The Man They Wanted to Send Through a Metal Detector
Just two weeks ago, Donald Trump stood inside a hockey arena in Michigan and declared that a Muslim Senate candidate would be the “only senator” required to pass through a metal detector. He claimed he was there to prevent a “jihadist Muslim Brotherhood member” from entering the US Senate and insisted that he would refer to the candidate only as “Mohammed”.
At 2:27 am Eastern Time on 4 November 2026, the Associated Press declared Abdul El-Sayed the winner of Michigan’s Senate race.
The physician, son of an Egyptian immigrant from Alexandria and a graduate of Oxford and Columbia universities, had become the first Muslim ever elected to the United States Senate.
He secured 52.5 per cent of the vote, defeating Republican opponent Mike Rogers, who received 45.5 per cent.
Standing before his supporters, El-Sayed delivered a message that would define the significance of his victory: “America is big enough for all of us.”
He then addressed the parents who had watched the president ridicule their children’s names and the way they prayed.
“The bad guys lost,” he told them.
And El-Sayed was not alone.
According to preliminary election tallies, at least 37 Muslim candidates had either won or were leading their races in the 2026 US midterm elections. The early count included eight congressional candidates, 27 candidates for state legislatures and two candidates for judicial or local positions.
Adam Hamawy became the first Muslim elected to represent New Jersey in Congress. Nabeela Syed captured a previously Republican-held seat in the Illinois State Senate, while Palestinian American Ruwa Romman won a seat in the Georgia State Senate.
But this is not an article celebrating American electoral results.
It is a question directed at the approximately 26 million Muslims living in Europe.
If such a breakthrough is possible in Trump’s America, at the height of a campaign of anti-Muslim incitement, what excuse do we have?
1. How Did Abdul El-Sayed Win? Not Because He Was Muslim, and Not Despite Being Muslim
The first lesson from El-Sayed’s victory is that he did not campaign as “the Muslim candidate”.
He presented himself as a physician advocating universal healthcare for all Americans, a politician rejecting corporate campaign contributions in favour of individual donations, and a candidate who talked about petrol prices, grocery bills and the everyday cost of living before anything else.
He addressed white suburban voters, workers in Michigan’s automobile factories and single mothers in Detroit through a common political language: their daily economic interests.
Yet he did not hide his identity or apologise for it.
He did not change his name, distance himself from his religion to satisfy political opponents or evade difficult questions about his beliefs.
He openly declared his opposition to American taxpayers’ money financing what he described as a “genocidal war” in Gaza, a position widely regarded as politically dangerous for conventional candidates seeking national office.
El-Sayed also accused the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) of spending $42 million to defeat him.
After winning, he sarcastically thanked the organisation for giving him the opportunity to defeat it twice, a reference to the Democratic primary and the general election.
There is a political lesson here that every young Muslim in Europe should understand.
Religious identity is not an electoral programme, but neither is it something to be concealed in shame.
A successful candidate builds a political platform around shared interests while carrying their identity with confidence, without allowing that identity to become the entirety of their political message.
This distinction is fundamental.
A Muslim politician does not need to make religion the centre of every campaign speech. But neither should entering public life require abandoning religious convictions, remaining silent about Palestine or accepting that visible Muslim identity is incompatible with political leadership.
El-Sayed’s campaign demonstrated that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive choices.
2. Why Did the Anti-Muslim Campaign Fail?
What El-Sayed faced was not ordinary political criticism.
It was an organised attempt to turn his religion into an accusation.
Trump described him as a “jihadist”. The vice president questioned his loyalty to the Constitution. His Republican opponent raised allegations involving money from organisations supposedly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, without presenting substantiating evidence.
Serious journalistic reviews found no evidence supporting the allegations of extremist affiliation.
Yet El-Sayed won.
The explanation offered by his victory is relatively straightforward: when Michigan voters were presented with a choice, many judged the physician they knew, a man who had previously led Detroit’s health department, to be more credible than the threatening image constructed by politicians in Washington.
Anti-Muslim incitement can be effective when a Muslim candidate is unfamiliar to the wider public, politically isolated and known only within their own religious community.
It becomes considerably harder when voters already recognise that candidate as a doctor, teacher, trade union representative, neighbour or public servant.
People who have encountered someone through years of community service are less easily persuaded by attempts to portray that person as an existential threat.
Michigan was not the first example.
In November 2025, Zohran Mamdani won the mayoralty of New York City, America’s largest city, after a campaign in which opponents sought to turn his name, religion and position on Gaza into political liabilities.
Years earlier, Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib entered Congress despite intense political attacks, and both went on to secure repeated electoral victories.
These developments suggest an emerging pattern in American politics: increasingly aggressive anti-Muslim rhetoric does not necessarily prevent Muslim candidates from building broader electoral coalitions.
In some circumstances, such attacks can strengthen opposition to the politicians deploying them.
This is precisely what many Muslim communities in Europe have yet to achieve.
We have not sufficiently developed public figures whom the wider population already knows, respects and trusts before being asked to vote for them.
3. Europe: The Numbers That Should Embarrass Us
Approximately 26 million Muslims live in Europe, representing around 5 per cent of the population according to estimates from the Pew Research Center.
The European Network Against Racism estimates that ethnic minorities account for at least 10 per cent of the European Union’s population.
But how adequately are these communities represented in the European Parliament?
According to Euronews data, just 37 of the 720 members elected to the European Parliament in 2024 had ethnically diverse backgrounds.
That represents approximately 5 per cent of parliamentarians, almost unchanged from the proportion recorded in 2019.
These figures concern ethnic diversity rather than religious affiliation. No official comprehensive count establishes how many members are Muslim, although Muslim representation constitutes only a subset of this already limited diversity.
The European Network Against Racism concluded that the Parliament does not adequately reflect the diversity of Europe’s population.
The disparity becomes more striking when considering the importance of the institution.
The European Parliament participates in shaping legislation affecting migration, asylum, security and fundamental rights across a European Union of approximately 450 million people.
Yet the communities most directly affected by many of these debates remain inadequately represented in its elected membership.
Europe has produced successful Muslim political leaders, but they remain exceptions rather than evidence of broad institutional representation.
Sadiq Khan, the son of a Pakistani bus driver, has governed London since 2016 and secured a third mayoral term in 2024.
Ahmed Aboutaleb, born in Morocco, led Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ second-largest city, from 2009 until 2024.
In 2023, Humza Yousaf became the first Muslim to lead the Scottish Government.
These are substantial achievements.
Nevertheless, such successes have largely occurred in municipal or regional politics rather than producing a comparable presence within the European Parliament itself.
And while Muslims remain underrepresented in European political institutions, those institutions continue to make decisions with potentially significant implications for Muslim organisations and communities.
On 8 October 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution by 381 votes calling for stronger EU action against entities described as linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.
The resolution called for consideration of terrorist designations concerning relevant entities and extended scrutiny to associated youth organisations and intellectual platforms.
The resolution was a political call for action rather than an automatic designation of organisations as terrorist entities. Nevertheless, its scope raises important questions about how political and religious associations are assessed and how broadly such measures could be applied.
The political lesson is difficult to ignore.
Communities absent from the decision-making table may find themselves the subjects of decisions made without meaningful participation from their own representatives.
4. Why Do Muslims Struggle to Win in Europe? Five Uncomfortable Reasons
The First Problem: Political Party Gatekeepers
The American electoral system provides opportunities for candidates outside established political leadership to compete in party primaries and defeat candidates favoured by the party establishment.
El-Sayed demonstrated this when he defeated Congresswoman Haley Stevens in Michigan’s Democratic primary.
In much of Europe, however, elections to the European Parliament operate through political party lists.
The party determines who receives a prominent position and who is placed so far down the list that election becomes practically impossible.
Muslim candidates may be included to demonstrate diversity, but inclusion does not necessarily translate into a realistic opportunity to win.
A photograph on a campaign poster is not the same as access to political power.
Without meaningful influence over party selection processes, Muslim representation can remain symbolic rather than substantive.
The Second Problem: Political Disengagement
A substantial section of young European Muslims does not participate consistently in elections.
Some have lost confidence in political institutions. Others regard European elections as remote from the concerns of everyday life.
But this disengagement carries consequences.
The Parliament that appears irrelevant to a young voter can influence legislation affecting family reunification, migration, religious freedoms and the legal environment in which civil society organisations operate.
Political decisions do not stop affecting a community simply because members of that community choose not to participate.
Disengagement may reflect understandable frustration, but it also weakens a community’s ability to influence the institutions making decisions about its future.
The Third Problem: Fragmentation
Europe’s Muslims are spread across numerous nationalities, languages, religious traditions and communities with different historical experiences.
Turkish, Moroccan, Algerian, Pakistani, Bosnian and other Muslim communities often maintain strong attachments to their countries of origin.
These connections are culturally important, but they can also complicate the development of shared political priorities.
Many community organisations remain influenced by the political agendas of the countries from which previous generations emigrated, rather than concentrating on the countries where their children were born and raised.
The result is that communities facing similar challenges in education, employment, discrimination and political representation may struggle to act collectively.
Attempts to establish parties built solely around Muslim identity have also frequently remained electorally marginal.
Religious identity alone does not automatically create a coherent political programme, particularly among communities whose members hold widely differing views on economic and social policy.
The Fourth Problem: The Absence of Political Infrastructure
In the United States, organisations have spent years developing programmes to train Muslim candidates, support campaigns and increase voter participation.
Such efforts are built around long-term political engagement rather than mobilisation during the final weeks of an election.
In Europe, Muslim community investment has historically concentrated on mosques, religious schools and charitable organisations.
These institutions are important and should not be dismissed.
However, considerably less attention has been devoted to establishing the infrastructure needed to prepare future generations for public office.
Who is developing the next generation of Muslim councillors, parliamentarians, legal specialists, policy advisers and public administrators?
Who is teaching young people how political parties operate, how candidates are selected, how legislation is developed and how public institutions function?
There is a difference between establishing institutions that serve a community and developing individuals capable of representing it within wider society.
European Muslim communities have considerable experience with the former. The latter remains underdeveloped.
The Fifth Problem: Fear
There is also fear.
Fear of public visibility.
Fear of being accused of infiltration or association with “political Islam”.
Fear that every religious association, charitable activity or community organisation a Muslim candidate has ever supported will become grounds for political suspicion.
These concerns are not imaginary.
In several European countries, debates about Islam and political participation have become intertwined with official discussions about security, extremism and national identity.
For Muslims considering public office, the possibility of having their religious identity subjected to exceptional scrutiny can be a powerful deterrent.
Yet the lesson from Michigan is that political confidence cannot develop through permanent withdrawal from public life.
El-Sayed did not escape scrutiny by becoming invisible.
He confronted it as a public figure with a record of service, an identifiable political programme and a willingness to defend his convictions.
5. What Can Young European Muslims Learn From Abdul El-Sayed?
The first lesson is to begin with the neighbourhood rather than a political slogan.
El-Sayed did not enter the United States Senate without previous experience.
He led Detroit’s health department, lost Michigan’s Democratic gubernatorial primary in 2018 and returned eight years later to contest a Senate seat.
Major electoral victories are often preceded by smaller defeats and years of public service.
Experience develops through working with people, understanding their problems and building credibility before seeking higher office.
The second lesson is to understand the language and institutions of one’s country.
The objective should not be to become what others consider a “good Muslim” for political purposes, but to demonstrate professional competence in public health, education, economics, law or another area of public responsibility.
Religious identity does not replace expertise.
A candidate’s credibility is strengthened when they understand the institutions they seek to influence and can offer practical responses to the problems facing the wider population.
The third lesson concerns relationships beyond one’s immediate community.
Trade unions, environmental movements, human rights organisations, student groups, Jewish opponents of war and other civil society organisations may share common interests with Muslim communities on specific issues.
Meaningful political cooperation does not require complete agreement on every question.
It requires recognising where shared priorities exist and developing working relationships around them.
The fourth lesson is to reject the assumption that Muslim political participation must depend on silence about matters of conscience.
Muslim politicians in Europe can face pressure to moderate or abandon positions on Gaza, publicly distance themselves from their religion, or accept the role of a politically convenient representative whose image is welcomed while their opinions are ignored.
El-Sayed openly criticised American involvement in Israel’s war in Gaza and still won his election.
His experience challenges the assumption that maintaining a principled position on Palestine is always an insurmountable electoral disadvantage.
Political dignity and electoral credibility need not be incompatible.
6. European Political Parties Must Also Make a Choice
Responsibility does not rest entirely with Muslim communities.
European political parties, from social democrats and liberals to the Greens and centre-right organisations, regularly speak about integration, diversity and equal opportunity.
Yet when candidate lists are prepared, people from immigrant backgrounds are frequently placed in positions that offer little realistic prospect of election.
These same parties then express surprise when sections of minority communities become politically disengaged.
Over recent years, some established parties have also adopted rhetoric associated with the far right, apparently believing that accommodating public fears about migration and Islam will help recover disaffected voters.
This approach can leave Muslim citizens questioning whether established political institutions regard them as equal participants or permanent subjects of suspicion.
There are two competing approaches available to European parties.
One is to make their commitments to representation meaningful by providing qualified Muslim candidates with genuine opportunities to compete for electable positions.
The other is to continue treating Muslim representation as secondary while accepting the consequences of political disengagement and the movement of disillusioned voters towards smaller parties.
Michigan offers a different political example: a candidate whose identity was repeatedly used against him nevertheless developed a coalition capable of winning a major statewide election.
That result challenges assumptions about the electoral limitations of visible Muslim political leadership.
7. The Next Deadline Is 2029
The next European Parliament elections are scheduled for 2029.
Less than three years remain.
That is enough time for meaningful preparation, but only if the work begins well before the final weeks of campaigning.
The objective need not be the establishment of a single European Islamic political party or the creation of exclusively religious electoral lists.
The alternative presented here is the development of a generation of qualified Muslim candidates operating within Europe’s existing democratic political parties, across the ideological spectrum from the left to the centre-right.
The challenge involves understanding candidate selection, political organisation and the institutional processes that determine who eventually reaches elected office.
Consider the Netherlands.
Hundreds of thousands of young people of Moroccan, Turkish, Syrian and Egyptian backgrounds live in the country. Many were born there, hold Dutch citizenship and speak Dutch as their primary language.
They are not temporary visitors to Dutch political life.
They are citizens whose futures are tied to the institutions governing their country.
Yet their collective political potential remains far greater than their visible presence in national and European political institutions.
Even modest increases in informed and organised electoral participation could alter how parties understand the priorities of communities they have historically treated as politically marginal.
The capacity already exists within these populations.
What remains underdeveloped is the organisation needed to translate civic presence into sustained institutional participation.
Muslim communities have invested heavily in constructing buildings and maintaining religious and charitable institutions.
The next stage of community development should also consider investment in people.
That means resources for political education, candidate training, voter registration, media literacy, legal knowledge and participation in municipal government.
It means preparing young people to understand not only the responsibilities of citizenship but also the mechanisms through which democratic institutions operate.
Political representation is not created overnight, and it cannot be secured through symbolic recognition alone.
It develops through years of experience, institutional knowledge and public trust.
Conclusion: Europe Is Big Enough for All of Us
On the night of his victory, Abdul El-Sayed declared that America was big enough for everyone.
The same principle applies to Europe.
But equal participation in political life does not automatically follow from demographic presence or formal citizenship.
It requires functioning democratic institutions, fair opportunities, public engagement and individuals prepared to undertake the demanding work of public service.
The young Muslim in Rotterdam, Berlin, Paris or Brussels should not have to seek special permission to imagine a future in public office.
They are citizens of the countries in which they live. Their religious identities do not diminish that citizenship, and their political ambitions are not inherently less legitimate than those of anyone else.
The question is whether Europe’s institutions and Muslim communities are prepared to translate that principle into meaningful representation.
In Michigan, opponents suggested that Abdul El-Sayed belonged behind a metal detector.
Instead, he passed through the ballot box.
