Despite repeated claims by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about his commitment to “not conceding” the Golan Heights and keeping it under Israeli control, a look behind the scenes of two rounds of talks with Syria reveals a different narrative. In closed-door discussions, Netanyahu and his envoys expressed entirely different views. When these details eventually come to light, the Israeli public may be shocked to learn how far both sides were willing to go to reach an agreement that included returning the Golan Heights to Syria.
Israeli historian Yigal Kipnis disclosed that “on the eve of the May 1999 elections, a televised confrontation occurred between Netanyahu and his former Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai. When the discussion turned to the Golan Heights, Mordechai confronted Netanyahu, saying, ‘Look into my eyes.’ Netanyahu’s first government principles from 1996 stated that ‘maintaining Israeli sovereignty over the Golan is the foundation of any settlement with Syria.’”
In an article published on the Walla website and translated by “Arabi21,” Kipnis noted that “the Israeli public, especially voters, did not expect Netanyahu to promote political moves on the Israeli-Syrian channel. Yet, he acted independently and secretly. Ultimately, his special envoy Ron Lauder presented the Syrians with a proposal during peace negotiations that included Israel withdrawing from Syrian territories occupied in 1967 to mutually agreed borders, based on the June 4, 1967 lines.”
Secret Negotiations with Syria Revealed
Kipnis elaborated that “in July 1998, Netanyahu and Ehud Barak held ten secret meetings at the Mossad office in the Galilee to discuss forming a unity government, where Barak would serve as acting Prime Minister. Regarding negotiations with Syria, there was no doubt that such a government, if established, would push forward towards a peace agreement. In mid-July 1998, Hafez al-Assad visited Paris and emphasized the need to continue political efforts with Israel from where they had previously stopped, warning that Netanyahu might ignite the region if the process did not resume ahead of his visit.”
He added, “Netanyahu’s envoy, Uzi Arad, traveled to Paris with a message about readiness to resume negotiations, acknowledging that the return of the Golan Heights was a top Syrian priority. Arad returned to Paris after Assad’s departure to follow up on French mediation efforts and discussions, despite opposition from Netanyahu’s ministers who warned against withdrawing from the Golan. At that time, Netanyahu even blocked a discussion in the National Planning and Building Committee regarding settlement expansion plans in the region.”
On July 22, the Knesset preliminarily approved a law requiring a referendum before evacuating the Golan Heights, with support from several Labor Party members. A week later, the Knesset approved a bill to bring forward elections.
Documents Exposing Peace Proposals
Kipnis revealed that during secret negotiations led by Ron Lauder, nine meetings were held with Assad, resulting in two key documents. The first, dated August 29, 1998, included ten points proposed by Netanyahu to Assad as principles for a peace agreement. Two days later, the Syrians rejected the document. Consequently, a revised document titled “Peace Treaty Between Israel and Syria,” dated September 12, 1998, was prepared. It proposed setting the border based on the June 4, 1967 lines, accompanied by a matching map.
However, Kipnis explained that “Netanyahu hesitated to hand over the map requested by Assad, who then refused to receive Netanyahu’s envoy without prior access to it. As a result, the Syrian channel was removed from the agenda in November 1998. Uzi Arad revealed that while reaching an agreement was still possible, it depended on returning the entire Golan Heights. He noted that Ehud Barak would be remembered for preventing a historic war, as joining Netanyahu in a unity government could swiftly lead to a peace agreement with Syria, something Netanyahu alone would not pursue.”
Netanyahu’s Political Challenges
Netanyahu’s political situation at the time was already precarious. The Hebron Agreement he signed with Yasser Arafat in the United States had cost him support from the right-wing. His willingness to consider withdrawing from the Golan Heights, as leaked by Ariel Sharon, further eroded his support base, ultimately leading to early elections and Barak’s victory.
Upon assuming office, Barak appointed Uri Saguy to lead negotiations with the Syrians, mediated by the U.S. Syrians spoke of the second draft agreement left by Netanyahu to Assad, which outlined borders based on the situation before the 1967 war. Ron Lauder even confirmed the existence of this document to U.S. President Bill Clinton.
The Second Round of Negotiations
The second round of negotiations with the Syrians took place between 2010 and 2011 and lasted about six months. Netanyahu engaged in peace talks with Bashar al-Assad without Israeli intelligence being aware. U.S. mediators Dennis Ross and Fred Hof, part of the Obama administration’s Middle East team, shuttled between Netanyahu’s residence and Assad’s palace. When the details emerged, one participant noted that the Israeli public would be surprised to learn how far the parties had progressed toward a peace agreement. However, the outbreak of the Syrian revolution abruptly halted these talks.
