In less than three months, on 7 and 8 July 2026, NATO delegations are expected to gather in Ankara for the alliance’s next summit. The agenda remains largely undefined, while the attendance of the most significant guest, US President Donald Trump, is still uncertain.
European allies may therefore find themselves with ample time to confront an increasingly urgent reality: the gradual Europeanisation of NATO is no longer theoretical.
Beginning in 2027, the United States is expected to contribute only 50% of NATO’s military combat power, a substantial decline from current levels. The central question is no longer whether NATO will become more European, but rather how quickly that transition will unfold and through which path.
Europe Faces the Question It Long Avoided
European policymakers are now confronting a dilemma that has lingered unresolved for decades: what comes after American military dominance?
Despite years of rhetoric surrounding “strategic autonomy” and independence from Washington, European governments have consistently failed to assemble the financial resources, political unity, and strategic will necessary to achieve that objective.
The most immediate challenge remains financial.
In 2025, only three European Union member states, Poland, Greece, and Estonia, met NATO’s target of allocating 2% of GDP to defence spending.
Meanwhile, countries such as Belgium, Spain, and Italy continue spending less than 1.3% of GDP on military defence.
At the annual Society and Defence Conference held in Sweden from 11 to 13 January 2026, European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius called for the establishment of a 100,000 strong European army capable of replacing American forces in Europe if necessary.
During his address, Kubilius stated that the United States had formally asked Europe to prepare to assume responsibility for conventional defence across the continent.
He posed a series of critical questions:
“If the Americans withdraw from Europe, how will we build a European pillar for NATO? Who will become the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe? What about European command and control capabilities and a European general staff?”
He also highlighted the deeper structural issue facing the continent:
“Most importantly, how will we replace the 100,000 American troops that form the backbone of military power in Europe?”
Replacing the United States Could Cost Europe $1 Trillion
An assessment conducted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in May 2025 estimated that replacing American military capabilities in Europe would cost approximately one trillion dollars over 25 years.
Yet the financial burden represents only part of the problem.
Military equipment can be purchased, but the institutional knowledge and operational integration required to make those systems effective cannot be replicated easily.
What the United States provides Europe is not merely hardware, but a fully integrated military framework that enables allied forces to coordinate rapidly under pressure through shared operational language, intelligence infrastructure, satellite communications, and precision strike capabilities.
Europe, by contrast, was never required to independently develop many of these systems because Washington effectively developed them on its behalf throughout the Cold War and beyond.
Eisenhower’s Prediction Is Returning to the Forefront
European military strategists have long debated the idea of a unified European army since the earliest stages of the European project during the Cold War era.
Within elite military circles, analysts frequently revisit a warning issued by Dwight D. Eisenhower during NATO’s founding in 1949.
Eisenhower believed the dominant role of the US military in Europe should only be temporary.
“If all American troops stationed in Europe for national defence purposes have not returned to the United States within ten years, then this entire project will have failed.”
At the time, the Eisenhower administration successfully persuaded European leaders to support the idea of a joint European army. However, the French parliament ultimately blocked the initiative by a narrow margin.
Had the proposal passed, the European project might have evolved first into a military union rather than an economic bloc.
The concept resurfaced in the 1990s following the creation of the European Union, but gradually lost momentum due to American opposition and continued reliance on NATO.
Europe’s Defence Structures Remain Fragmented
In 2017, representatives from 23 of the EU’s then 28 member states signed an agreement establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), effectively creating the foundations of a European defence union.
Later, nearly all remaining EU members joined the framework except for Malta.
In March 2025, the European Commission outlined its defence policy through 2030, formally recognising Russia as a major strategic threat and setting plans to strengthen European and Ukrainian defence capabilities over the following five years.
Yet discussions across Europe have remained overwhelmingly focused on financing rather than addressing the continent’s deeper structural fragmentation.
Europe currently operates through 25 separate military systems shaped by the legacy of the Cold War.
Some states possess advanced conventional forces, limited fifth generation air capabilities, and nuclear deterrence systems. However, Europe’s nuclear protection remains confined to only two NATO states and is neither formally nor practically extended across the alliance.
The core challenge is not simply military quantity, but integration.
The United States provides Europe with intelligence infrastructure, satellite communication systems, precision strike capabilities, and integrated command structures that Europe never independently built for itself.
Europe’s “Bonsai Armies”
The absence of political cohesion among the EU’s 27 member states has produced what former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell once described as “bonsai armies.”
These are small national militaries suffering from chronic underfunding and incapable of collectively projecting power.
Growing concern now exists across Western capitals not only about NATO’s long term future, but about the immediate consequences of a formal collapse of the alliance itself.
Increasingly influential voices argue that Europe must prepare not only for an orderly transition from American dominance to European leadership, but also for worst case scenarios in which the continent may need to defend itself without US support in the near term rather than the distant future.
That raises difficult questions:
What capabilities does Europe genuinely possess today? Which critical capabilities are missing? Which decisions require political authority, and who would make them during a crisis?
Without confronting those questions directly, debates over Europe’s future security architecture remain largely technical exercises disconnected from the scale of the strategic crisis approaching the continent.
Competing Visions for Europe’s Future Defence Order
Some analysts believe the most realistic path forward would involve a smaller coalition of willing NATO members taking the lead.
At the centre of that effort would likely be the Joint Expeditionary Force led by the United Kingdom and including the five Nordic countries, the three Baltic states, and the Netherlands.
If Poland were added alongside limited support from Germany and France, proponents argue the alliance could form a military bloc capable of deterring or confronting any potential Russian threat.
Others advocate reviving the 1948 Brussels Treaty that established the Western European Union before its later integration into NATO and eventual merger into the European Union in 2010.
Such a structure could provide a legal foundation for a core European defence union that includes willing EU members alongside Britain and Norway.
Europe’s Window for Delay Is Closing
Creating a fully functional European defence structure may still take longer than current security pressures allow.
Yet if Europe intends to defend itself with limited American support, or potentially without Washington altogether, it will require a flexible body capable of making rapid political and military decisions during crises.
An effective European Security Council increasingly appears to many strategists as the most realistic route out of what is becoming one of the gravest security dilemmas Europe has faced in decades.
The era in which European governments could indefinitely postpone confronting this reality appears to be ending.
The American security guarantee that once made such discussions unnecessary is no longer unconditional.
The threat environment remains active, while political momentum in capitals such as Berlin, Warsaw, and Paris is moving in favour of deeper European defence integration.
The unresolved question is whether that momentum is advancing quickly enough, and whether all 27 European capitals are moving in the same direction.
