Israel’s military campaign against Gaza has not ceased since the ceasefire was announced in October last year. The confrontation on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts did not prevent the Israeli occupation from continuing its policy of targeted assassinations, deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and the killing of more than 1,000 Palestinians over the past eight months.
Meanwhile, the Palestinian side adhered to the ceasefire agreement and refrained from responding to the ongoing attacks in an effort to prevent the return of the war of extermination and renewed forced displacement.
During the fighting on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts, Israel maintained a policy of concentrated military operations in Gaza while gradually expanding its control over areas that remained outside its occupation under the ceasefire agreement.
It steadily enlarged the territory under its control to nearly 70% of the Gaza Strip, confining almost two million Palestinians to a narrow coastal strip covering no more than 150 square kilometres while denying them even the most basic humanitarian rights.
Despite this, Israel’s political leadership has so far stopped short of authorising a full scale return to war on the same scale, intensity and methods seen before the ceasefire agreement was signed.
However, threats to resume the war have never disappeared and intensified significantly following the signing of the memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States.
Israeli Political Fallout
The Israeli governing coalition and right wing circles openly expressed their anger towards the Trump administration over the agreement with Iran, which they argued was concluded over the heads of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government.
The Israeli opposition quickly seized on the agreement to launch strong criticism of Netanyahu, accusing him of overseeing a strategic failure because Israel had failed to translate what they described as military achievements against the Axis of Resistance into political gains.
According to these critics, Netanyahu’s determination to prolong the war indefinitely for personal and political reasons prevented Israel from securing a meaningful political outcome.
This has also affected Israeli public opinion, with recent opinion polls indicating declining support for Netanyahu and projecting fewer parliamentary seats for his governing coalition in the next election.
Factors That Will Shape Israel’s Gaza Policy
Israel’s approach towards Gaza in the coming period will be influenced by several key factors.
First: The Military Position
The leadership of the Israeli military and its various branches remains united in their determination not to relinquish security control over Gaza.
Their strategy continues to be based on preventing potential threats before they fully emerge, which they have used to justify repeated violations of the ceasefire under the pretext of eliminating security threats.
Military leaders believe the resistance’s capabilities have been significantly weakened but argue that it is actively rebuilding by recruiting, training and arming new fighters.
They also maintain that the objective of eliminating the resistance has not yet been achieved because Palestinian factions continue to reject disarmament. In their view, this refusal justifies returning to war.
The military leadership, particularly the Southern Command, believes any renewed offensive should end with the complete subjugation of the Palestinian side.
According to the analysis, operational plans remain in place for military operations in central Gaza, an area Israeli ground forces did not fully enter before the ceasefire, as well as for completing military objectives in Gaza City that were left unfinished.
Military circles also believe any future campaign would be easier because there are no longer Israeli captives inside Gaza and because many senior resistance figures have already been assassinated.
The military’s position cannot be separated from recent changes in senior command appointments, which were made under the direct influence of Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz and were shaped by political considerations.
Second: The Governing Coalition and the Far Right
The ideological outlook of Israel’s far right continues to play a central role in decision making.
According to the analysis, the far right views the current period as a rare historic opportunity to realise its long term ambitions of decisively resolving the conflict with the Palestinians, asserting Israeli dominance across the region and eliminating external threats.
Far right parties believe their strategic objectives in Gaza remain incomplete.
These objectives include the displacement of at least one million Palestinians, the establishment of Israeli settlements in Gaza and the imposition of direct Israeli military rule.
With the government’s term drawing to a close, far right parties, their political movement and electoral base continue to push for the resumption of the war in order to complete these objectives.
Third: Netanyahu’s Position
Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza is shaped by a combination of domestic and international considerations and by his assessment of the political benefits that could result from renewing the war.
This is particularly significant following what the analysis describes as the failure of his personal project to eliminate what he viewed as the existential Iranian threat.
The article also argues that Netanyahu failed to persuade US President Donald Trump to resume military action against Iran or abandon negotiations.
It further contends that he failed to separate the various regional fronts after Iran insisted that the Lebanese front remain linked to the wider agreement with the United States.
At the same time, Israel faces obligations arising from the Lebanon ceasefire, including the withdrawal from occupied territory, developments that have contributed to Netanyahu’s declining popularity.
The article also points to a cooling relationship between Netanyahu and Trump, as well as public exchanges of criticism between Netanyahu’s allies and US Vice President JD Vance.
According to the analysis, most Israeli voters do not favour conflict with the American administration.
Netanyahu had hoped that his close relationship with Trump would strengthen his electoral prospects and help shield him from his ongoing legal proceedings.
His declining popularity, falling poll numbers, setbacks on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts, pressure from the far right and the military’s own position are all identified as factors pushing him towards resuming military operations in Gaza.
Fourth: The American Position
The American approach to Gaza is influenced by several considerations.
Most Middle Eastern countries, except Israel, are seeking to de escalate regional tensions following the economic consequences of the war with Iran and concerns about a broader regional conflict.
These governments believe negotiations and diplomacy remain the best path towards ending conflicts across the region, including in Gaza, and view any renewed war there as a direct threat to negotiations with Iran that could return the region to square one.
Washington is also concerned that renewed fighting in Gaza could undermine the agreement with Iran by increasing the risk of deeper American involvement in a prolonged conflict with Iran and its allies.
Domestic opposition to war inside the United States has also grown, while President Donald Trump’s declining approval ratings have raised concerns about Republican prospects in the upcoming midterm elections.
The article further argues that Trump has repeatedly portrayed ending the Gaza war and establishing a peace council under his leadership as one of his major diplomatic achievements.
Any collapse of that effort would therefore represent a significant setback for American diplomacy under his presidency.
According to the analysis, Trump’s recent statements suggest he no longer views Gaza as a direct threat to Israel, indicating that he is unlikely to grant Israel unrestricted approval to resume the war.
The article also argues that, ahead of the midterm elections, Trump is unlikely to welcome renewed images of mass killing, destruction and starvation in Gaza dominating media coverage and strengthening opposition campaigns.
Beyond Washington, the analysis notes that nearly every country except Israel now favours reducing regional conflicts, arguing that prolonged wars continue to damage the global economy, international stability and security.
Diplomatic solutions are increasingly viewed as serving both national interests and public opinion, which has grown increasingly opposed to continued warfare.
What Could Change Trump’s Position?
According to the analysis, the only scenario that could persuade Trump to give Netanyahu approval for a renewed large scale offensive in Gaza would be successful pressure from the pro Israel current within the Republican Party.
The article argues that this faction continues to wield considerable financial influence and media power and may seek to compensate Netanyahu for the Iran agreement and the Lebanon ceasefire by encouraging Trump to authorise a broader military campaign in Gaza.
It also claims that, just as Netanyahu and his supporters within the Republican Party succeeded in persuading Trump to become involved in two military confrontations with Iran, they could attempt to do so again regarding Gaza.
Outlook
Based on the positions of the various parties involved, the current situation in Gaza appears unlikely to move towards stability, either militarily or humanitarianly.
The analysis argues that Netanyahu has little interest in achieving calm or reaching a settlement before the Israeli elections scheduled for the end of October, particularly after what it describes as his failures on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts.
As a result, the possibility of Israel resuming its war of extermination in Gaza and seeking to impose its own security and political vision on the territory cannot be ruled out.
According to the article, such a move would serve multiple objectives by compensating for Netanyahu’s failure to prevent the US Iran agreement, improving his electoral standing and satisfying his right wing coalition partners.
Nevertheless, the analysis concludes that the only figure capable of restraining a renewed Israeli offensive is Donald Trump, should he continue to prioritise regional stability.
At the same time, it warns that Trump could ultimately yield to pressure from pro Israel Republicans opposed to the Iran agreement and choose to overlook a new Israeli offensive in Gaza, justified by Palestinian factions’ continued refusal to disarm.
