Why do we keep asking the question when we already know the answer?
Some might respond with another question: Can they even stop the war if they wanted to?
Let’s first look at it from a capability perspective—because the numbers may shock you and the generations to come. The Arab world has purchased enough weapons to fight multiple large-scale wars on all fronts, especially when compared to the Zionist entity—what I consider the only true occupier and colonial power in the region. Unfortunately, most Arab regimes don’t share that view. For them, Israel is no longer the enemy. Instead, their real threat is political Islam—especially the Muslim Brotherhood, followed far behind by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
But let’s take a quick look at the scale of Arab military stockpiles since oil wealth began flooding the region:
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- A 2020 U.S. Congressional report on arms sales to the Middle East revealed that between 2015 and 2019, the region accounted for 35% of global arms imports. Of these, 45% came from the United States, 19.3% from Russia, and 11.4% from France.
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- According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) alone accounted for 20% of all global arms imports between 2020–2024, up 4.1% from the previous five-year period.
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- Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait are among the world’s top 10 arms importers. In a statement published by the White House on May 13, 2025, the U.S. announced the largest defense sales deal in history—nearly $142 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia, supplied by over 12 American defense companies.
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- In contrast, the Israeli military’s annual budget was around $23.4 billion in 2022—just 16% of the May 2025 U.S.-Gulf arms deal alone.
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- According to Global Firepower 2025, Egypt is the only Arab country ranked among the world’s top 20 armies at number 19. In comparison, Pakistan ranked 12 and Iran ranked 16—despite economic sanctions and isolation. The Israeli army ranked 15. Shockingly, none of the GCC states made the top 20, despite spending over 20% of global arms imports.
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- Within the Arab world, the military rankings are as follows: Egypt first, followed by Saudi Arabia (24th), Algeria (26th), Iraq (43rd), and UAE (54th), according to Arab Defense.
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For those who claim Israel dominates with air power, consider this:
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- Saudi Arabia has 917 military aircraft, including 283 fighter jets
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- UAE: 551 aircraft
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- Qatar: 251 aircraft, many of them combat-ready
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- Egypt: 238 fighter jets
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- Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Oman, and Kuwait all field dozens more
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- Arab armed forces collectively number 2.4 million active personnel, with an additional 1.9 million in reserves. By comparison, Israel’s active military numbers just 169,000, with 465,000 in reserves—meaning the Arab world outnumbers the Zionist army by a factor of six to seven.
So, in terms of raw military capacity, the Arab world is not lacking. Thanks to trillions in oil wealth, Arab states are armed for decades to come. But in practice, the Arab armies haven’t confronted Israel since 1973. Meanwhile, Israel invaded Beirut in 1982, ravaged southern Lebanon for decades, and has bombed both Damascus and southern Syria. In contrast, Arab armies have only fought fellow Arab nations—most notably in Yemen, where despite overwhelming superiority, the Saudi-Emirati coalition has failed to defeat the modestly armed Houthi movement.
Even more troubling: UAE forces are involved in Sudan, supporting factions against a fellow Arab nation—yet have done nothing to support the Palestinian resistance, which is geographically closer and morally indisputable.
Now let’s set aside military might—what about political, economic, and diplomatic power? Can Arab states pressure Israel to halt its aggression?
The answer is yes—but with a thousand caveats. The rest of this article will explain why.
On paper, the combined strength of the GCC, Egypt, and Iraq easily surpasses Israel’s. So why do they not enter the battle—or at least supply meaningful military support to Palestinian and Lebanese resistance?
https://www.sunnafiles.com/?s=gazaAfter 18 months of Israeli failure in Gaza, the answer is clear:
The very question is flawed.
Why? Because it assumes that Arab armies are independent entities. They’re not.
They may exist on Arab soil, but the decision to deploy them isn’t made in Riyadh or Cairo—not even in Abu Dhabi or Amman. It’s made elsewhere. At first, one might assume Washington. But after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, it has become abundantly clear: Tel Aviv holds the real veto power over war and peace in the Arab world.
No Arab leader can so much as mobilise a battalion without first consulting the U.S. and Israel. Consider this: at the beginning of the war on Gaza, Netanyahu warned Arab leaders not to express support—not for the resistance, but not even for the people of Gaza.
And it seems they agreed.
Why? Because they all share a common objective with Netanyahu: the elimination of Islamic resistance. As revealed in journalist Bob Woodward’s book “War”, quoting former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, this goal was seen as “strategic alignment.”
In today’s Arab world, the only time rulers have full political and military freedom is when they go to war against their own people.
This is the bitter truth—though many still fear to say it out loud. Some avoid it out of cowardice, others out of opportunism, and still others out of misplaced hope that one day these regimes might wake up and change. But based on all current realities, such a change is nearly impossible.
Most Arab rulers stay in power by weaponising American iron and Zionist fire, demonising their own people—especially Islamic movements—as threats to national security. This is why Arab militaries are deployed to suppress protests, not defend the Ummah from Zionist crimes that exceed even the horrors of Nazism.
So let us stop begging those armies and pleading with those rulers.
They have power. What they lack is the will. And that will cannot exist without sovereignty and independence—two things that are long gone in today’s Arab world.
