We do not exaggerate when we say that Sunday, August 3, 2025, marked the worst day the Al‑Aqsa Mosque has endured since its occupation in 1967.
On that day, a radical shift occurred—one unimaginable until then. A new, irreversible reality was established, one more severe than any until today, short of the mosque’s division or the erection of a synagogue within it.
According to the Islamic Waqf in Jerusalem, a record 3,969 settlers stormed the compound—the highest number since 1967. Extremist Temple groups disputed this figure: Asaf Farid claimed the actual number was around 3,527, citing data from the Temple Mount Organisations Alliance. Still, the Waqf’s count is more reliable, as it includes all intruders—tourists included—not just ideological activists. This is significant, given that settler “tourism” has been permitted under Israel’s military oversight since 2003, without any coordination with the Islamic Waqf.
But the intrusions went beyond sheer numbers. Settlers seized full control of Al‑Aqsa’s courtyards, and for the first time held a so‑called “Sh’ma prayer” and other Jewish rites—including “Priestly Blessings” and midday prayers—in the very heart of the mosque—the Marwani Prayer Hall and the Qibla Mosque.
They also attempted to introduce predominantly Jewish religious artifacts—Torah scrolls and Tefillin devices—into the compound. Extremist leader Tommy Nisani even shared an image of himself parading large Torah scrolls in the Old City, in protest over being denied entry into Al‑Aqsa. Some extremists performed what they called “epic prostrations” inside the compound.
Moreover, symbols of Israel’s far-right nationalist narrative were deliberately introduced. For the first time, Israeli flags were waved en masse inside the mosque—a politicised, nationalistic act that blurred the line between religious and ethnic symbolism. This strategic blend aims to transform Al‑Aqsa into a cause embraced not only by religious extremists but by nationalist secular factions as well.
The day was orchestrated at the highest levels. Itamar Ben‑Gvir, the Minister of National Security, personally led the incursion, beginning at Bab al-Qattanin with Haredi participants, then conducting collective prayers inside Al‑Aqsa, and culminating with prayers at the Western Wall. Likud MK Amit Halevi, who previously proposed dividing the mosque, raised the Israeli flags within the compound. Shuli Moalem‑Rafaeli, an ex-member of Jewish Home, sang the Israeli national anthem, Hatikvah. Likud’s Oshri Shiklim performed the “epic prostration.”
This unprecedented convergence of religious, political, and nationalist actors shattered the myth of the “status quo.” Netanyahu’s office, true to form, issued a statement claiming commitment to preserving the existing arrangements. But such declarations now ring hollow, as their interpretation of “status quo” clearly reflects the new normal imposed by occupation.
Remember, this shift did not occur in isolation. The government—under Netanyahu and led by Ben‑Gvir—had already authorised open Jewish prayers at Al‑Aqsa in 2024 and permitted singing and dancing inside the mosque in 2025.
The deeper consequence is that this is not merely a provocation—it is a strategic transformation. The far-right now dominates Israeli policy, having normalised actions previously confined to fringe elements. They are reshaping revered Islamic spaces to reflect a parallel Jewish identity. Moshe Feiglin—an ideologue from the extremist Zionist camp—exposed this audacity, stating that every attempt to forbid Jewish presence at Al‑Aqsa only emboldened them—and that their actions have, paradoxically, brought quiet by their symbolic defiance.
Therefore, the only viable path to protect Al‑Aqsa is—ironically—to escalate the issue both publicly and politically. Passivity will embolden further erosion of sacred rights. Without strong, mobilised resistance—Arab, Islamic, and global—the mosque risks permanent redefinition, and any regrets then will come too late.
