The US-Israeli war against Iran may produce a strategic outcome neither Washington nor Tel Aviv intended: a more assertive Tehran, greater Iranian leverage over Gulf shipping and a deeply fragmented regional order that the United States struggles to stabilise.
American columnist Thomas Friedman, writing in The New York Times, warned that discussions with Arab, Iranian, Israeli, American and European participants at the Sir Bani Yas regional conference in Abu Dhabi revealed profound anxiety about the war’s consequences.
Gulf governments had not requested the war, he noted, but expected Washington to possess a credible exit strategy. Instead, they increasingly fear that Iran could emerge more emboldened, claiming to have confronted both the United States and Israel without suffering a decisive defeat.
A war intended to weaken Iran could leave Tehran with stronger instruments of regional coercion and Washington with fewer acceptable options.
Hormuz: Iran’s New Strategic Weapon
The Strait of Hormuz has become central to Iran’s bargaining position. While President Donald Trump has sought to portray maritime traffic as returning to normal, Friedman cited a senior Emirati oil official describing sophisticated Iranian attacks on UAE-owned tankers inside Emirati territorial waters.
According to the official, cruise missiles and drones have repeatedly struck tanker engine rooms, disabling vessels and forcing rescue operations. The reported attacks have occurred almost daily.
Friedman argues that Tehran is confronting Trump with two politically costly choices: accept an agreement that preserves Iran’s standing or resume military operations, risking another surge in oil prices and domestic opposition.
Why Iran’s Leadership Has Not Surrendered
Iran’s resistance to capitulation involves more than its ability to endure sanctions and military pressure. Iranian academics attending the conference described a political system that tightly controls decision-making and largely excludes public influence over national strategy.
Friedman identified another complication: the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2026. After approximately 37 years in power, Khamenei had possessed the authority to balance competing institutions and potentially impose a settlement.
His successor, his son, now operates alongside a divided leadership structure in which competing factions risk being accused of betrayal for supporting concessions to Washington.
Rather than producing the regime collapse anticipated by Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the leadership change left the Iranian system intact but, in Friedman’s assessment, angrier, more hardline and less cohesive.
The China Parallel: Pressure That Backfired
Friedman compared Iran’s position with China’s response to Trump’s trade confrontation. After Washington escalated tariffs in 2025, Beijing retaliated with its own tariffs and export controls on seven categories of rare-earth elements and associated magnets.
Washington eventually reached a trade truce that restored rare-earth flows, but China’s ability to restrict them remained. Friedman sees a similar outcome in Iran’s demonstrated willingness to weaponise the Strait of Hormuz.
Tehran avoided closing the waterway even after US strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan in June 2025. Following the renewed American offensive launched on 28 February 2026, however, it took that risk. The possibility of repeating such disruption now forms part of its strategic leverage, even if a peace agreement is eventually reached.
A Middle East Splintering Into Rival Alliances
Beyond Iran’s military capabilities, Friedman warned of worsening regional fragmentation. He described the Gulf Cooperation Council, comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman, as increasingly fractured.
His account identified emerging alignments involving Israel, the UAE, Greece, Cyprus and India, alongside a Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani grouping described as the Mecca Defence Alliance. Qatar and Oman, meanwhile, are pursuing their own arrangements with Tehran.
Divisions also persist across Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Palestinian politics. Iran’s influence over armed groups and competing political factions further complicates attempts to establish a unified regional security framework.
Friedman consequently questioned whether Washington could disengage from the Middle East while leaving behind a stable political and security order.
Washington’s Accountability Problem
On domestic politics, Friedman argued that Democrats should pursue comprehensive congressional investigations rather than simply block war funding. Such inquiries, he maintained, should establish the extent of planning failures, damage to the American military presence and responsibility among senior officials.
Artificial Intelligence Could Transform Regional Warfare
Friedman also raised a longer-term concern: the possibility that artificial intelligence could give relatively small armed groups increasingly sophisticated military capabilities.
Citing research discussed by analysts Kabir Taneja and Siddharth Yadav, he referred to findings alleging that Yemen’s Houthis had used Anthropic’s Claude AI system in three weapons-development programmes, including work on a ballistic missile with a range exceeding 2,000 kilometres.
With UN experts estimating approximately 350,000 active Houthi fighters by 2024, Friedman questioned how Gulf states would manage such threats if increasingly advanced AI systems enabled armed groups to accelerate weapons development by the end of 2027.