The Trump administration’s move to advance a potential sale of Lockheed Martin F-35s to Saudi Arabia might mark a significant turning point in regional military dynamics. Yet the central question remains: would the acquisition truly grant Riyadh a decisive edge, or will “Israel’s” deeply entrenched air superiority remain firmly intact?
The announcement, made as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) visited Washington, does not itself consummate a transfer. Any sale would require formal notification to, and likely scrutiny by, the US Congress, and would reopen the fraught question of how Washington preserves “Israel’s” qualitative military edge (QME) while exporting one of the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft. While the operational edge of Israeli pilots and aircrew is evident, the US retains the ability to constrain Saudi F-35 capabilities through technical and software-based controls.
The deal on the table and the road to congressional approval
When a US president signals willingness to sell F-35 aircraft, the next formal step is notification under the Arms Export Control Act and a review period during which Congress can raise objections or seek certifications. For decades, US administrations have treated QME for “Israel” as a legal and political constraint on certain arms transfers; that tradition has informed reviews of past F-35 discussions with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Any proposed sale to Riyadh will therefore be judged not only on price and offset packages but on assurances that “Israel’s” operational superiority will remain intact; a determination that is both technical and political and could trigger contentious hearings. Members of both parties have in the past conditioned or slowed high-end sales over human-rights concerns, counter-proliferation assessments, and explicit demands to preserve the QME.
However, competing pressures further complicate Washington’s calculus as the Trump administration attempts to solidify its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, secure a landmark normalisation agreement with one of West Asia’s most influential powers, and counter the expanding Russian and Chinese footprint in the Kingdom’s defence and technology sectors.
Who in the region flies fifth-generation aircraft today
As of today, the Israeli Air Force is the only air force in West Asia operating the F-35s.
Abu Dhabi negotiated for the aircraft in 2020 but later suspended the talks; other Gulf air forces operate advanced fourth-generation fighters but not fifth-generation stealth airframes.
The practical consequence is that a US sale to Riyadh would not simply add another modern fighter to the region; it would introduce a category of capability that, until now, has been regionally singular.
Why the airframe is only half the story
It is important to separate the aircraft’s physical attributes from the invisible systems that make it decisive in combat. The F-35’s important advantages include low observable design or stealth, powerful sensors, sensor fusion, and integrated electronic warfare, which enable pilots and commanders to detect, identify, and engage threats at ranges and with a fidelity earlier generations cannot match.
Much of the F-35’s real combat power does not lie in the airframe but in the software stack that governs nearly everything the jet does:
- Mission-data files (MDFs)
- Electronic-warfare threat libraries
- Radar-emitter databases
- Electronic-attack and jamming profiles
- Sensor-fusion logic
- Weapons-employment algorithms
Most critically, the US controls every layer of this ecosystem for all export customers, except “Israel”.
“Israel’s” F-35I “Adir” has a special agreement allowing the integration of sovereign Israeli-made sensors, electronic warfare systems, and locally developed software add-ons. While the core flight software remains a US product, “Israel” can add its own “plug-and-play” systems and has the authority for some domestic maintenance and upgrades, giving it a level of independence not afforded to other customers. In practice, the platform’s combat potential is as much a product of data and code as it is of metal and jet engines.
This creates a built-in mechanism for Washington to tilt the operational balance decisively toward “Israel,” even if other states receive the same aircraft on paper.
Update priority, withholding certain mission-data libraries, limiting weapons-integration permissions, and controlling sustainment services are all practical mechanisms to maintain an advantage for one operator over another.
“Israel’s” F-35I “Adir” and operational freedom
Israel negotiated an unusually broad set of privileges for the Adir. Unlike most customers, the Israeli regime has been permitted deep customisation, integration of indigenous sensors and weapons, unique mission-data development, and a degree of independence from the US sustainment cloud that most operators use.
Those permissions give the Israeli Air Force both practical freedom of operation and a pathway to maintain and evolve its fleet in ways other buyers cannot match.
Israeli mission data files are infused with intelligence drawn from decades of regional aggression. Their electronic-warfare tuning reflects specific threat libraries, and the backlog of locally developed weapons integrations further differentiates the Adir from standard F-35As.
The aircraft can fire the Israeli Python‑5 and Derby/Derby‑ER air‑to‑air missiles, giving it a sovereign engagement capability independent of US munitions. It also carries advanced stand‑off strike weapons such as the SPICE‑1000 and SPICE‑2000 precision‑guided kits and the Delilah loitering cruise missile, enabling deep, accurate attacks against heavily defended targets. Added to this is a bespoke Israeli C4I architecture and a classified electronic‑warfare suite installed directly into the aircraft’s systems, granting the Israeli Air Force full control over threat libraries, jamming profiles, and data links.
The airframe itself has also been adapted to support these systems. The Israelis received rare permission to incorporate custom apertures, access points, and internal wiring channels into the fuselage in coordination with Lockheed Martin, enabling installation and maintenance of its electronics. In addition, “Israel” is the only country known to operate F‑35s equipped with Conformal Fuel Tanks (CFTs), which add 600–800 gallons of fuel along the fuselage without compromising stealth or weapons capacity. These tanks extend the Adir’s operational range, reduce reliance on aerial refuelling, and allow longer, deeper-strike missions, providing a level of flexibility and endurance unavailable to any other F‑35 operator.
Software and sustainment
The F‑35’s combat edge lies less in its airframe than in the software, mission-data, and sustainment systems that govern nearly every aspect of its operations. Historically, the US has used software-centric restrictions to preserve the advantage of favoured partners, ensuring that certain operators maintain a decisive qualitative edge.
Key instruments include mission-data files (MDFs), which encode threat signatures, radar and SAM profiles, and geospatial threat maps. Operators with richer, bespoke MDFs detect and classify threats more quickly and respond more effectively. Denying or limiting MDF depth to a buyer is therefore a direct mechanism to sustain another operator’s superiority. Similarly, restricting electronic-warfare software, including emitter libraries, advanced jamming and deception modes, and the timing of mission-data updates, can materially degrade an F‑35’s ability to detect, classify, and suppress hostile radars. The operational effect is slower threat identification, narrower jamming envelopes, and less accurate geolocation for Suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) operations, giving the Israeli Air Force a persistent edge even if both sides operate the same airframe.
These fundamental differences could prove decisive in a theoretical Saudi-Israeli confrontation. An export-restricted Saudi F-35, with its potentially downgraded software, might detect Israeli emitters seconds later and with reduced precision. In contrast, the Israeli F-35I Adir, equipped with bespoke software, proprietary threat libraries, and its electronic warfare systems, could identify, geolocate, and suppress Saudi radar networks first.
These software controls illustrate how the US could maintain Israeli superiority should the Saudi deal move forward. While technically effective, such safeguards carry grave political and operational costs for the buyer, the same concerns Abu Dhabi cited when it stepped back from F‑35 talks in 2021.
Basing, geography, Israeli red lines
Unlike the UAE, whose main airbases are distant from Israeli interests, parts of Saudi Arabia lie relatively close to Israeli settler populations and military centres. Israeli officials have publicly signalled concern that basing F-35s in western Saudi Arabia would materially shorten flight times into Israeli airspace and therefore elevate risk perceptions in Tel Aviv. Reports also indicate “Israel” is pressing Washington to condition any sale on formal normalisation and legally binding basing limits.
Those basing preferences are intimately linked to the software and sustainment controls described above. Even if Riyadh accepted software tiering, “Israel” still wants to condition the basing of F-35 jets to be outside Western Saudi Arabia airstrips.
Why Abu Dhabi balked despite normalisation
The UAE’s experience is a near-perfect case study for what Riyadh may face. Abu Dhabi negotiated a package in 2020 under a broader normalisation agreement but informed US officials in December 2021 that it would suspend discussions, citing “technical requirements, sovereign operational restrictions, and cost-benefit analysis” as reasons.
Three interlocking fault lines explain why. First, as explained, export conditions on software, weapons, and mission systems sharply limit a buyer’s operational autonomy. Doing anything beyond the approved list requires US authorisation and often a long, costly certification process. For a state that prizes independent strike options and rapid operational adaptation, those limits impose real political and tactical costs.
Second, sustainment architecture locks customers into US logistics and updates ecosystems. The F-35’s logistics and health-monitoring systems (ALIS originally, now the ODIN framework) and the global sustainment enterprise mean that maintenance and updates become levers Washington can control.
Third, and more prosaically, the practicalities of preserving stealth require specialized sustainment. Low-observable coatings, seam integrity, and specialised repairs demand trained personnel, approved materials, and certified processes; many of those tasks are regulated and performed under Lockheed-approved protocols or at regional hubs designated by the program. Buyers often cannot fully sustain the low-observable characteristics that make the jet survivable without continuing contractor or US support.
Finally, political and geostrategic concerns compounded the technical ones. Washington’s scrutiny of buyers’ ties to third parties, notably China, and congressional insistence on preserving “Israel’s” QME raised further strings the UAE found difficult to accept, from restrictions on sensitive supply-chain partners to conditioned access to high-end sustainment and software features.
“The Americans want to sell the Emiratis the planes, but they want to tie their hands,” a Gulf source told Reuters at the time. The source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said defence deals include requirements for purchasing nations, but that the restrictions in this deal made it unfeasible.
Geopolitical considerations, only amplified by Riyadh’s larger strategic weight and geography, will determine whether Saudi Arabia accepts comparable limits, if imposed by Washington, or walks the same path as Abu Dhabi.
