Over the past decade, Türkiye’s defence industry has evolved into an increasingly important channel of foreign policy. The process often begins with a presidential visit or military cooperation agreement, then extends into procurement, training, maintenance, local production and technology transfer.
These relationships give Ankara recurring access to defence ministries, armed forces and procurement institutions in importing countries. In some cases, an initial weapons contract develops into broader security and economic partnerships lasting years beyond the original deal.
The Turkish state manages this export expansion alongside an industrial network whose companies specialise in drones, electronics, missiles, warships and armoured vehicles.
Türkiye’s growing position in the international arms market has given this strategy greater weight. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, international transfers of major weapons reached their highest level since the end of the Cold War during 2021 to 2025. The source data cited in this analysis ranks Türkiye 11th among the world’s exporters of major arms during that period, with 1.8% of global exports and a 122% increase compared with 2016 to 2020. Pakistan accounted for 16% of Turkish exports, the United Arab Emirates 12%, and Ukraine 8.4%.
Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached $10.05 billion in 2025, according to figures announced by the country’s defence industries leadership. The sector includes more than 3,500 companies and employs more than 100,000 people, while continued export growth has become increasingly important for financing development programmes and keeping production lines active.
A 2024 study by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that Türkiye’s defence industry had undergone a dramatic transformation, while warning that the pursuit of greater self-sufficiency would become progressively more difficult and costly as weapons systems became more technologically sophisticated. The industry’s future growth therefore increasingly depends on exports and international cooperation.
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, known as SWP, reached a similar conclusion in 2024, arguing that Ankara was making strategic use of arms exports to expand its international networks, including into markets where other NATO countries were reluctant to operate.
How Türkiye Turns Arms Deals Into Influence
The Turkish state remains central to directing the industry abroad.
The Presidency of Defence Industries, or SSB, operates under the Presidency and manages major programmes involving procurement, development, contracting and manufacturing.
At the highest level sits the Defence Industry Executive Committee, which includes the president, vice-president, ministers responsible for the treasury, interior, defence and industry, as well as the chief of the General Staff and the head of the defence industries authority.
Its powers include decisions relating to defence exports, industrial offset arrangements and countertrade, as well as coordinating institutions and financing training programmes. This structure connects export policy with political, military and industrial considerations from the point at which a potential market is selected.
The state’s direct involvement is particularly visible through ASFAT, the state-owned Military Factory and Shipyard Management company operating under the Ministry of National Defence.
ASFAT markets the expertise of Turkish military factories and shipyards abroad and undertakes design, construction, modernisation, training and logistical support projects.
This structure allows Ankara to enter long-term contracts led by state institutions but involving shipyards, engineering companies and suppliers of systems and components.
Private and state-linked companies then operate within this broader network according to their specialisations.
Baykar develops unmanned aerial systems including the Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akıncı. ASELSAN produces defence electronics including radar, communication, sensing and targeting systems. Roketsan specialises in missiles and guided munitions.
STM works in warship design, systems integration and logistical support, while FNSS produces armoured vehicles and carries out manufacturing and modernisation programmes within partner countries.
The pattern was visible during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Jeddah in July 2023, when cooperation plans between the Turkish and Saudi defence ministries were accompanied by major defence agreements.
The political visit therefore opened the way for an industrial relationship extending beyond an initial procurement contract.
Türkiye’s involvement continues after the delivery of a weapons system through training, maintenance, spare parts, ammunition, upgrades, service centres and production lines.
Warships require years of design, construction, testing and crew preparation. Drones depend on control stations, sensors, software, munitions, maintenance and operator training.
At that stage, the contract becomes a recurring institutional relationship between Turkish companies and the armed forces, defence ministries and domestic defence industries of the purchasing state.
The relationship can deepen further when maintenance and training develop into joint manufacturing and permanent military committees, and from there into broader security or economic arrangements.
Saudi Arabia: Arms Deals Reinforce Reconciliation
Saudi-Turkish defence cooperation developed as part of a wider political reconciliation in which high-level visits reopened relations between Ankara and Riyadh.
In July 2023, the Saudi Ministry of Defence signed two contracts with Baykar for the acquisition of Bayraktar Akıncı heavy combat drones, alongside a defence cooperation plan and agreements in energy, investment and communications.
The contracts were followed by localisation agreements connecting Baykar with Saudi Arabian Military Industries, or SAMI.
Saudi Arabia’s National Company for Mechanical Systems also entered into arrangements involving ASELSAN and Roketsan to localise sensors and munitions used by the drone systems.
Following the Baykar contracts, Saudi localisation institutions moved to bring parts of production, testing, training and technical support into the Kingdom.
On 25 July 2025, FNSS expanded the Turkish industrial presence by signing an agreement with SAMI Land Systems to manufacture next-generation eight-wheeled armoured vehicles in Saudi Arabia under the patronage of defence and industry officials from both countries.
These agreements gave Ankara access to Saudi Arabia’s military localisation programme while connecting multiple Turkish companies to Saudi defence and industrial institutions.
They also added long-term industrial interests involving production lines, testing, ammunition, training and technical support to the political reconciliation between the two states.
At the same time, the bilateral agenda expanded into major economic projects, including agreements for two solar power plants in Sivas and Karaman with a combined capacity of 2,000 megawatts and investments approaching $2 billion.
Investment and electricity purchasing agreements were signed on 20 February 2026, illustrating the simultaneous expansion of defence and economic ties.
Türkiye’s influence in Saudi Arabia therefore takes the form of reinforcing political rapprochement through institutional and industrial interdependence.
Turkish companies gained access to a large market and a position within Saudi Arabia’s localisation strategy, while Ankara acquired a continuing institutional channel into the Saudi Defence Ministry and industrial bodies.
Riyadh, however, is using the same arrangements to develop domestic capabilities and diversify its suppliers.
Türkiye’s long-term position will therefore depend on whether its companies can continue providing technologies, platforms and new programmes as Saudi domestic manufacturing expands.
Saudi regional policy remains shaped by its own interests, alliances and calculations. Defence cooperation does not determine Riyadh’s foreign policy, but it creates shared industrial and security interests that can help stabilise the bilateral relationship and reduce the likelihood of another severe rupture.
Pakistan: A Partnership Reaching Deep Into the Military Establishment
Pakistan represents a deeper model of Turkish access to a foreign military establishment.
On 13 February 2025, the seventh session of the Türkiye-Pakistan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held in Islamabad under Erdoğan and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The joint declaration provided for Turkish defence products to receive priority in Pakistani procurement and Pakistani products to receive similar consideration in Türkiye. It also encouraged joint projects, research and development and industrial localisation.
The relationship continued through the Türkiye-Pakistan High-Level Military Dialogue Group, which held its 20th meeting at Pakistan’s Defence Ministry in Rawalpindi on 7 April 2026.
Political-military and defence industry working groups reviewed existing programmes and potential areas of cooperation involving regional security, training, capacity building and defence industrial cooperation.
The regularity of these meetings gives Ankara recurring exposure to Pakistan’s assessments of military requirements and modernisation priorities.
The Turkish MILGEM warship programme forms one of the central pillars of this relationship.
Pakistan’s navy signed a contract with ASFAT in 2018 for four warships, two to be built in Türkiye and two at Karachi Shipyard with technology transfer.
STM supplied engineering solutions and integrated propulsion systems in a programme connecting shipyards, suppliers and engineers in both countries.
The relationship also drew on experience from the PNS Moawin fleet tanker, designed by STM and built at Karachi Shipyard.
That programme included training for crews and shipyard personnel, along with technical and logistical support, and allowed around 20 Turkish companies to participate in the supply chain.
Cooperation subsequently expanded into ship maintenance, submarine modernisation, spare parts and technical services.
The result is recurring Turkish institutional access to the Defence Ministry, military headquarters, the navy and the maritime defence industry through programmes that can continue for years.
There are nevertheless clear limits to Turkish influence.
China remains overwhelmingly dominant in Pakistan’s imported weapons market. According to SIPRI figures cited in the source, Pakistan became the world’s fifth-largest importer of major weapons in 2021 to 2025, with China accounting for 80% of its imports.
Türkiye’s strongest position therefore remains concentrated in particular naval and aerospace sectors rather than across Pakistan’s entire procurement system.
Ukraine: From Weapons Supplier to Security and Industrial Partner
Ukraine represents a case in which defence cooperation has expanded into a broader security and industrial partnership.
The maritime relationship began with a contract signed between Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and STM on 17 December 2020 for two Ada-class corvettes with technology transfer.
Construction of the first vessel began with steel cutting in April 2021. It was launched in October 2022 and began sea acceptance trials in May 2024.
The second corvette was launched in August 2024 and is scheduled for delivery in 2027. The project continued despite the war, maintaining a significant area of maritime industrial cooperation between the two countries. (stm.com.tr)
On 3 February 2022, the Turkish and Ukrainian governments signed a framework agreement covering advanced technology, aviation and space cooperation.
The arrangement included the development, production and operation of Bayraktar systems, with Ukrainian engineers participating in manufacturing, maintenance, modernisation and training.
This created an aerospace-industrial relationship combining Baykar’s drone expertise with Ukrainian capabilities in engines and components.
In September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Baykar chief executive Haluk Bayraktar discussed plans for a Baykar factory inside Ukraine and the production of systems incorporating Ukrainian components.
In February 2024, Baykar announced that construction had begun on a factory near Kyiv expected to employ around 500 people.
This shifted aerospace cooperation from development agreements towards a long-term industrial investment inside Ukraine.
On 13 March 2025, Zelenskyy described Türkiye as a strategic partner, particularly in relation to security guarantees, during a meeting involving Turkish government officials and business representatives.
He linked participation in Ukraine’s security arrangements with potential priority in post-war reconstruction projects and referred to Bayraktar supplies and Kyiv’s interest in expanding drone manufacturing cooperation.
Defence, reconstruction and investment were therefore increasingly being placed within a single political framework that could give Turkish companies a role in post-war Ukraine.
The relationship continued to broaden in 2026.
Following a meeting with Erdoğan in Istanbul on 4 April, Zelenskyy announced new steps in security cooperation and joint defence industry projects, while highlighting Ukraine’s ability to contribute expertise, technology and battlefield experience.
On 14 July 2026, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the free trade agreement signed by the two countries on 3 February 2022.
Turkish defence exports have therefore contributed to Ankara moving from the position of supplier towards that of a security and industrial partner for Kyiv.
This role is reinforced by Türkiye’s position in the Black Sea, its control over naval passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, its relationship with Moscow and its role in hosting negotiations.
The relationship also runs in both directions.
Ukraine receives military systems, investment and cooperation with a NATO member, while Türkiye gains access to Ukrainian engines, components, technologies and experience.
A June 2025 study published by the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies argued that Turkish-Ukrainian defence cooperation could form part of the foundation for future Black Sea security arrangements.
Different Countries, Different Degrees of Influence
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Ukraine demonstrate that Turkish defence exports produce different political returns depending on the depth and structure of the relationship.
In Saudi Arabia, defence cooperation helped reinforce political reconciliation and opened localisation programmes to Turkish companies.
In Pakistan, Ankara gained extensive institutional access to the military and maritime defence sector through long-term programmes.
In Ukraine, Türkiye’s position expanded into discussions involving security, reconstruction, investment and trade.
The level of influence depends on the previous political relationship, the depth of industrial cooperation and the extent to which continued operation of the imported systems depends on Turkish support.
Poland and Albania: Military Access, Limited Political Weight
Poland and Albania illustrate another model.
Turkish companies have entered their military markets and established operational relationships, but the political effect of those contracts remains more limited.
Warsaw signed a contract on 24 May 2021 for four Bayraktar TB2 systems consisting of 24 armed drones, along with control stations, radars, simulators, munitions, spare parts, training and logistical support.
The agreement also included technology enabling maintenance and repair of engines, control stations and cameras in Poland.
Deliveries began in October 2022.
The contract gave Baykar its first entry into the armed forces of a NATO member and established channels for training, maintenance and industrial cooperation with one of Eastern Europe’s largest militaries.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies assessed defence cooperation with Ankara as supporting Warsaw’s efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and increase coordination over Ukraine and the Black Sea.
Poland nevertheless continues to base its defence strategy primarily on NATO, the European Union and major procurement relationships with the United States, South Korea and European suppliers.
Albania presents a similar model on a smaller scale.
Tirana introduced Bayraktar TB2 drones into its armed forces, with operators receiving training in Türkiye.
In March 2025, Albanian Defence Minister Pirro Vengu announced that the drone squadron had become fully operational and was capable of night missions, border and coastal surveillance and support for civil protection operations.
The Turkish systems operate in the wider environment of Kuçova Air Base, which NATO modernised as a hub supporting logistics, air operations, training and exercises. NATO invested around €50 million in the facility, which officially reopened in March 2024.
The drones and accompanying training gave Ankara a channel into Albanian military operations and procurement, but the country’s security policy remains firmly anchored in NATO and its relationship with the United States.
Poland and Albania therefore demonstrate that selling weapons to a foreign military can open doors for training, maintenance and military-to-military contact without necessarily producing a comparable change in that country’s broader political alignment.
Localisation and Technology Transfer: Influence Versus Independence
Localisation and technology transfer create another important tension in Türkiye’s defence export model.
During the initial phases of local production, a purchasing state depends heavily on Turkish designs, components, experts, training and technical support.
This increases the frequency and depth of interaction between Turkish companies and the importing country’s military and industrial institutions.
But as local expertise develops, the purchaser becomes increasingly capable of carrying out maintenance, production and development independently and acquires greater leverage when negotiating with suppliers.
Saudi Arabia is using agreements with Baykar, ASELSAN, Roketsan and FNSS to advance the military-industrial localisation objectives of Vision 2030.
Pakistan is developing shipbuilding and programme management capabilities at Karachi Shipyard.
Ukraine contributes engineers, components and technological expertise to aerospace programmes.
Localisation can therefore deepen the bilateral relationship while production lines and expertise are being established, but it also gradually increases the purchaser’s capacity to operate independently.
Maintaining Türkiye’s position consequently depends on Turkish companies continuing to provide new products, technologies and projects that their partners cannot easily replace domestically.
The Foreign Components Problem
Ankara’s ability to fulfil export contracts is also constrained by the degree of independence within Türkiye’s own defence industry and supply chains.
The T129 ATAK attack helicopter provides one of the clearest examples.
The aircraft is developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries through a programme based on an Italian-British design, while using an engine from the LHTEC T800 family whose export requires US approval.
Pakistan signed a contract in 2018 to purchase 30 helicopters, but delivery stalled after the required engine export licences were not issued.
Islamabad later turned towards the Chinese Z-10ME attack helicopter.
The case demonstrated that a supplier’s ability to deliver on export contracts depends on controlling sensitive components and the permissions required to export them.
Failure to deliver can open the market to competitors and undermine the long-term institutional relationship that Ankara hopes to build through defence sales.
Greater Turkish independence in engines, electronics and advanced materials is therefore not simply an industrial objective. It is central to sustaining the foreign-policy influence Türkiye is attempting to build through defence exports.
From Strategic Autonomy at Home to Influence Abroad
Türkiye’s modern defence industry was originally developed in large part to reduce the ability of foreign suppliers to influence its own military decisions.
As exports have expanded, the same industrial capacity has begun giving Ankara a recurring position within the procurement and modernisation decisions of other states.
Maintenance, training, ammunition, upgrades and joint manufacturing repeatedly bring Turkish companies back to the negotiating table.
Military councils and permanent dialogue mechanisms also provide Ankara with greater visibility into the future requirements and modernisation priorities of partner militaries.
Research on Türkiye’s defence industry points to the same fundamental shift. Ankara has moved from heavy dependence on external suppliers towards becoming an increasingly competitive exporter, although advanced technologies, supply chains and foreign components continue to impose limits on complete strategic autonomy.
The result is a two-sided relationship.
Türkiye seeks to convert defence exports into durable strategic access, while importing countries use Turkish technology to diversify their suppliers and build greater domestic industrial independence.
The political value and durability of each arms deal are ultimately determined by the balance between those two objectives.
