The surprise visit of US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to Israel has reignited debate over the possibility of renewed war with Iran, raising questions about whether Washington is preparing for another military confrontation or attempting to prevent Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from launching one independently.
The visit came just one week before Israel’s Knesset elections, scheduled for 27 October 2026, against a backdrop of American military preparations and Israeli warnings of a possible surprise Iranian attack.
Israeli media offered sharply different interpretations of Hegseth’s visit. Some reports suggested preparations were underway for a major joint American-Israeli offensive against Iran. Others indicated that Washington was attempting to restrain Netanyahu and prevent him from initiating military action before the US congressional midterm elections.
The competing interpretations have brought the political calculations of both governments into focus, particularly as Israel approaches its parliamentary elections and the United States prepares for its own electoral contest on 3 November.
A Secretive Meeting at a US Military Deployment Site
Israeli political correspondent Barak Ravid revealed on Channel 12 on 19 October that Hegseth had arrived in Israel on an unannounced visit and met Netanyahu at Ovda Air Base in the Negev.
The base hosts American military personnel and aircraft, including aerial refuelling planes considered essential for conducting long-range operations against Iran.
The meeting was attended by Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz, National Security Council chief Shmuel Ben Ezra and Netanyahu’s military secretary Guy Markiziano.
Notably absent were Israeli military chief Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir and Mossad director Roman Gofman.
Israeli newspaper Haaretz and Channel 13 subsequently confirmed that the meeting had taken place and that Iran was among the subjects discussed.
The Israeli news website Maariv also reported the possible participation of representatives from the United Arab Emirates, although other accounts disputed their presence.
The meeting attracted particular attention because of its location, timing and participants.
Ovda Air Base is associated with the American military presence in Israel, while aerial refuelling capabilities would be indispensable to sustaining extensive air operations against Iranian targets.
Nevertheless, the meeting itself does not establish that a decision to launch another war has been made.
Two Competing Explanations for Hegseth’s Visit
In an analysis published by Yedioth Ahronoth on 20 October, political and diplomatic correspondent Itamar Eichner presented two substantially different explanations for the American defence chief’s visit.
The first, based on diplomatic reporting, suggested that Washington and Tel Aviv could launch a large-scale joint attack against Iran immediately after the US congressional midterm elections on 3 November.
Under this scenario, President Donald Trump would avoid initiating a major military confrontation before American voters went to the polls, potentially leaving the administration greater political flexibility once the elections had passed.
The second explanation pointed in almost the opposite direction.
Eichner cited an informed Israeli official who said Hegseth had primarily travelled to inspect American forces stationed in Israel.
According to the official, his meeting with Netanyahu was also intended to ensure that Washington would not be caught off guard by a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran before the American elections.
The official claimed that Netanyahu wanted to strike Iran, while the Trump administration preferred to avoid another confrontation for the time being.
These accounts suggest two fundamentally different possibilities.
In one, Washington and Israel are coordinating preparations for renewed war. In the other, the United States is attempting to control the timing of any Israeli military action and prevent an escalation that could undermine its domestic political calculations.
The second explanation is particularly consequential given Israel’s dependence on American military support to sustain extensive air and defensive operations.
A broader confrontation could also involve threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, including the possibility of its closure, and trigger a regional conflict extending well beyond Iran and Israel.
Two Possible Windows for Military Escalation
The Yedioth Ahronoth analysis identified two potential periods for escalation, drawing on assessments attributed to Israeli officials.
The first falls before Israel’s parliamentary elections on 27 October.
Eichner quoted an Israeli official who estimated a 30% probability of an attack before the vote, compared with a 70% probability that no attack would occur.
The official suggested that an early strike would most likely be linked to intelligence indicating an imminent Iranian attack.
The second potential window begins after the American midterm elections on 3 November.
The same official placed the probability of an attack during that period at 70%, against a 30% probability that no attack would take place.
These figures, however, represent the personal estimates of an unidentified Israeli official. They are not publicly disclosed intelligence assessments or independently established probabilities.
Another period attracting attention extends from 3 November until 3 January 2027, when the newly elected US Congress is scheduled to begin its term.
According to the Israeli analysis, Trump could seek to use this interval to pursue major military decisions if the midterm elections weaken the Republican Party’s position in Congress.
Such a scenario would place the prospect of military confrontation with Iran within a narrow political timetable shaped by developments in both Washington and Tel Aviv.
Netanyahu’s Electoral Calculations and the Risk of War
Hegseth’s visit coincided with Trump’s public declaration of electoral support for Netanyahu, intensifying debate in Israel over whether military preparations against Iran could become entangled with the prime minister’s efforts to remain in office.
According to the reporting, American support for Netanyahu is also associated with Washington’s ambition to expand the Abraham Accords and facilitate regional arrangements concerning Gaza and Lebanon.
However, this interpretation is not supported by any publicly announced political agreement within Israel.
Domestically, Israeli opposition figures have approached repeated warnings about an approaching war with caution.
Their concerns centre on the possibility that Netanyahu could use confrontation with Iran to reshape the election campaign.
Rather than focusing on accountability for the failures surrounding 7 October 2023, the election could become a contest over national security leadership, an issue Netanyahu may seek to place at the centre of his campaign.
Israeli journalist Ben Caspit reported on the Walla news website that military chief Eyal Zamir had warned American officials that renewed fighting before the Israeli elections could lead to the postponement of the vote.
Nevertheless, postponing an election would require legal and institutional procedures. It would not follow automatically from a military confrontation.
There is also a political risk for Netanyahu.
A renewed war exposing Israeli population centres and critical infrastructure to large-scale Iranian missile attacks could generate public dissatisfaction rather than electoral support.
The political consequences of another confrontation are therefore far from predictable, particularly if the Israeli government cannot guarantee a rapid or decisive military outcome.
Could a Third War Achieve What Previous Attacks Could Not?
Beyond the electoral calculations, Israeli security officials face a more fundamental question: what could another round of fighting accomplish that previous confrontations failed to achieve?
Earlier Israeli and American military operations focused on weakening Iran’s political leadership, damaging its nuclear programme and reducing its missile capabilities.
Yet Iran retained sufficient military capacity to retaliate and rebuild parts of its arsenal.
This has fuelled questions within Israel about the effectiveness of further attacks, particularly if their strategic objectives remain unchanged.
A 2026 study published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies documented a notable decline in public satisfaction with the military achievements of the confrontations.
The proportion of respondents expressing a high level of satisfaction with military accomplishments fell from 70.5% following the June 2025 war to 42% in May 2026.
Meanwhile, 48% of respondents expressed low or very low satisfaction with the political results of the latest war.
These findings point to a distinction between military achievements and lasting strategic outcomes.
Although Israeli and American strikes inflicted damage on Iranian capabilities, questions remain about whether military pressure alone can force Tehran into accepting the political and security outcomes sought by its adversaries.
Iran’s Rebuilt Missile Capabilities Complicate Israeli Planning
On 10 October, Haaretz published Israeli security assessments indicating that Iran had restored a substantial portion of its missile stockpile.
Israeli military officials also warned about the consequences of launching an attack shortly before the parliamentary elections.
Their concerns included the vulnerability of Israel’s civilian population and critical infrastructure to Iranian retaliation, alongside the difficulty of ensuring that even an expanded military campaign could bring about the collapse of Iran’s government.
The restoration of Iranian missile capabilities is particularly important because it raises the potential cost of any new confrontation.
A renewed Israeli offensive would not necessarily prevent Tehran from responding against Israeli targets, while an extended exchange could place further pressure on Israel’s defensive systems and increase its dependence on American support.
Analyses by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies have also indicated that the absence of a comprehensive settlement covering Iran’s nuclear programme, missile capabilities and sanctions leaves any cessation of hostilities vulnerable to collapse.
In that context, another military confrontation could weaken Iranian capabilities temporarily without resolving the underlying disputes.
Four Scenarios Facing Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran
The present crisis leaves four potential paths open.
The first involves continued mutual deterrence, with Washington, Israel and Iran maintaining military readiness while avoiding a direct confrontation.
The second is a limited military strike that develops into a broader exchange of attacks, particularly if either side responds more forcefully than its adversaries anticipate.
The third is a large-scale joint American-Israeli war against Iran, potentially involving sustained air operations and wider regional consequences.
The fourth involves an interim understanding reached through military pressure and diplomatic mediation, allowing the parties to avoid another major confrontation without necessarily resolving their underlying differences.
Each scenario carries significant uncertainty, particularly given the military deployments, unresolved political disputes and competing electoral calculations involved.
There is also the possibility of escalation through miscalculation.
If Tehran interprets American and Israeli military movements as preparations for an imminent attack, Iranian authorities could decide to act pre-emptively, potentially triggering the very confrontation that diplomatic and military calculations are intended to manage.
Who Ultimately Controls the Decision for War?
Hegseth’s visit has revealed the continued military preparations by Washington and Tel Aviv for the possibility of renewed war with Iran, but it has also exposed uncertainty over the timing, objectives and potential consequences of another confrontation.
The competing accounts emerging from Israeli media raise a central question about the American-Israeli relationship: whether Washington is coordinating a future offensive or attempting to prevent Netanyahu from imposing a military timetable of his own.
The political constraints facing the two governments are not identical.
Netanyahu faces an election in which national security and his record in office remain central issues. Trump, meanwhile, must consider the consequences of a major Middle Eastern war for the American midterm elections and the congressional balance that will emerge afterwards.
Negotiations remain a possible alternative, but the absence of a comprehensive settlement continues to leave military escalation on the table.
Between deterrence, political calculation and preparations for renewed fighting, the danger remains that a decision taken in Washington, Tel Aviv or Tehran, or a miscalculation by any of them, could ignite a much wider regional war.
