicate that the relationship has moved beyond diplomatic normalisation into a long-term military, intelligence and industrial network.
