Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent offensive remarks about Saudi Arabia carry significant weight. This is the same figure whom several Arab countries accepted as a partner in normalization agreements during his previous term, signaling a clear shift toward sidelining and disregarding the Palestinian cause. Since the introduction of the Arab Peace Initiative—originally a Saudi proposal—the official Arab stance has linked normalization with the establishment of a Palestinian state based on UN Resolution 242. However, Israel has continuously rejected this proposal, reinforcing its settlement expansion efforts since the Beirut Summit in 2002. Despite the initiative’s concessions, which granted Israel 78% of historic Palestine and ambiguously designated East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital, Israel has yet to take any positive steps toward the Palestinians.
Following the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, Netanyahu rewarded both Arabs and Palestinians by systematically undermining the agreement’s intent. This compelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into separate accords that ultimately strengthened Israeli interests and tightened restrictions on the Palestinian Authority, such as the Wye River Agreement (1996) and the Hebron Protocol (1997), alongside extensive excavations beneath Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Since the failure of the Camp David II negotiations in 2000 and the killing of unarmed Palestinians at Israeli checkpoints during the early days of the Second Intifada under Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Israel’s position has remained unchanged. The most it is willing to offer Palestinians is a limited authority, whose existence and sustainability depend solely on security cooperation with Israel. This stance persisted even after the Palestinian political split in 2007, with Netanyahu and his ultranationalist allies intensifying their settlement expansion efforts. At its core, Israeli policy is based on a broad national consensus that refuses to relinquish the West Bank, a strategic asset.
The so-called peace process with Israel was driven by the belief that defeating it was impossible and the illusion that it could be pressured into conceding 22% of the land it occupied in exchange for full regional acceptance. Over time, this was no longer viewed as just an option but became a doctrine that limited Palestinian resistance strategies and normalized Israel’s presence in the region. Ultimately, Israel became the gateway to Washington and the perceived counterbalance to Iran. This led to alliances with some of the most arrogant and extremist Israeli leaders, including Netanyahu. This trajectory cemented the notion that “Palestine is not my issue,” a slogan that underpinned the Abraham Accords.
Gradually, Palestinians were portrayed as adversaries in Arab policies—not just because of alliances with their enemy but because those alliances inherently required erasing their cause. This narrative was reinforced by a systematic media campaign since 2017, painting all Palestinians as deceitful troublemakers. Given this long-standing effort, a sudden shift in stance was unlikely—even when Israel waged a 15-month-long genocide in Gaza, particularly when many believed that eradicating Hamas, as Netanyahu promised, would be beneficial to Israel’s regional allies.
Throughout this process, Arab decision-makers did not perceive Israel as a threat to national security. Each Arab regime prioritized its own stability over external threats. However, the situation changed dramatically in light of Israel’s mass killing of Palestinians in Gaza, exposing Israeli attempts to leverage the war’s outcome to put Arab governments in an extremely awkward position.
Israeli audacity toward Arabs is nothing new, and Netanyahu’s comments were not a mere passing insult but a direct expression of the Zionist project’s genocidal nature. His statement that “Saudi Arabia could establish a Palestinian state somewhere in its vast lands” was not just an offhand remark but a core tenet of the settler-colonial mindset. This forces official Arab regimes—especially those in the Levant—to confront the reality that Palestine remains an Arab issue, no matter how much they try to distance themselves from it.
Before questioning why Netanyahu is embarrassing Arab governments, one must ask: is it really surprising that they now face the consequences of aligning with Trump and Netanyahu? Had they not undermined Palestinian resilience, fueled division to marginalize key Palestinian factions, and remained silent on genocide, would they be in this predicament today? The real response to this challenge cannot be anything other than strengthening Palestinian steadfastness, despite Israel’s opposition.
The belief that Netanyahu’s actions embarrass Arab governments assumes that such embarrassment is against Israel’s interests. Some argue that imposing Israel’s solution to the Palestinian issue requires a more discreet approach and continued Arab disengagement. However, given that Netanyahu’s rhetoric stems from an ideological Zionist worldview, his government inevitably reflects these ideas in both speech and action. Is it really surprising, for instance, that Netanyahu’s faction views Jordan as Israeli land, generously “ceded” for Palestinians to establish a state?
Amid this war, we should not expect Netanyahu to use diplomatic language. Seeing that Israel could carry out a genocide in Gaza without any real Arab reaction, Netanyahu assumes he can continue without consequence—even while directly insulting Arab leaders or pushing for the forced displacement of Palestinians. This time, Israel is positioning itself as a direct threat to Arab regimes, those same governments that eagerly embraced normalization and abandoned Palestine. Netanyahu and his government are now working to make displacement a subject of open debate, attempting to create a discourse where forced transfer is seen as a viable option.
For the Israeli right, this moment is critical—not just to implement their settlement agenda but also to consolidate control over Israeli institutions. The internal competition among right-wing factions to secure public support and media dominance has made Israeli discourse increasingly blunt and extreme. Having temporarily abandoned his rhetoric of absolute victory in Gaza, Netanyahu has pivoted toward entrenching right-wing ideologies. Just as Trump dismissed warnings of regional instability when he moved the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem—believing no consequences would follow—he now assumes there will be no real pushback if he supports displacing Gazans to Arab lands.
Yet, reality suggests otherwise. “Operation Sword of Jerusalem” and “Al-Aqsa Flood” were clear responses, proving that Palestinian resistance remains active. However, the broader Arab response has only deepened integration into the U.S.-Israeli strategy to discard the Palestinian cause. The question is, is this so-called response an act of agency or merely a reaction dictated by American and Israeli interests?
Despite all these realities, some Arab liberal intellectuals continue to claim that the real problem was Arab wars against Israel and that normalization is the solution. Ironically, while Israeli leaders reject normalization if it comes at the cost of a Palestinian state, these intellectuals argue that past resistance was the problem all along. Some may even go as far as supporting the displacement of Palestinians or suggesting their state be established in Saudi Arabia!
