The escalating war between the United States and Iran is no longer about Tehran’s nuclear programme, nor even about regime change, the objective that initially drove Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s campaign to draw US President Donald Trump into the conflict.
It is now a struggle for control over the Strait of Hormuz.
After the first month of war, Iran found itself in an unexpectedly advantageous position, having secured de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz. Controlling the world’s most critical energy chokepoint enables Tehran to influence global oil prices and, by extension, pressure the US economy and shape Washington’s political calculus.
This constitutes the Islamic Republic’s most formidable strategic deterrent against the US and Israel in decades. It is precisely this advantage that Washington is now fighting tooth and nail to wrest from Iran.
The latest round of conflict began after a memorandum of understanding was signed by Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The agreement heavily favoured Iran, with Article 5 explicitly granting it the authority to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels”. Tehran then designated a commercial shipping corridor entirely within its territorial waters.
Three days after the deal was signed, on 20 June, the US-backed Joint Maritime Information Centre announced that commercial vessels could transit the Strait of Hormuz under US guidance via the southern route, directly challenging Iran’s newly acquired leverage. Tehran declared that Washington had violated Article 5 of the memorandum by interfering with its responsibility to ensure the safe passage of ships.
From Tehran’s perspective, the move aimed to strip Iran of de facto control over the strait by diverting shipping to the southern channel, beyond its effective reach, thus nullifying Hormuz as a source of geopolitical leverage. Iran responded by targeting commercial vessels, prompting the US to intervene.
War of attrition
The central question now is whether either Iran or the US can sustain a prolonged war of attrition without incurring prohibitive costs.
A recent analysis by NourNews, the mouthpiece of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, argues that Washington has shifted from seeking a rapid military victory to a strategy of attrition aimed at eroding Iran’s military capabilities, economic resilience and societal cohesion. It argues that Tehran must avoid passive defense and impose greater costs on the US and its regional allies.
This counter strategy, however, carries profound risks on at least three fronts.
Firstly, the domestic economic outlook is deteriorating rapidly, with the inflation rate in Iran soaring past 88 percent last month. Economist Masoud Nili, a former presidential adviser, has warned that Iran could enter a period of hyperinflation, citing Venezuela as a cautionary example: “Four months ago, no province had triple-digit inflation. Last month, there were 11.”
The labour market is under similar strain. According to some estimates, between three and 4.5 million Iranians have lost their jobs because of the war. Together with collapsing living standards, these pressures substantially increase the likelihood of another wave of violent anti-government protests, particularly among younger Iranians.
Secondly, the war could progressively devastate Iran’s critical infrastructure. That danger has grown since Trump adopted what amounts to a “bridge for a ship” strategy, threatening to retaliate for every Iranian attack on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by destroying a bridge or power plant.
A prolonged exchange could ultimately render large parts of Iran’s critical infrastructure inoperable, making the country effectively ungovernable.
Thirdly, Tehran’s insistence on continuing to target commercial vessels transiting Omani waters fails a basic test of strategic logic. The attacks have already demonstrated Iran’s ability to disrupt one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, thus establishing strategic deterrence. Why continue attacking commercial shipping when doing so risks unnecessary escalation?
Strategic paradox
Trump also faces significant constraints in sustaining a prolonged war of attrition. Despite the bellicose rhetoric emerging from his administration, mounting evidence suggests that the US lacks the resources for an expanded military campaign against Iran, with a US official telling the Washington Post: “We do not have enough [air defense and long-range munitions] to safely sustain operations, and I don’t think the White House is aware of that.”
A separate Washington Post report last week cited US intelligence assessments that concluded Trump’s expanding campaign had reached a stalemate – findings that “underscore the dilemma” Washington now faces.
The war’s economic impacts on Americans have become increasingly difficult to dismiss. Inflation, which soared to 4.2 percent in May – up from 2.4 percent in February – fell slightly to 3.5 percent in June after the memorandum of understanding was signed and oil prices declined.
Public support for the war has also eroded. According to a new Politico poll published last week, half of Trump’s Maga base thought the Iran war was worth its economic costs in May; today, that number has dropped to around a third.
According to the Economist, among all US wars for which comparable public opinion data exist, the Iran war is the least popular.
That shift could have major implications for the November midterms, where Democrats are currently forecast to have a greater than 70 percent chance of winning the House, while the Senate race remains tighter. If the conflict drags on and intensifies, public discontent is likely to deepen, increasing the chances of Republican losses.
At the same time, despite Trump’s irresponsible threat to bomb Iran “back to the Stone Ages”, a campaign to systematically devastate the country’s infrastructure – thereby imposing unbearable hardships on millions of ordinary Iranians – would face formidable practical, political and humanitarian constraints.
The fact that Trump ultimately accepted a ceasefire and returned to the negotiating table suggests that those constraints are far more consequential than his rhetoric implies.
The result is a strategic paradox. Both Tehran and Washington might believe that time is on their side, but the cumulative costs and mounting constraints of a prolonged war of attrition could ultimately narrow their strategic options, pushing them back towards negotiations.
Source: MEE
