Despite Israeli claims of achieving military successes on the fronts of Lebanon and Gaza, the realities on the ground and leaked classified information expose the falsehood of these assertions. These revelations help explain the ongoing military failures of the occupation in these two arenas, particularly following the announcement to establish the “Nagel Committee for Examining the Army’s Budget and Force Structure” to review operational plans in preparation for drafting its allocated budget.
General Hanan Shai, a strategic military planning expert, emphasized that “the plans to be presented to the Nagel Committee are no different from the defensive strategies that led to the army’s defeat during Hamas’ attack on October 7. These same offensive plans implemented in Gaza and Lebanon have resulted in Israel being caught in a prolonged war of attrition, lasting over a year, with no control over its intensity or timeline. These plans are also the root cause of the army’s failures, from the Second Lebanon War in 2006 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014.”
In an article published in the Hebrew newspaper Maariv and translated by Arabi21, Shai stated, “The occupation army has transformed from a force designed to swiftly defeat its enemies into one merely capable of delivering heavy strikes to dissuade the enemy, without achieving outright victory. Predictably, as shown in past conflicts, the enemy has no intention of surrendering. Although the army was instructed by the Winograd Committee to become a decisive force, it remains only a deterrent, lacking the capability, military expertise, and emergency plans to prevent defensive defeats and decisively overcome its adversaries in offensive operations.”
Shai pointed out, “The current failures the army faces in Gaza and Lebanon necessitate revisiting the Multi-Dimensional Defense Document prepared by General Herzli Halevi in 2020, as part of the army’s multi-year strategy known as Tnufa. Analyzing this document reveals a state of shock for several reasons. Firstly, it reflects the disconnection of the army’s senior leadership from the art of war and the military’s combat doctrine, resulting in a blatant disregard for its contents, which constitutes a violation of military law.”
He further explained, “The second reason for this shock lies in the document’s disregard for Israel’s defense strategy, upon which the army was built and quickly won all its wars since 1948. This strategy enabled military victories that the political leadership transformed into strategic political gains. However, a turning point began with the army’s defeat in 2006 and extended through its subsequent wars in Gaza up to today.”
Shai noted, “It is impossible to adjust the new defense budget and force structure to align with a combat doctrine that contradicts Israel’s defense policy and strategy, as well as the deterrence doctrine, which has led to a series of defeats and disasters for Israel.”
He called for the new committee’s recommendations to be based on lessons learned from the war and the findings of the planned investigative committee. This would aim to explain the reasons behind the army’s failure against the October 7 attack and its inability to overcome adversaries on the Gaza and Lebanon fronts simultaneously. However, regrettably, this investigative committee has not yet been established.
In conclusion, Shai stated, “Since delays in approving the budget and restructuring the army are inevitable, the Nagel Committee has no choice but to focus on fundamental principles, such as national defense policy. The current security reality grants this policy a renewed mandate based on the original principle of decisiveness. Without this principle, the army cannot effectively implement its defensive strategy or develop a force structure capable of neutralizing threats at their inception. Preventive warfare, which preempts threats before they grow to catastrophic proportions, is a necessity, as evidenced by the past fourteen months of ongoing consequences.”
