A former Israeli intelligence officer described the recent explosions in Lebanon as a “crime” and a waste of opportunity, noting that it would have been better to directly target Hezbollah for a decisive blow.
The newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth published a report detailing the moments when Israel could have directly assassinated the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.
The report labeled Nasrallah as one of Israel’s most dangerous enemies, explaining that, “On July 12, 2006, after Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, Nasrallah held a brief press conference, boasting about the operation.”
It continued, “At that time, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah addressed the public in the heart of Beirut, openly speaking in front of the cameras. He warned Israel that if it attacked Lebanon, it would deeply regret it, and if Tel Aviv chose confrontation, it should expect surprises.”
Nasrallah further mocked the Israeli leadership at the time, claiming that Ehud Olmert, Amir Peretz, and Dan Halutz were inexperienced and lacked the necessary skills to deal with the situation.
The report highlighted that “it is doubtful that any Israeli leader at that moment realized that Israel was missing its only chance to eliminate Nasrallah during the Second Lebanon War.”
Retired Colonel Ronen Cohen, former Deputy Chief of the Research Department (HTAM) in Israeli Intelligence, commented: “This was the only time Nasrallah’s location was exposed, and he appeared publicly until the end of the war. Lebanese and foreign journalists were present, and he seemed unafraid. It was a golden opportunity to take him out.”
Cohen continued: “At the start of the war, the situation was chaotic, and weapons were being transferred to Lebanon. Decisions were made in the Israeli government to launch attacks on Lebanon, but the chance to assassinate Nasrallah required a swift government decision, which wasn’t even on the agenda.”
He described the situation as “peculiar,” noting that despite the significant changes in Israeli assassination policies following the Second Intifada, Israeli intelligence had not gathered sufficient information in the years after its withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 to eliminate Nasrallah. Shortly after the withdrawal, in November 2000, Hezbollah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area. At that time, Israel was not interested in escalating the situation, preferring to stabilize the border without provoking a conflict.
Even in the years leading up to the 2006 abduction of Israeli soldiers, no intelligence efforts were made to gather information aimed at eliminating Nasrallah, despite his being a key target for Israel.
Cohen revealed that on the eve of the 2006 Lebanon War, there was a window of opportunity to exploit Nasrallah’s complacency, but Israel did not seize it. By the time they decided to act, it was too late. Nasrallah had gone underground, and Israel’s security apparatus was left scrambling in the dark. On the first night of the war, Israel launched attacks across various areas of Lebanon, and by the second night, the bombings had begun in Beirut. When Nasrallah realized Beirut was under attack, he hid until the war’s end.
During that time, Israeli forces made numerous attempts to locate Nasrallah’s exact whereabouts within a network of tunnels in Beirut. These tunnels were not small, but rather vast underground complexes with command and control rooms that covered a large area.
The report also revealed that, after Nasrallah’s disappearance, the Israeli military invested enormous resources in trying to locate and assassinate him. On the eighth day of the war, Israel dropped 23 tons of explosives on a Hezbollah bunker in Beirut, but Nasrallah survived.
According to Cohen, Israel’s air force deployed its entire stockpile of JDAM bombs on the location believed to be Nasrallah’s hideout, but failed to eliminate him. Eighteen years have passed since that attack, and progress has been slow.
Cohen added: “We carried out two major attacks during the war in an attempt to kill Nasrallah. The first attack was massive and involved a powerful explosion, but we didn’t even get a sign of whether we were heading in the right direction. In hindsight, we realized he was in the area we had bombed. The second attack targeted the southern suburbs of Beirut, but the bombs at that time had limited penetration capabilities. The target was a tunnel, and we believed he might be hiding inside, but the bomb failed to penetrate. He may have heard the explosion above, but nothing more.”
The report concluded: “We tried various special operations, but in the end, it was too late. There was no reliable intelligence until the end of the war, but special teams were formed. Many attempts were made, but the opportunity had passed. Nasrallah remained in hiding not just until the war’s end, but for a long time after.”
