Malaysia’s decision to prohibit government employees from using the popular navigation application Waze has renewed scrutiny of the platform’s Israeli origins, its founders’ reported connections to Israeli military intelligence and the potential security implications of the location data it collects from millions of users worldwide.
The application, now owned by Google’s parent company Alphabet, has approximately 180 million users globally and an estimated 500,000 users across the Arab world, according to figures cited by app analytics platform Sensor Tower and statistical research website World Population Review.
Despite its widespread popularity, many users may be unfamiliar with Waze’s development in Israel, the military backgrounds attributed to its founders and the legal framework governing aspects of its operations.
These concerns have prompted Malaysia to introduce restrictions on the application within government institutions, raising broader questions about whether navigation services collecting detailed information about citizens’ movements could create national security vulnerabilities.
Malaysia Raises Concerns Over Israeli Jurisdiction
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim announced that government employees would be prohibited from using Waze after concerns emerged over the application’s Israeli origins and potential implications for national security.
Speaking on Tuesday, Ibrahim said the government was examining the risks associated with the application, which he described as being subject to Israeli laws.
Following a meeting of the National Cybersecurity Committee, the prime minister reinforced his position in a Facebook statement.
“We cannot afford to be complacent when it comes to the security of people’s data and identities,” he said.
The decision reflects concerns about the jurisdiction governing digital platforms and the possible exposure of sensitive information collected through applications used by government personnel.
Iraq has also moved towards restricting Waze.
Earlier this month, the Iraqi Ministry of Communications announced plans to block the application by the end of December 2026, bringing forward an earlier timetable that had envisaged restrictions beginning in early 2027.
The developments have renewed attention on Waze’s ownership, legal obligations and the origins of the technology behind one of the world’s most widely used navigation services.
An Israeli Technology Project Acquired by Google
Waze originated in Israel in 2006 as a collaborative mapping project known as FreeMap.
The project allowed users to contribute geographical information and improve the accuracy of digital maps through shared data.
It was formally launched as Waze in 2008 through Waze Mobile, founded by Shabtai, Uri Levine and Amir Shinar.
Google acquired the company in June 2013 for approximately $1.3 billion.
Since then, Waze has expanded into a major international navigation platform, providing real-time traffic information, alternative routes, speed camera alerts and information about road conditions.
Its commercial ownership has been American for more than 13 years, but questions have persisted about its Israeli corporate origins and the legal arrangements governing its services.
According to the application’s terms and policies as described in the source reporting, Israeli law continues to govern relevant aspects of its operations.
The distinction is important because ownership by an American technology company does not necessarily resolve questions about the jurisdiction of particular corporate entities, the handling of personal data or the legal obligations applicable to those entities.
However, the existence of Israeli legal provisions in an application’s terms does not, by itself, establish that Israeli intelligence agencies have access to its users’ information.
Determining the practical implications requires examining the relevant contractual terms, data storage arrangements and applicable legal procedures.
Founders’ Reported Links to Israeli Military Intelligence
One of the most controversial elements of Waze’s history concerns the reported military backgrounds of its founders.
According to a report by Irbak, an independent rights-focused platform that investigates companies with connections to Israel and its military, all three Waze founders previously served together in the Israeli army before establishing the company in 2008.
The platform identifies their backgrounds with Unit 8200, the Israeli military intelligence organisation responsible for signals intelligence and cyber-related operations.
The Israeli army’s official website has also referred to Uri Levine as an example of a successful entrepreneur who emerged from the Israeli military.
That reference, however, does not independently establish the specific service histories of all three founders.
What Is Unit 8200?
Unit 8200 is one of the most prominent branches of Israel’s military intelligence apparatus.
Operating within the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, it specialises in signals intelligence, cyber operations, data collection and electronic surveillance.
The unit is described as one of the Israeli military’s largest individual formations, with approximately 5,000 personnel.
Much of its activity remains classified.
Its intelligence operations have included the collection and analysis of communications, while its surveillance capabilities have attracted particular scrutiny because of their use in monitoring Palestinians.
The unit has also been linked to the use of Microsoft cloud technologies in intelligence operations involving Palestinian communications.
Reporting on those operations described the use of cloud-based infrastructure to support the monitoring of telephone communications involving Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.
These activities have contributed to wider concerns about the relationship between Israel’s intelligence establishment and its technology sector.
Former members of Israeli intelligence units have gone on to establish or participate in numerous technology companies, particularly within the cybersecurity industry.
The source reporting also draws attention to Wiz, a separate Israeli-founded cybersecurity company associated with former intelligence personnel.
Wiz, which should not be confused with the navigation application Waze, was acquired by Google in a transaction valued at approximately $32 billion, described in the source as taking place in March 2026.
The reference reflects the wider debate surrounding the influence of Israel’s military technology ecosystem on commercially available digital services.
Nevertheless, the reported military backgrounds of technology founders do not, on their own, demonstrate that the companies they subsequently establish conduct intelligence operations.
European Privacy Concerns Preceded Malaysia’s Decision
Malaysia’s decision is not the first time Waze has faced scrutiny over data privacy and security.
In May 2025, the European investigative journalism platform Follow the Money published findings examining concerns about the application and the handling of personal information.
The investigation raised questions about the European Commission’s sharing of sensitive information with Waze and the legal protections governing such exchanges.
According to the investigation, the Commission was sharing data with the Israeli company without obtaining separate authorisation or implementing additional protective measures.
The reporting linked this arrangement to the European Union’s recognition of Israel as a jurisdiction offering an adequate level of personal data protection.
Israel was described as one of 16 jurisdictions benefiting from this designation.
Such arrangements allow certain transfers of personal information under European data protection rules, but they do not eliminate wider questions about how information might be handled after it reaches another jurisdiction.
The Follow the Money investigation also examined concerns expressed by specialists about the potential relationship between information collected through navigation services and artificial intelligence technologies used for surveillance.
Those concerns were particularly sensitive in the context of Israeli military intelligence operations in Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories.
Experts interviewed by the publication raised questions about whether location data gathered through commercial services could potentially support surveillance technologies capable of monitoring individuals and tracking their movements.
The investigation did not establish that Waze user data had been used directly in Israeli military targeting operations.
Nonetheless, the concerns reflected a broader debate about the possibility of civilian technology and commercially collected information being repurposed for intelligence or military applications.
Eleven Civil Rights Organisations Raised the Alarm
In April 2024, eleven non-governmental organisations concerned with civil rights submitted an open letter to the European Commission, according to Follow the Money.
The organisations raised concerns about Waze’s relationship with Israel and the potential implications of Israeli intelligence agencies’ extensive surveillance capabilities.
Their intervention reflected unease about whether the collection and transfer of location information could create security risks for individuals whose movements and personal activities were recorded through the application.
Elisabeth Holterman, a strategic adviser at Cyberveilig Nederland and a former officer of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, supported the concerns, drawing on her previous experience with Israeli intelligence and security organisations.
The investigation also alleged that information collected by Waze was stored and processed through cloud servers located in Israel.
This claim is important to the debate because the physical location of data storage and the legal jurisdiction of the organisations handling that data can influence which authorities may seek access to it.
However, the source material does not independently establish that all Waze user data is stored exclusively in Israel.
Nor does it establish that Israeli intelligence agencies have obtained direct access to the application’s databases.
The distinction between a potential legal or technical vulnerability and documented intelligence access remains central to assessing the allegations.
Is Israel Using Waze to Spy on Users?
The most consequential question is whether Israeli security agencies can exploit the data collected by Waze for intelligence purposes.
The concerns arise from several overlapping factors: the application’s Israeli origins, its founders’ reported military backgrounds, the laws applicable to aspects of its operations and the nature of the information collected from users.
Navigation applications can accumulate extensive records of movement, including repeated journeys, frequently visited locations, travel patterns and information about road networks.
Such information can become particularly sensitive when associated with identifiable individuals, government employees or personnel working in strategically important institutions.
The source reporting argues that Israeli law and the alleged storage of information on Israeli servers could create pathways through which security agencies might seek access to user information.
However, no official confirmation has been presented establishing that Waze provides Israeli intelligence agencies with access to its users’ data.
Nor is there verified evidence in the supplied reporting demonstrating that the application operates as an intelligence collection tool on behalf of the Israeli government.
The security concerns therefore centre on the potential for access and misuse rather than an established finding of espionage.
For governments evaluating the risks of using foreign-developed digital applications, that distinction does not necessarily eliminate the need for scrutiny.
An application can present potential data security concerns without evidence that its operators are knowingly participating in intelligence activities.
Why the Controversy Resembles Washington’s Concerns About TikTok
The controversy surrounding Waze has similarities to the concerns raised by the United States about Chinese technology platforms, particularly TikTok.
Washington’s restrictions on TikTok were driven in part by concerns that personal information collected from American users could become accessible to Chinese authorities through legal obligations imposed on companies operating under Chinese jurisdiction.
American officials expressed particular concern about personal photographs, videos and other information potentially being stored on servers in China and becoming accessible to the Chinese government.
These concerns contributed to the pressure placed on TikTok over its ownership structure, data management and operations in the United States.
The Waze controversy raises a comparable question from a different political perspective.
If an application’s legal jurisdiction, corporate connections or data storage arrangements are considered sufficient grounds for national security scrutiny when the company has Chinese origins, similar questions can reasonably be raised about applications with Israeli origins.
That comparison does not establish that Waze and TikTok share identical legal structures, technical arrangements or security risks.
Rather, it raises the question of whether governments apply comparable scrutiny to foreign technology platforms whose operations may expose sensitive information to another state’s jurisdiction.
For Arab countries, where Israeli military and intelligence activities remain matters of particular sensitivity, the issue extends beyond ordinary consumer privacy.
It also concerns the security implications of allowing foreign-linked platforms to collect detailed information about national infrastructure, government personnel and civilian movement.
Why Waze Collects Particularly Sensitive Information
Unlike many social media applications, Waze collects information directly related to physical locations and movement.
Its navigation system relies on location tracking, map data and real-time information contributed by users.
These features allow the platform to identify traffic conditions, recommend alternative routes, detect congestion and display reports about speed cameras and police activity.
The application can also display information about mobile police patrols and other road-related incidents.
Its mapping infrastructure contains detailed information about streets, road networks and geographical locations in the countries where it operates.
At an individual level, location information can reveal more than a person’s current position.
Repeated travel patterns may expose the places a user regularly visits, the routes they follow and the times at which they move between locations.
At a broader level, aggregated location information can provide insights into traffic flows and patterns of movement across cities and surrounding areas.
Such information has obvious commercial benefits for improving navigation systems.
However, privacy specialists have warned that the same categories of data can create risks when collected on a large scale or accessed by parties for purposes unrelated to the service users originally intended to receive.
This is particularly relevant to government employees, military personnel and individuals whose regular movements may be considered sensitive.
European privacy experts cited in the investigations expressed concern about the volume of location-related information collected by the application and the extent to which users understand how that information is processed.
Although navigation services generally require location permissions to function, accepting those permissions does not necessarily mean users understand every potential use, transfer or retention arrangement involving their information.
Could Navigation Data Be Used in Military Artificial Intelligence?
A further concern raised in the reporting involves the possible use of commercially collected geographical information to develop artificial intelligence systems with military applications.
Location and mapping data can potentially be useful in training technologies designed to recognise terrain, interpret road networks and support navigation.
Such information may also have applications in autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial systems.
In military contexts, geographical data can contribute to systems used for surveillance, movement analysis and operational planning.
The source reporting raises the possibility that information collected through Waze could be repurposed for Israeli artificial intelligence technologies used in Gaza, including systems associated with the tracking and targeting of individuals.
It also raises the possibility of such information contributing to the development of drones and driverless vehicles.
These possibilities remain hypothetical in the absence of evidence demonstrating that Waze data has actually been transferred into such systems.
No independently established connection is presented between Waze’s commercial navigation databases and specific Israeli military artificial intelligence programmes used to target Palestinian civilians.
Nevertheless, the underlying concern reflects the increasingly blurred boundary between civilian digital infrastructure and technologies that may have intelligence or military applications.
Detailed geographical data can have value beyond its original commercial purpose, making questions about access, storage, transfer and oversight particularly consequential.
The Wider Question for Arab Governments and Users
Malaysia’s restrictions and Iraq’s planned ban have placed Waze within a broader discussion about digital sovereignty, foreign technology dependence and the protection of sensitive personal information.
The controversy is particularly relevant to Arab users because of the Israeli origins of the application, the reported military backgrounds of its founders and the continuing scrutiny of Israeli surveillance practices involving Palestinians.
For the estimated 500,000 users across the Arab world, the immediate question is what information the application collects, where that information is processed and which legal authorities may have access to it.
For governments, the stakes extend to whether navigation platforms used by public employees could expose sensitive movement patterns or information about strategically important locations.
The fact that Waze is owned by Google does not automatically resolve every concern about jurisdiction or data processing.
Equally, Israeli corporate origins and previous military service by company founders do not independently prove that an application is engaged in espionage.
What Malaysia’s decision demonstrates is that the security implications of commercial navigation technology are no longer being treated solely as matters of individual privacy.
They are increasingly being examined as questions of national security, technological dependence and control over information that can reveal the movements of people and institutions.
For countries concerned about the potential misuse of such information, the controversy places renewed attention on the relationship between commercial technology, state intelligence capabilities and the protection of citizens’ digital data.
