Recent developments have sparked deep frustration within the Israeli political and security establishment. Observers are connecting the resumption of U.S.–Iran nuclear talks, reports of a new prisoner exchange deal in Gaza, and President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf—viewed as the start of the “Saudi chapter” of his presidency.
According to Israeli analysts, the driving force behind these negotiations is Saudi Arabia, seeking rapprochement with Iran and a potential joint Gulf defence alliance—a move that sidelines Israel and directly conflicts with its regional agenda.
“The Saudis Know They’ll Be Hit First”
Jewish Orientalist Pinhas Inbari, writing for Zaman Israel, explained that Riyadh’s shift stems from one central truth:
“If Iran is attacked by Israel, the response will hit Saudi Arabia first—devastating its infrastructure and igniting a global energy crisis.”
Inbari criticised Israel for abandoning the opportunity to lead a Middle East defence coalition—a vision once supported by President Joe Biden—by choosing instead to follow the hardline tracks laid out by Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, figures known for their extreme anti-Arab rhetoric and escalation in Jerusalem.
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Gaza, Al-Aqsa, and the Red Lines of Riyadh
With Israel’s war on Gaza ongoing, and extremist settlers expanding their grip on the West Bank, Inbari argues that Saudi Arabia, as a leading Arab and Islamic power, cannot proceed toward normalisation while:
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- Ben Gvir continues provocations in Al-Aqsa
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- Settler violence escalates
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- And no progress is made toward Palestinian statehood
He notes Riyadh has warned against granting Jewish extremists a synagogue inside Al-Aqsa Mosque, calling for “tangible progress” toward a Palestinian state as a condition for any diplomatic movement.
The tension, he says, risks creating a coalition crisis inside Israel, with Netanyahu possibly offering Smotrich and Ben Gvir new internal targets (like the Bedouins in the Negev) to appease them for reducing their activities in Al-Aqsa—reminiscent of previous political manoeuvres under Trump.
Saudi Arabia Not Part of the Abraham Accords
While the UAE and others embraced the Abraham Accords, Inbari makes clear:
“Saudi Arabia is not part of that process. Its leadership position in the Gulf requires it to launch something new—perhaps a Red Sea Alliance to secure shipping routes from the Houthis.”
This proposed coalition could include Israel, Jordan, and Egypt—especially as Egypt faces massive losses due to disruptions in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which have crippled the Suez Canal’s revenue. Meanwhile, Qatar backs the Houthis, and Turkey is pursuing its own ambitions in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
New Prisoner Exchange Deal on the Horizon
A major consequence of these shifting alliances is a possible new prisoner swap deal. Interestingly, the usual “mediators” like Qatar and Egypt are no longer front and centre—though Egypt’s proposal appears to carry more weight.
The article suggests that:
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- A Red Sea security pact may come with Qatar’s reduced role in Gaza
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- Qatar’s function may shift to Gulf diplomacy and Islamism outreach, given its position as host of the Al Udeid U.S. airbase and its influence over political Islamic movements
Steve Witkoff, a key Trump ally involved in both the Iran talks and the prisoner deal, reportedly stressed the need for Qatar to join the Abraham Accords—implying a diplomatic repositioning away from Gaza and toward broader Gulf integration.
Still No Saudi Role in “Gaza’s Day After”
For now, Saudi Arabia remains absent from discussions around Gaza’s post-war future. The only country with actual capacity to manage this transition is Egypt, but Cairo is reluctant to take the lead.
The Egyptian proposal reportedly centres on forming a technical committee of Palestinian experts, with the agreement of both the PLO and Hamas, to govern Gaza during the transitional period.
While the situation remains complex, the prospect of a near-term prisoner release is growing more likely. And for the time being, that outcome is the most tangible point of progress amid the shifting regional landscape.
