Seventy nine years ago this month, United States Secretary of State George Marshall stood at Harvard University and unveiled a programme to rebuild post war Europe.
The initiative soon became known as the Marshall Plan.
More than 13 billion dollars were allocated to revive Western Europe after the devastation of the Second World War, an amount equivalent to roughly 150 billion dollars today.
Donald Trump’s agreement with Iran, signed days ago in Versailles, commits the United States and its regional allies to ensuring that Iran receives “no less than 300 billion dollars” for what the document describes as its rehabilitation and economic development.
In effect, this is a Marshall Plan for the Iranian government, even if it is not funded directly by American taxpayers.
Yet while the original Marshall Plan was designed to consolidate an American victory, this new arrangement appears intended to manage the consequences of a defeat that could push the United States towards a gradual withdrawal from the Middle East.
An Agreement Filled With Ambiguity
The memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran contains substantial ambiguity.
Its opening clause commits both sides to preserving peace and stability in the region.
United States Vice President JD Vance told CNN that this means Iran will stop funding allied groups and cease activities Washington considers destabilising.
Tehran, however, may interpret the language very differently.
The agreement reaffirms Iran’s commitment not to develop nuclear weapons and refers to its willingness to “reduce” the concentration of highly enriched uranium at its facilities.
Beyond that, the memorandum offers few details regarding enrichment limits or implementation mechanisms.
The agreement also stipulates that Iran will not impose transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz for the next sixty days, but remains silent on what happens after that period expires.
When questioned about the 300 billion dollar figure, Vance claimed that Gulf states would provide the entire amount.
Yet the agreement itself contains no such provision.
Instead, it tasks the United States and its regional partners with designing the programme.
This may explain why a senior administration official told CNN that “the wording should not be overinterpreted”.
The official described the memorandum as a political document, adding:
“We reached language that allows the Iranians to say what they need to say domestically.”
Iran, however, is likely to insist that Washington adhere to the agreement literally.
Immediate Benefits for Tehran
What is clear is that sanctions relief will occur gradually.
The immediate easing of restrictions will allow Iran to resume oil exports, effectively restoring arrangements similar to those under the Obama era nuclear agreement.
Those exports are estimated to generate around 60 billion dollars annually.
Once the memorandum is implemented, and before any final agreement is reached, Iran’s frozen assets will be released for Tehran to use as it sees fit.
Reports estimate these assets at 24 billion dollars held in banks in Qatar, Oman and Iraq.
Iran, however, believes its total frozen assets worldwide may exceed 100 billion dollars.
Iran will not receive the full 300 billion dollars, nor will all sanctions be lifted, including those related to terrorism, ballistic missiles and human rights violations, unless a final agreement is reached.
Nevertheless, Tehran stands to receive significant financial benefits well before any comprehensive settlement.
A Temporary Deal That May Become Permanent
The prospects for a final agreement remain uncertain given the considerable gap between the two sides.
History is filled with wars that ended through temporary arrangements while the most difficult issues were postponed for future negotiations.
Eventually, those temporary measures became permanent realities.
This scenario appears highly plausible in the current case.
If that happens, Trump will face a difficult choice.
He could accept the reduction in uranium enrichment and embrace the new status quo.
Or he could terminate exemptions and reimpose oil sanctions.
If he chooses the latter, Iran could respond by imposing transit fees through the Strait of Hormuz, leveraging the influence it gained during the war.
The situation could deteriorate again.
Yet Trump has been clear about his desire to end the war and his fear of the economic consequences of closing the Strait.
That concern is unlikely to diminish as congressional midterm elections approach.
Iranian officials are undoubtedly aware of this reality, reducing the likelihood that Tehran will offer additional concessions.
A War That Failed to Achieve Its Objectives
The agreement may be flawed, but Washington currently has few attractive alternatives.
Judged against the administration’s own objectives, it is difficult to describe the outcome as anything other than defeat.
The United States entered the conflict seeking to dismantle Iran’s regional influence and force Tehran to accept strict limits on its nuclear programme.
Instead, Iran emerged from the war with sanctions relief, a pathway to generous reconstruction funding, continued ambiguity over key nuclear issues and full leverage over the Strait of Hormuz.
The reason for this outcome was not a lack of military resolve.
Many hawks in Washington called for deploying ground troops.
That, however, would almost certainly have made matters worse.
The United States could have found itself trapped in a prolonged counter insurgency campaign with heavy losses, much like previous costly wars elsewhere.
Had Washington attacked Iran’s civilian infrastructure, Tehran would likely have retaliated against infrastructure across the Gulf, widening the conflict and deepening global economic shocks.
A War That Should Never Have Been Fought
The United States should not have entered this war.
But once it did, it pursued it recklessly.
Beginning the campaign by targeting the highest levels of Iran’s leadership transformed the conflict into an existential struggle for the Iranian government.
Tehran no longer had any incentive to exercise restraint.
This contrasts sharply with the twelve day war the previous summer, which was focused on targeting Iran’s nuclear programme.
At that time, Tehran calibrated its response carefully to avoid a prolonged war with Washington.
It did not attack Gulf states.
It did not close the Strait of Hormuz.
This winter, it did both.
Trump’s administration made little preparation for these reactions, despite the fact that many analysts had anticipated them.
The End of America’s Security Role?
The memorandum itself may not represent Iran’s greatest achievement.
The more significant outcome may be that the war marks the beginning of the end of America’s willingness to serve as the principal security actor in the Middle East.
Domestic support for the American alliance with Israel is eroding.
American military bases across the region have suffered damage and increasingly appear to be vulnerabilities rather than assets.
Trump, and those who follow him, may hesitate before using force against Iran again, knowing that doing so could lead to another closure of the Strait of Hormuz and another global economic crisis.
Americans could reasonably argue that they have spent the last quarter century experimenting with every possible policy in the Middle East.
They tried war.
They tried diplomacy.
They worked with civil society.
They pursued regional partnerships.
They encouraged rivals to sign agreements.
In the eyes of many, none of these approaches delivered lasting success.
A More Unstable Region
Few should assume that an American withdrawal from the Middle East would make the region more stable.
Competition between Israel and Iran would likely intensify.
The Strait of Hormuz could face repeated disruptions.
Additional wars may follow.
New rivalries, including between Israel and Turkey, could become more severe and expansive.
The situation of Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank would almost certainly deteriorate further.
Russia and China would be expected to deepen both their influence and strategic presence.
Supporters of continued American involvement in the region currently have limited arguments at their disposal.
Israel is increasingly viewed by many Americans as a state too willing to use force and insufficiently attentive to American interests.
For a growing number of people in Washington, the Middle East is becoming a strategic black hole.
The Beginning of an American Withdrawal?
This situation could change if a new government comes to power in Israel.
Some observers point to retired General Gadi Eisenkot, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most prominent critics, whose popularity has risen in recent opinion polls.
A new Israeli leadership might persuade Washington to re-engage in the region, help build alternative energy infrastructure that reduces dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, and revive efforts to normalise relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, provided progress is made on the Palestinian issue.
Yet the chances of such a transformation remain slim.
For two decades, Washington has debated how to manage this turbulent region.
Increasingly, many Americans are beginning to ask a more fundamental question:
Why remain involved at all?
If that sentiment takes hold, Trump’s agreement with Iran may one day be remembered as the moment the United States began its withdrawal from the Middle East.
