Türkiye’s navy surpasses its Israeli counterpart in the number of frigates, submarines, support vessels and maritime patrol platforms. It also operates through a wider deployment network stretching from the Aegean Sea to Mersin, Iskenderun and northern Cyprus.
“Israel”, by contrast, relies on a smaller fleet that has been heavily equipped to protect its coastline and offshore gas fields, while operating in close coordination with the air force, intelligence services and missile defence systems.
This balance gives Türkiye a greater capacity to mobilise forces, remain at sea and distribute vessels across several sectors. Israeli naval effectiveness, however, increases as any confrontation moves closer to Haifa, Ashdod and the Tamar, Leviathan and Karish gas fields.
Around Cyprus, Ankara’s advantage in the north intersects with the military cooperation network that “Israel” has established with southern Cyprus and Greece. Under these conditions, the location and duration of any confrontation, along with the presence of aircraft and submarines, become more important than the total number of ships.
The issue returned to the forefront following an incident reported by Israel’s Channel 12. In a report published on 25 June 2026, the channel said four large Turkish vessels approached within several hundred metres of an Israeli missile ship sailing west of Cyprus during an exercise linked to cooperation with Cyprus and Greece.
Details of the incident remained limited to the channel’s account, which used the term “destroyers” to describe the Turkish vessels. The report did not provide the exact date of the encounter, the names or images of the ships, or navigation data. Nevertheless, it revived comparisons between the naval capabilities of both sides.
A Larger Turkish Fleet and a Concentrated Israeli Force
Türkiye possesses a larger and more diverse naval force than “Israel”, including a greater number of frigates, corvettes and submarines, as well as landing vessels, support ships and maritime patrol aircraft.
The total number of registered vessels does not necessarily reflect the number currently ready for operational service. Two Yavuz-class vessels have been reassigned to testing and training duties, while frigates under the Istif programme continued their trial and outfitting phases during the northern summer of 2026.
The Israeli surface fleet, by comparison, is concentrated around a smaller number of missile boats and corvettes, led by the Sa’ar 6 vessels, which completed their operational qualification in December 2023.
These ships combine surveillance, air defence and anti-ship missile capabilities on a single platform. Their design is primarily intended to protect gas fields and offshore installations. This concentration increases the combat value of each Israeli vessel, but it also makes the division of ships between protection, patrol and combat readiness more vulnerable when any vessel is taken out of service.
The numerical gap also extends beneath the surface. Türkiye’s combat submarine force consists of around 12 submarines, including the first two Reis-class vessels equipped with air-independent propulsion.
This figure refers to submarines assigned to combat duties, while the number available to sail at any given time varies according to maintenance and training schedules.
“Israel” operates five Dolphin-class submarines, while the operational status of the sixth submarine, Drakon, remains publicly unclear. The secrecy surrounding the armament and strategic missions of Israeli submarines gives each vessel a deterrent value that exceeds the significance of the declared numbers.
Türkiye reinforces its numerical superiority with vessels capable of transporting troops, helicopters and drones, while also supplying naval formations operating away from port. This strengthens its ability to deploy and remain at sea during extended operations.
This advantage becomes particularly important when Ankara distributes its forces across the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, as support vessels allow naval formations to operate for longer periods and across widely separated areas.
Türkiye’s defence industry is also working to reduce the navy’s dependence on foreign systems by domestically producing missiles, torpedoes, radars and combat management systems.
This approach has strengthened Ankara’s ability to modernise older ships and manage maintenance and ammunition supplies. However, part of the surface fleet still relies on hulls dating back several decades, requiring increasing resources to preserve operational readiness.
“Israel”, meanwhile, has focused its investments on increasing the density of surveillance and interception systems aboard Sa’ar 6 vessels. These include systems capable of detecting air and maritime targets, countering missiles and drones, and launching anti-ship missiles.
The C-Dome system recorded its first publicly announced naval combat interception in April 2024. In February 2025, the Israeli occupation army announced an operational test of the Gabriel 5 missile.
This package reflects a defensive doctrine shaped by a limited coastline and high-value energy installations, rather than by the objective of building a widely deployed fleet.
Türkiye’s advantage is especially clear in naval aviation directly operated by the navy. It includes maritime patrol aircraft equipped for surveillance, reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare, alongside a fleet of naval helicopters.
These platforms give the Turkish navy an independent capacity to search for and track submarines and escort vessels without relying entirely on air force units.
“Israel”, by contrast, depends on integrating helicopters, drones and air force aircraft with naval vessels, intelligence units and command centres.
Publicly announced exercises and operations have demonstrated a high level of coordination between these branches in developing the maritime operational picture, intercepting drones and identifying targets.
Türkiye therefore leads in the number of organic maritime patrol and surveillance platforms, while Israeli strength depends on integrating a smaller fleet into a broader air and intelligence network.
This structure gives Türkiye an advantage in mobilisation, deployment and independent naval operations over longer periods. Israeli naval effectiveness rises when its fleet operates near its coastline and under the protection of the air force, intelligence services and air defence systems.
The effect of the numerical gap ultimately depends on the location and duration of a confrontation. Numbers favour Türkiye in prolonged operations, while the density of systems and integration between military branches allow “Israel” to offset part of that gap within its immediate maritime area.
Geography Divides the Advantage
Türkiye’s advantage in the Eastern Mediterranean rests on a broader network of bases and ports extending from Aksaz on Türkiye’s south-western coast to Mersin and Iskenderun near the eastern basin.
This gives the Turkish navy a greater capacity to move vessels between different sectors and support larger ships.
“Israel”, meanwhile, relies on Haifa and Ashdod as its main naval centres for protecting the coastline and offshore gas fields. Atlit remains the base for naval special forces, while Eilat lies within a separate theatre in the Red Sea.
Northern Cyprus holds particular importance in Turkish calculations because the ports of Famagusta and Kyrenia provide Ankara with access and support points that could be expanded during a crisis, although they do not yet constitute permanent naval bases comparable to Aksaz or Iskenderun.
The same applies to Türkiye’s air deployment in the north, which included the temporary stationing of F-16 fighter jets and air defence systems during March 2026, while the permanence of that presence remained unresolved.
The map below shows the distribution of major bases and ports, maritime access routes between the Turkish coast, Cyprus, the Syrian coastline and Israeli ports, as well as gas fields and the principal areas of friction and military exercises around the island.
Maritime distances show that Türkiye enjoys a clearer advantage around northern Cyprus and the Syrian coast, with Mersin and Iskenderun closer to Famagusta, Latakia and Tartus. The distances become relatively more balanced as the comparison moves towards southern Cyprus.
Haifa and Ashdod give “Israel” shorter access routes to its coastline and gas fields, increasing the speed of response during nearby defensive missions. However, this also places a heavier burden on the smaller Israeli fleet when ships must be divided between protection, patrol and combat readiness.
The picture is further complicated by the Greek islands, Cyprus and the surrounding airspace, as Ankara must distribute part of its force between the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean.
“Israel”, meanwhile, benefits from a growing military cooperation network with Greece, Cyprus and the United States. This provides training, intelligence sharing and experience in joint operations around the island, without automatically implying direct military participation in any confrontation with Türkiye.
The most prominent points of friction in this theatre are connected to energy and sovereignty more than to the movement of vessels alone.
“Israel” seeks to protect the Tamar, Leviathan and Karish gas fields as strategic installations, while Türkiye views the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones around Cyprus as extensions of the dispute over sovereignty and the rights of Turkish Cypriots.
Since the Mavi Marmara crisis in 2010, through the escalation of Turkish drilling near Cyprus in 2019, and into the tensions connected to exercises and air and naval deployments around the island in 2025 and 2026, Cyprus, the gas fields and maritime access routes have become the clearest centres of competition between the two sides.
How Is “Israel” Trying to Narrow the Gap?
The Israeli plan relies on increasing the combat value of each vessel and linking it closely with the air force, intelligence services and missile defence.
This is evident in the Sa’ar 6 ships, which combine advanced radar, interception systems, anti-ship missiles and the ability to operate helicopters within a mission focused on protecting gas fields and the exclusive economic zone.
All four vessels entered full operational service by December 2023. The C-Dome system recorded a combat interception in April 2024, while Barak missiles were also incorporated into the ships’ capabilities.
These systems allow a relatively small corvette to respond to missiles, drones and aircraft while protecting a specific offshore installation. This helps “Israel” offset part of the numerical gap within its immediate coastal area.
“Israel” is also working to replace its ageing Sa’ar 4.5 ships through the Reshef project.
In December 2024, the Israeli Defence Ministry signed a contract worth approximately 2.8 billion shekels, or around US$780 million, to purchase five vessels from Israel Shipyards.
Construction of the first units and steel cutting began in February 2025. Delivery of the first ship was scheduled for around three and a half years after construction began, with the overall programme expected to take approximately six years.
The Reshef project therefore remains outside the balance of power in the northern summer of 2026. The first vessel is expected to enter service around 2028. The programme nevertheless reflects Israel’s intention to replace older ships with more capable platforms while maintaining a fleet of roughly similar size.
The same direction is visible in the submarine force.
Drakon represents a new stage in the Dolphin programme, but its operational status remains publicly unresolved. “Israel” is also proceeding with the Dakar submarine programme to renew its fleet during the next decade.
This will provide a longer-term strategic capability, while the confirmed operational force in the northern summer of 2026 remains five submarines.
Partnerships with Greece, Cyprus and the United States form an additional layer of Israel’s effort to offset the gap.
“Israel’s” transfer into the area of responsibility of US Central Command in 2021 expanded exercises and coordination with the US Fifth Fleet.
Exercises with Greece and Cyprus also enabled Israeli forces to operate farther from their own coastline and train in anti-submarine warfare and the construction of a shared maritime operational picture.
These partnerships provide communications, training, surveillance and a greater capacity for intelligence sharing.
Whether they would develop into direct military participation in a confrontation with Türkiye would depend on the decisions of the countries involved, as well as the nature, location and duration of the confrontation.
The cooperation gives “Israel” important operational depth around Cyprus, but it does not automatically add Greek or American vessels to its combat inventory.
The Israeli plan nevertheless faces limitations connected to fleet size and the cost of platforms and ammunition.
Each Sa’ar 6 vessel carries a major burden in protecting offshore installations. The loss of a single ship to maintenance or damage would place additional pressure on the remaining vessels.
Protecting the gas fields also requires continuous patrols and a sustained stockpile of interceptor missiles, particularly during simultaneous missile and drone attacks.
Türkiye faces different constraints.
Its multiple theatres require it to distribute forces between the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, limiting its ability to keep most of the fleet concentrated in one sector for an extended period.
Some frigates also depend on older hulls despite the modernisation of their systems. National frigate and submarine programmes will require years before they fully replace ageing units.
Türkiye nevertheless possesses a broader naval and missile industrial base, along with a greater capacity to construct ships, submarines and support vessels domestically.
How Would a Limited Confrontation Unfold?
In a limited confrontation near northern Cyprus or around drilling vessels, Türkiye would begin with an advantage derived from the proximity of Mersin and Iskenderun, the possible use of northern Cypriot ports, and its larger number of vessels, submarines and maritime patrol aircraft.
It could deploy several ships into the area and establish a presence that raises the cost of approach for an Israeli research vessel or small naval force.
The balance becomes more even around southern and western Cyprus, where the distances from Haifa and Mersin become relatively similar.
Surveillance, electronic warfare and air cover would then determine which side could detect, track and engage the other more effectively.
Relations with Cyprus and Greece would also influence aircraft movements and access to airspace and ports.
Around Israeli offshore installations, “Israel” would begin from a stronger position.
Sa’ar 6 vessels would operate near their bases, command centres and air force support. Their systems were specifically designed to protect gas fields and intercept missiles and drones.
Israeli aircraft could quickly reach the nearby maritime area, while Turkish forces in this scenario would operate farther from their bases and under intensive air and intelligence surveillance.
This advantage would remain tied to a limited confrontation in terms of duration and number of fronts.
A prolonged war of attrition would place pressure on the number of Israeli vessels and interceptor missile stocks, while giving Türkiye an opportunity to exploit its larger number of platforms, support ships and capacity to rotate units.
In a broader confrontation involving aircraft, submarines and missiles, Türkiye would enter with greater numerical, industrial and logistical weight.
It could rotate more ships and submarines if it reduced its commitments in the Black Sea and the Aegean.
“Israel”, by contrast, would enter with air power operating close to its coastline, dense naval air defence and a command and intelligence network that strengthens the smaller fleet’s ability to detect targets and distribute firepower.
The longer any confrontation lasts, the more it would favour Türkiye because of its larger number of platforms, support ships and rotation capacity.
Short distances and integration with the air force would favour “Israel” in rapid engagements close to its own coastline.
Submarines remain difficult to measure on both sides because their deployment areas, armament and operational rules are secret.
The presence of even one submarine in a decisive sector could restrict the movement of several opposing vessels.
