Israel’s latest elections have raised the possibility of Benjamin Netanyahu losing power. But for Palestinians and the wider Arab world, a more consequential question remains: would replacing Netanyahu actually change Israel’s policies towards the occupied Palestinian territories?
The elections exposed deep political divisions and difficulties in forming a stable government. Yet a change in leadership does not necessarily mean a change in policy, particularly on Palestinian rights, settlements and Israeli security control.
Changing who governs Israel is not the same as changing the policies that shape Palestinian lives under occupation.
An Election Without a Clear Majority
The final results of the 27 October election left no political camp with the 61 seats needed to command a majority in Israel’s 120-member Knesset.
Bloc
Parties
Lists
On 8 November, Israeli President Isaac Herzog tasked Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot with forming a government after parliamentary blocs representing 67 members recommended him.
However, parliamentary recommendations do not guarantee a stable coalition. Disagreements among Netanyahu’s opponents, particularly over cooperation with Arab parties, remain substantial obstacles. Opposition to Netanyahu does not automatically constitute agreement on an alternative political programme.
Political Reform Is Not Palestinian Liberation
The differences between Netanyahu and his opponents are genuine. They include judicial powers, military service exemptions, accountability for the failures of 7 October and Israel’s international standing.
Eisenkot’s camp has proposed reviewing judicial changes, investigating those failures and limiting prime ministerial terms. Such reforms may reshape Israeli governance without fundamentally changing its position on Palestinian national rights.
Reforming Government
Judicial policy, political accountability, institutional powers and government leadership.
Changing Occupation Policies
Settlements, Jerusalem, sovereignty, Palestinian national rights and the future of Gaza.
Eisenkot himself has described expectations of implementing a two-state solution after 7 October as unrealistic. He has also indicated that future arrangements would exclude a Palestinian army, preserve Israeli security control and retain settlements approved in Area C.
These positions demonstrate why political differences within Israel must be assessed against concrete policies rather than simply measured by opposition to Netanyahu.
Arab Parties Have Influence, but Face Limits
The Arab lists’ 19 seats have made them an influential parliamentary force. Nevertheless, disagreements over whether Israeli opposition parties should cooperate with them constrain their political leverage. The two Arab lists also have distinct positions and calculations.
Their parliamentary influence matters for Palestinian citizens of Israel, but participating in government formation is not equivalent to transforming Israeli policies in the occupied West Bank or Gaza.
What Should Arabs Actually Judge?
Israeli parties should not be treated as politically identical. Their differences in policies, programmes and willingness to negotiate are real.
But those differences must be judged through decisions on settlement expansion, Jerusalem, Palestinian sovereignty, Gaza and the rights of people living under occupation.
Not who replaces Netanyahu, but what changes on the ground for Palestinians: their land, rights, freedom and political future.
Why an Independent Arab Position Matters
Arab governments have reason to follow Israeli elections closely. The mistake begins when political observation becomes political dependency, with Arab expectations tied to who occupies the Israeli prime minister’s office.
Israeli policies are shaped by domestic political forces, security and military calculations, relations with Washington and regional and international pressures. A new government may change its tactics without changing its underlying position towards Palestinians.
An effective Arab approach therefore requires independent political priorities and an assessment grounded in measurable decisions, not promises or expectations surrounding Israeli coalition negotiations.
Whether Eisenkot forms the next government or negotiations reach a deadlock, the decisive question remains unchanged: will Israeli policy towards Palestinians actually change? Replacing a prime minister is one thing. Ending the policies that sustain occupation is another.
