Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom has revealed new details about covert intelligence relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia dating back to 2006, describing nearly two decades of discreet security contacts shaped by shared regional interests, particularly concerns over Iran and other regional threats.
According to the newspaper’s report, published on Tuesday, the relationship began taking shape during Meir Dagan’s leadership of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency. It subsequently developed through indirect security and intelligence channels, despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv.
The revelations provide further insight into a longstanding relationship that has remained largely outside public scrutiny, while raising questions about the extent to which intelligence cooperation could eventually influence efforts towards Saudi-Israeli normalisation.
Secret Intelligence Channels Dating Back to 2006
The Israeli report identified Eyal Tzir Cohen, who headed the Middle East department within Mossad’s Tevel division, responsible for foreign intelligence relations, as one of the figures involved in managing the relationship.
According to the newspaper, Cohen inherited an already established intelligence relationship between Mossad and Saudi Arabia when he assumed responsibility in 2010.
A former Israeli intelligence official was quoted as saying: “I inherited the relationship that Mossad had been managing with Saudi Arabia.”
The newspaper described a network of intermediaries and indirect communication channels that enabled Israeli and Saudi representatives to maintain contact without publicly acknowledging their exchanges.
Among these arrangements was what the report characterised as a “special liaison”, which facilitated discreet meetings and communications away from public attention.
One incident reportedly involved officials from the two sides meeting during a reception at the White House. The representatives moved into a separate room to conduct a private conversation away from other attendees.
According to Israel Hayom, Israeli intelligence officials sought to develop these initial contacts into more systematic professional cooperation involving security and political representatives.
Their efforts reportedly included attempts to establish communication with more senior figures within Saudi Arabia’s leadership and royal family.
Riyadh, meanwhile, was said to have shown interest in obtaining Israeli intelligence, technological capabilities and security expertise.
However, the Saudi side reportedly remained cautious about the potential political consequences if the relationship became public, reflecting the sensitivity of maintaining undisclosed contacts with Israel in the absence of diplomatic recognition.
Iran and the Houthis at the Centre of Shared Security Interests
Concerns about Iran were among the principal factors driving the intelligence relationship, according to the Israeli newspaper.
Both sides reportedly identified overlapping security interests concerning Iranian influence across the Middle East and the activities of armed groups aligned with Tehran, particularly the Houthi movement in Yemen.
The newspaper had previously reported, on 15 September, that Saudi Arabia had contacted Israel indirectly through the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in an effort to obtain intelligence relating to Houthi threats.
Those contacts reportedly focused particularly on maritime security, including potential dangers to regional shipping routes and the strategically important Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Citing regional diplomatic and security sources, the report said the communications formed part of efforts to identify ways of responding to Houthi threats.
However, the reported exchanges did not amount to an announcement of formal security cooperation or the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Houthi Allegations of Israeli Intelligence Flights
In a related development, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi alleged that Saudi Arabia had opened its airports to Israeli intelligence flights heading towards Yemen in exchange for intelligence information.
The allegation, if substantiated, would suggest a more operational dimension to the relationship than previously acknowledged.
However, the report offered no independently verified evidence supporting al-Houthi’s claims.
Neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel has publicly disclosed the full nature or scope of any intelligence cooperation between them.
The reported contacts illustrate the importance of unofficial intelligence channels in managing regional security concerns.
Such arrangements can enable governments to exchange information, coordinate responses to perceived threats and pursue shared security objectives without establishing overt political relations that could carry substantial domestic or regional consequences.
Israeli Surveillance Technology and Saudi Security Interests
The relationship has also reportedly extended into technological and intelligence capabilities, particularly surveillance and cybersecurity.
The Israeli newspaper referred to previous reporting about Saudi interest in Israeli security technologies, including surveillance systems and spyware developed by Israeli companies.
Among the technologies mentioned was Pegasus, the sophisticated spyware developed by Israeli surveillance company NSO Group.
Pegasus has been the subject of international investigations examining its reported use to target the mobile phones of political figures, journalists and activists across several countries.
The spyware also featured in reporting connected to the case of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.
However, the existence of those investigations does not independently establish the nature of specific technology transfers or intelligence agreements between Saudi Arabia and Israel at different stages of their relationship.
According to Israel Hayom, the security relationship was not confined to political contacts.
It also involved interest in technical expertise, intelligence capabilities and the potential exchange of security-related information.
The relationship reportedly remained characterised by secrecy and caution, with significant aspects of the contacts never publicly disclosed by either government.
Intelligence Sharing as an Instrument of Political Influence
The Israeli report also examined the strategic value of intelligence sharing between foreign security partners.
In intelligence practice, such cooperation generally involves exchanging information concerning security threats, potential attacks or planned operations, allowing participating governments to prevent incidents or reduce their consequences.
A former Israeli intelligence official reportedly explained that sharing sensitive information could help partner countries prevent attacks, but could also serve a broader political purpose.
According to the account, a government providing valuable intelligence may gain additional influence over the recipient, particularly when that information contributes to preventing serious security threats.
This creates the possibility that intelligence cooperation can develop beyond an operational arrangement into a source of diplomatic leverage.
The report cited previous international coverage of intelligence exchanges between Israel and Western countries concerning possible security threats.
Among the examples mentioned were intelligence reports said to have been shared with France ahead of the 2024 Paris Olympic Games, as well as other cases involving alleged plots and potential attacks.
However, these examples relate to broader Israeli intelligence-sharing practices and do not independently establish the full extent of intelligence cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The newspaper’s account nevertheless presents intelligence sharing as a potential means of developing political influence alongside security relationships.
Could Intelligence Cooperation Pave the Way for Saudi-Israeli Normalisation?
The reported intelligence contacts have also raised questions about whether shared security concerns could eventually create momentum towards formal diplomatic relations.
An analysis published by Al-Monitor in September suggested that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might seek to use Saudi Arabia’s need for intelligence concerning the Houthis to advance normalisation discussions.
The analysis cited Israeli political sources who considered the possibility of leveraging mutual security interests to encourage political engagement between the two sides.
However, it did not present such an outcome as an agreed arrangement or suggest that the future of normalisation had already been determined.
Saudi-Israeli normalisation efforts have faced considerable obstacles in recent years, particularly over the Palestinian question.
Saudi Arabia has maintained, through previous public statements and official positions, that establishing relations with Israel must be linked to meaningful progress towards the establishment of a Palestinian state.
This position remains an important political consideration, notwithstanding the existence of reported intelligence contacts.
Consequently, covert security cooperation does not necessarily indicate that an announcement of formal normalisation is imminent.
While shared concerns over Iran and the Houthis may provide incentives for continued intelligence exchanges, broader political considerations and the unresolved Palestinian question remain influential factors in determining the future of Saudi-Israeli relations.
A Relationship Developed Outside Public Diplomacy
The Israel Hayom revelations trace a reported intelligence relationship that began nearly two decades ago and gradually evolved through indirect communications, security exchanges and interest in advanced technological capabilities.
The account suggests that mutual security concerns, particularly those involving Iran and regional armed groups, have provided the basis for maintaining contacts despite the absence of diplomatic relations.
It also indicates that Israeli intelligence officials have sought to use those channels to establish more regular cooperation and reach senior levels of Saudi decision-making.
Nevertheless, substantial details about the relationship remain undisclosed, and the report does not establish that the contacts have developed into a formally acknowledged diplomatic partnership.
The distinction remains important: while intelligence cooperation may create opportunities for political engagement, it does not by itself resolve the diplomatic obstacles surrounding normalisation, particularly Saudi Arabia’s stated position on Palestinian statehood.
