Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaydi received a warm welcome at the White House, where Baghdad presented proposals closely aligned with US President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to trade and investment.
American approval was reflected in major oil agreements awarded to US companies. The anticipated withdrawal of American forces in September was effectively replaced by a growing commercial presence, alongside a proposal to establish an Iraqi-American energy and development fund financed by revenues equivalent to 500,000 barrels of oil per day, with its assets deposited in American financial institutions.
The understandings also included efforts to reduce Iranian influence by restricting weapons to state institutions and dismantling Iraqi armed factions.
The package offered to Trump did not receive unanimous support inside Iraq. It produced a clear division between cautious political approval from some members of the Coordination Framework and outright rejection from prominent armed factions.
Those groups may escalate their opposition and confront al-Zaydi’s government in parliament in an effort to block the agreements.
In the coming period, al-Zaydi is expected to pursue flexible and negotiated measures to dismantle the remaining factions. However, the option of enforcing the law by force would remain available as a last resort should peaceful solutions fail.
Iran’s Decline and Türkiye’s Strategic Opportunity
Iran views the outcome of al-Zaydi’s Washington talks, particularly the planned end of the international coalition’s mission, as serving one of its longstanding strategic objectives: establishing a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.
At the same time, however, the regional balance of power is increasingly favouring a gradual decline in Iranian influence and the rise of Turkish strategic and commercial interests.
This creates space for Ankara to emerge as Baghdad’s most stable economic and security partner.
Al-Zaydi’s political camp believes that the real guarantor of Iraq’s Shia majority is not the armed factions, but the Iraqi military and official security institutions.
It also argues that the deep oil and economic ties being established with the United States and the West can provide Iraq with an international “safety net” against external threats.
Iraq as an Indispensable Transport and Energy Hub
Al-Zaydi believes Iraq can establish itself as an “indispensable transport and energy hub” through projects such as the Development Road and newly proposed investment funds.
Ankara sees the direction taken by al-Zaydi’s government as a major opportunity to strengthen Türkiye’s position in Iraq with the approval and support of Baghdad.
A joint investment fund has been announced to finance major strategic and development projects across Iraq. This could give Turkish companies a commanding role in the country’s infrastructure sector while securing energy partnerships and regional connectivity with Ankara.
Türkiye would provide Iraq with a secure alternative for diversifying its oil and gas corridors, while advancing Ankara’s ambition to become a central energy supply hub for Europe.
Through this model, Türkiye gains the position of a “trusted economic and development partner” operating with full Iraqi government approval and broader international guarantees.
Projects such as the Development Road and joint funds involving Türkiye and Gulf states could transform Iraq into an essential global transport and energy junction, compelling regional powers to engage directly with Baghdad and its government.
From the perspective of political realism, geography does not eliminate Iraq’s political or regional strength. Rather, that strength can be reconstructed in accordance with current realities.
Turkish Expansion Under the American Umbrella
The Turkish vision of economic expansion closely intersects with Washington’s objective of reducing Iranian influence, creating the conditions for the emergence of a stronger Turkish role with American support.
The United States maintains extensive leverage over Iraqi finances through dollar sales and the Federal Reserve system.
Washington also needs a powerful regional alternative to Iran with a shared land border, substantial industrial capacity and a major commercial base. Türkiye is the most readily available power capable of fulfilling that role.
The Development Road and the Iraqi-Turkish investment funds supported by al-Zaydi enjoy clear American approval.
Washington sees the overland route linking Iraq to Europe as a means of integrating Baghdad into the Western economic system while marginalising Iranian corridors and parallel regional routes.
Türkiye’s expanding role in Iraq is therefore advancing with clear American encouragement and a political green light from Washington.
Managing Turkish Influence Without Sacrificing Iraqi Sovereignty
Baghdad understands that Ankara’s ambitions extend beyond trade.
Türkiye has longstanding security concerns in northern Iraq, particularly regarding the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, alongside water-related and historical interests.
Replacing Iranian influence with Turkish economic and security dominance backed by the United States could weaken Iraqi sovereignty in northern regions and Nineveh under the banners of investment and counterterrorism.
Concerns over an expanding Turkish role under American sponsorship, or possible Gulf financial dominance, are therefore realistic and legitimate.
At this stage, Iraq faces less danger from sectarian conflict than from what could become economic absorption and a wider restructuring of regional dominance.
Success in navigating this difficult transition will depend primarily on the ability of Iraqi negotiators to keep control of the country’s economic decision-making in Baghdad and prevent any foreign party from monopolising sovereign sectors.
Türkiye as a Regional Counterweight to Iran
Ankara sees the decline of Iranian influence, encouraged by the Trump administration and the government of Ali Faleh al-Zaydi, as an opening through which it can secure major strategic gains.
Trump’s preference for reducing direct US military expenditure aligns with Washington’s broader objective of containing Iran.
The United States views Türkiye, a member of NATO, as the most capable conventional regional power for balancing Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria without requiring the deployment of large American armies across the region.
Economic projects such as the Development Road are not merely commercial routes. They are instruments for redrawing political maps.
Weakening Iran directly strengthens the Turkish project, which seeks to make Türkiye the essential corridor for energy and trade between East and West.
Ankara is positioned to benefit from American backing and the current Iraqi government’s need for financial and political stability.
Türkiye Turns Towards Lebanon
Türkiye is also moving to fill regional gaps created by declining Iranian influence and increasing US pressure, with Lebanon now emerging as another focus of Ankara’s strategy.
The Turkish approach is advancing through efforts to contain Iranian influence while establishing a new deterrence balance with “Israel”.
Erdoğan and Nawaf Salam Discuss a Strategic Partnership
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in Istanbul for discussions on establishing a new “strategic partnership” aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s presence in Lebanon.
Media reports published before the meeting said Ankara was considering extensive military and political support for the Lebanese Armed Forces to help them maintain national stability.
The reports also referred to Türkiye’s possible readiness to contribute a substantial military force to a proposed international mission in southern Lebanon.
The force could replace the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and would be tasked with overseeing the ceasefire agreement and containing any military escalation led by Hezbollah.
Washington views Türkiye as a conventional regional power capable of filling Lebanon’s political and security vacuum.
Under this framework, Ankara could serve as a security guarantor capable of balancing Islamic resistance forces with “Israel’s” security interests.
Strengthening the Authority of the Lebanese State
Türkiye has proposed a vision centred on placing all security activity under the sole authority of the Lebanese state.
The Turkish initiative aligns with the principle that official Lebanese institutions should hold exclusive responsibility for national security.
It also points to a wider Turkish-led regional effort, supported by an alliance involving Riyadh, Cairo and Doha, to restrict Hezbollah’s independent military capabilities and place all weapons under the control of state institutions.
Türkiye’s relationship with Lebanon had previously cooled following Beirut’s signing of a maritime border agreement with Cyprus.
Ankara strongly opposed the agreement, viewing it as a violation of Turkish energy and territorial water interests in favour of Cyprus and Greece.
Political forces close to Hezbollah argue that the Cypriot maritime arrangements, along with the trilateral Israeli-Greek-Cypriot military coordination established for 2026, ultimately serve to protect Israeli gas fields and secure energy supply routes to Europe.
Salam’s talks in Istanbul are therefore also understood as an attempt to review and amend these sensitive agreements, ensuring they cannot be used as a tool of pressure against Lebanon.
