A recent Foreign Affairs report challenges Western perceptions of Iran’s weakness, arguing that the long-standing “negotiate or bomb” strategy rests on a fragile illusion. Despite regional setbacks, Iran continues to wield considerable influence and has developed advanced deterrent capabilities—including precision missiles and drone warfare.
The report, translated by Arabi21, states that ongoing U.S.–Iran diplomacy offers cautious hope for progress on the nuclear issue. However, Iran’s refusal to abandon uranium enrichment or export its stockpile could derail talks—prompting the U.S. or Israel to launch airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.
The magazine argues that the “negotiate or bomb” approach assumes that Iran is currently vulnerable and therefore can be coerced into making sweeping concessions. This flawed narrative portrays Iran as having crumbling air defenses, a collapsed economy, and political instability.
Following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in 2020, Iran’s resistance axis experienced a setback. Likewise, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, operation against Israel provoked fierce retaliation not only in Gaza but also against Hezbollah in Lebanon, weakening Tehran’s regional alliances. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria—should it occur—would be Iran’s most severe strategic blow in decades.
Yet, Iran remains a force that cannot be ignored.
While Hamas has been hit hard, losing senior commanders, it has not been defeated. The movement has regrouped and still holds hostages despite Israel’s relentless bombardment and ground assaults. A senior Hamas delegation’s visit to Tehran in February underscores ongoing ties.
Hezbollah, the crown jewel of Iran’s deterrence doctrine, has suffered painful losses, including the assassination of top leaders in Israeli strikes. Nevertheless, it remains heavily armed and politically influential through its alliance with the Amal Movement. Should Iran be attacked, Hezbollah could retaliate. Although Iranian forces have scaled back in Syria, remnants of the Assad regime and the Alawite minority could still allow Iran to arm Hezbollah through alternative channels.
Despite setbacks, Israel’s battlefield achievements have not translated into lasting strategic victories.
Iran’s reach in Iraq remains deep. Through the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), it maintains influence among Shi’a clerics and Baghdad’s political elite. These dormant networks could quickly be activated to threaten U.S. interests if Iran comes under attack, the report warns.
Meanwhile, the Houthis in Yemen have emerged as Iran’s most resilient ally. They have disrupted Red Sea shipping, launched missile attacks on Israel, and reportedly breached Israeli air defenses near Ben Gurion Airport. A recent U.S. bombing campaign failed to neutralise them, and the Houthis would almost certainly support Tehran in the event of war.
Diplomatically, Iran has scored significant wins. It has normalised relations with all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which now publicly support a peaceful resolution to the nuclear standoff. Tehran has also deepened ties with China and Russia, signing 25-year and 20-year strategic pacts, respectively, covering economic and military cooperation. While Beijing and Moscow may not fight on Iran’s behalf, they could bolster its war effort indirectly.
The report highlights that hardline U.S. voices are calling for the complete dismantling of Iran’s enrichment program, either through Libya-style diplomacy or military strikes. But unlike Libya’s rudimentary program under Gaddafi, Iran now sits on the nuclear threshold. For Tehran, accepting the Libyan model would be tantamount to suicide out of fear of death.
Launching military strikes based on the illusion of Iranian weakness, the report warns, risks repeating Saddam Hussein’s 1980 miscalculation when he attacked post-revolution Iran, expecting a swift victory. Instead, he triggered an eight-year war. Similarly, in 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq based on false intelligence. Today’s belief in Iran’s vulnerability reflects the same dangerous hubris.
Any Israeli strike would be perceived in Tehran as a joint U.S.–Israeli operation. Iran believes Israel lacks the military capacity to act alone. A strike could rapidly escalate into a wider conflict. Without regime change or full-scale invasion—both unlikely—the best Israel could hope for is a temporary delay of Iran’s nuclear program.
According to Foreign Affairs, an Israeli strike could lead to radioactive fallout, civilian casualties, and environmental damage. Tehran would likely withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), accelerate its bomb-making efforts, marginalise pro-engagement factions, and disrupt the fragile succession plans for Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—potentially paving the way for a more hardline successor.
Often overlooked is the doctrine underpinning the Axis of Resistance: defense of homeland and regime. Backed by a massive arsenal of missiles and drones, mobile launch platforms, fortified bases, and battle-hardened militias, Iran is capable of both conventional and asymmetric warfare. While Israeli strikes have damaged its air defenses, Iran’s offensive capabilities remain largely intact—and can still deliver significant disruption regionally.
The fallout of a strike could include Iranian or Houthi attacks on U.S. bases, Israeli cities, or Gulf oil infrastructure. The strategic chokepoints of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb could be blocked, sending oil prices soaring, rattling global markets, and jeopardising post-COVID economic recovery.
Moreover, continued U.S.–Iran confrontation undermines promises by former President Donald Trump to avoid “forever wars.” Escalation would derail the region’s gradual pivot toward development. While Iran would suffer in any conflict, both Israel and the United States would face heavy costs.
Some in Washington fantasise that strikes might collapse the Iranian regime or ignite mass protests to paralyse its response. But such thinking is naïve. Iran’s government may be strained, but it is not on the verge of collapse.
Economic hardship and state repression have created volatility, but the regime remains intact, supported by a brutal security apparatus. The opposition is fragmented and lacks clear vision. Iran’s cautious middle class fears chaos more than it desires regime change. A foreign attack would likely unite a divided political base, ignite nationalist fervour, and rally even critics of the regime to defend their homeland.
In conclusion, Foreign Affairs warns that an attack could offer the Iranian regime a lifeline, not a death sentence. Western reliance on military escalation to subdue Iran may backfire. The nuclear deal—built on mutual concessions—remains the least dangerous path forward.
