Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is facing one of the most difficult strategic periods of his leadership, as renewed confrontation in Yemen, the continuing war on Iran and the limitations of Saudi Arabia’s external alliances narrow Riyadh’s room for manoeuvre.
Against this backdrop, the recent appearance of King Salman bin Abdulaziz chairing a Cabinet meeting after a prolonged absence from public view carried particular political significance. The analysis published by Al-Akhbar argues that Mohammed bin Salman is once again drawing on his father’s legitimacy at a moment of exceptional pressure on the Saudi leadership.
The moment recalls King Salman’s role more than a decade ago in providing the political cover for Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. At the time, Mohammed bin Salman was defence minister but had not yet become crown prince.
The analysis portrays the original Yemen intervention as a decision made with strong US involvement and in coordination with Mohammed bin Salman. But it also argues that responsibility for the consequences cannot be placed on him alone.
The current Yemen crisis has its roots in a war that began before Mohammed bin Salman had consolidated the degree of authority he holds today. Responsibility, therefore, extended across the Saudi governing establishment. Mohammed bin Nayef, then crown prince and later a major rival to Mohammed bin Salman before his detention, was also formally part of the leadership, even if he appeared increasingly removed from effective decision-making.
A New Setback After Years of Foreign Policy Recalibration
The latest Saudi setback in Yemen has returned Mohammed bin Salman to a position the Saudi leadership had spent years trying to escape.
The Al-Akhbar analysis describes the development as personally damaging for the crown prince and links it to a wider record of foreign policy ventures pursued since he became defence minister in 2015 and crown prince in 2017.
The author assesses most of those ventures as unsuccessful, with one notable exception: Saudi Arabia’s relative success earlier this year in pushing UAE-aligned factions out of parts of southern and eastern Yemen. That outcome, the analysis suggests, may have encouraged Riyadh to take greater risks in the latest confrontation.
Over time, however, Mohammed bin Salman had shifted towards negotiation, de-escalation and regional settlements, partly in response to earlier experiences.
The latest developments threaten to reverse that strategy, placing Saudi Arabia once again inside the regional conflicts from which the crown prince had sought to distance it while concentrating on the domestic economic and development projects central to his political programme.
The Iran War Has Narrowed Riyadh’s Options
The renewed crisis in Yemen has also complicated Saudi Arabia’s position towards the war on Iran.
Riyadh was already confronting difficult choices following what the analysis describes as the failure of the US-Israeli attack to achieve its intended objectives.
Mohammed bin Salman was unable to secure an end to the war or fully insulate Saudi Arabia from its consequences.
At the same time, Iran avoided striking US forces inside Saudi Arabia with the same intensity directed at American bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan and even Qatar, reducing some of the immediate military pressure on Riyadh.
Despite continuing Saudi-Iranian dialogue and Mohammed bin Salman’s policy of engagement with Tehran, the crown prince appears to have limited leverage over either side of the conflict.
He cannot dictate Tehran’s decisions, but neither does Riyadh appear capable of forcing Washington or Tel Aviv towards ending the war.
Trump Refuses the Saudi Request
The problem became more acute when Saudi Arabia’s attempts to broaden its security options failed to produce the results Riyadh sought.
According to the analysis, US President Donald Trump rejected a Saudi request to intervene directly by launching strikes against Ansar Allah forces in Yemen.
Mohammed bin Salman reportedly raised the request during a telephone call with Trump the previous week. Rather than entering the conflict on Riyadh’s behalf, Trump indirectly reaffirmed Washington’s preference for maintaining its own ceasefire understanding with Ansar Allah, even though the movement had excluded Saudi vessels from those permitted to transit through Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea.
The episode exposed the limits of Riyadh’s expectations of direct US military backing.
The Makkah Defence Pact Meets Its First Serious Test
Saudi Arabia also failed to draw its newer partners, Türkiye and Pakistan, into the Yemen confrontation.
The three states signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement in August 2026, establishing a framework under which an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all three. The alliance has since begun establishing its secretariat and institutional structures in Riyadh.
Yet in the current crisis, neither Türkiye nor Pakistan entered the war on Saudi Arabia’s behalf.
The Al-Akhbar analysis therefore portrays the newly established pact, at least under present circumstances, as having delivered little immediate operational value to Riyadh.
The article also claims Saudi Arabia was unable to bring large numbers of Syrian jihadist fighters into Yemen.
According to this assessment, Riyadh was wary of the longer-term consequences of deploying such forces, particularly the possibility that they could later find a receptive environment within Saudi Arabia’s conservative Muslim society. Such a development would conflict with Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to reshape the kingdom’s social and political image.
The Deeper Problem Is Washington
The central argument, however, is that Saudi Arabia’s most difficult strategic constraint does not come primarily from Iran or Yemen.
It comes from its relationship with the United States.
In theory, Riyadh could seek an agreement with Sana’a to end the Yemen war while simultaneously reaching an understanding with Tehran preventing Saudi territory from being used in attacks against Iran.
In practice, the analysis argues, Mohammed bin Salman cannot completely separate Saudi policy from Washington.
Saudi Arabia remains deeply embedded within the US security framework, leaving the crown prince with considerably less strategic autonomy than recent efforts to diversify Riyadh’s international relationships may have suggested.
This creates a contradiction.
Washington remains the kingdom’s principal external security patron, yet the United States has itself struggled to fully protect its military bases and personnel across the Gulf during the current regional confrontation.
The analysis argues that while Washington might intervene if the survival of the Saudi ruling system faced a direct external threat, the present crisis does not meet that threshold.
How Much Independence Does Mohammed bin Salman Actually Have?
The article goes further, arguing that US influence over Saudi Arabia is not limited to external defence.
It describes Washington as possessing significant leverage across Saudi political, security and economic power structures, including relationships involving members of the royal family, security institutions, economic sectors, tribal figures and sections of the opposition.
This, in the author’s assessment, gives Washington considerable ability to shape Saudi options even when Riyadh seeks a more independent foreign policy.
Mohammed bin Salman nevertheless retains some room for manoeuvre because he has consolidated authority inside the kingdom.
The analysis also argues that Washington has little interest in placing so much pressure on him that maintaining the US alliance itself becomes politically unsustainable.
The experience of the Joe Biden administration is cited as evidence. Washington tested whether the structure of its relationship with Saudi Arabia could be significantly altered, but ultimately failed to replace the existing strategic framework.
The Crown Prince’s Most Difficult Test
The pressures now converging on Saudi Arabia may therefore represent one of the most consequential tests Mohammed bin Salman has faced since consolidating power.
He must navigate a war in Yemen, limit the consequences of a wider confrontation with Iran, preserve Saudi Arabia’s development agenda and manage a security relationship with Washington that remains indispensable while also restricting Riyadh’s freedom of action.
The question is no longer simply whether Saudi Arabia can diversify its alliances.
It is whether Mohammed bin Salman can use the limited strategic space available to him to steer the kingdom in the direction he wants without being pulled back into conflicts and dependencies he had spent years attempting to manage.
