As Israel continues its policy of assassinations across the devastated and besieged Gaza Strip, with such attacks intensifying in recent weeks despite a ceasefire that entered into force nearly a year ago, questions are growing over how Israeli forces are now managing to locate and target resistance commanders during the truce after failing to reach many of them during the war.
This month alone, Israeli forces assassinated several prominent resistance commanders in Gaza. On 11 September, an Israeli strike killed Mohammed al-Yazouri, commander of the Khan Younis Brigade of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing.
Five days later, Israel assassinated Ahmed al-Batsh, commander of the Jabalia Battalion in the Qassam Brigades. The following day, an Israeli strike in the al-Mawasi area of Khan Younis in southern Gaza killed Nael Abu Obeid, commander of the Qassam Brigades’ Rafah Brigade.
Restricted Areas and Extreme Population Density
Political writer and analyst Iyad al-Qarra said the recent assassinations must be understood against the severe conditions facing Gaza’s population, which he said is now concentrated in areas amounting to roughly 30 per cent of the territory.
“We are talking about difficult and harsh conditions affecting all citizens in the Gaza Strip, who are now present in limited areas amounting to around 30 per cent of the Strip,” al-Qarra told Arabi21.
He said the prolonged duration of the situation has also changed the operational environment.
“The period has been long, three years. These figures are present on the ground. They are not carrying out resistance activity in the direct sense, but they are now in the open within that 30 per cent,” he said. “They have instructions not to carry out any resistance activity against the Israeli occupation, in compliance with the ceasefire, and they are adhering to that.”
Al-Qarra argued that Israel, by contrast, was not adhering to the ceasefire, saying the recent assassinations were linked not to the commanders’ current activities but to their previous roles.
“These attacks have nothing to do with their current role, but rather with their previous role, whether in clashes during the war on Gaza or on 7 October 2023,” he said, noting that Israel had openly declared its intention to target those who participated in or planned the 7 October attacks.
He said the current environment in Gaza also makes concealment considerably more difficult.
“The situation in the Strip is difficult and harsh even for ordinary civilians. We are talking about very large numbers of tents, and people have daily needs for themselves and their families,” al-Qarra said.
He added that Israel possesses advanced technological surveillance capabilities and also relies on informants and collaborators, factors that he said collectively increase its ability to locate resistance commanders.
Al-Qarra also pointed to the role of armed militias operating inside Gaza.
“There is no doubt that armed militias are playing an ugly and damaging role in this,” he said. “They are directly involved in killing, abducting and tracking members of the Palestinian resistance.”
According to al-Qarra, some of these groups have operated openly and, in certain cases, succeeded in killing or targeting members of the police, security services and resistance factions. He said they had also abducted and pursued Qassam fighters who remained in Rafah following the Israeli invasion of the city.
He described those involved as collaborators working for Israel by monitoring and tracking resistance members, while cautioning against suggesting that the phenomenon had become widespread.
“We cannot speak of large cells or a broad proliferation of this phenomenon. Society remains, to some extent, protected against it,” he said.
Al-Qarra said Israeli targeting also relies on several technological methods, including surveillance, reconnaissance aircraft and the planting of spying devices.
The Growing Role of Collaborators
Mamoun Abu Amer, a specialist in Israeli affairs, said the recent targeting of first and second-tier resistance commanders involved both technological and organisational factors.
“The Israeli occupation uses highly advanced technical means for surveillance and monitoring inside the Strip,” Abu Amer told Arabi21, adding that this capability was connected to what he described as extensive assistance Israel had received from US technology companies.
He also said some resistance commanders and officials had made mistakes related to intelligence security while attempting to conceal their movements, at the same time that Israel maintained collaborators on the ground, aerial surveillance systems and allied militias.
According to Abu Amer, Israel uses both collaborators operating inside Gaza and those positioned behind the so-called Yellow Line, where militias operate under Israeli control, to gather information and penetrate areas inside the Strip.
He described collaborators on the ground as particularly dangerous because of their ability to directly monitor individuals.
Abu Amer said Israel had obtained information through several channels, including archives belonging to Palestinian resistance factions that Israeli forces had discovered, as well as information extracted from Palestinian detainees during interrogations under torture.
He said some collaborators were also able to move through areas close to densely populated communities, where identifying and approaching individuals had become easier because of the extensive mixing of displaced civilians.
Abu Amer further suggested that Israeli pressure and repeated displacement of civilians could also serve an intelligence purpose.
“Moving the population may be aimed at locating certain individuals,” he said. “This creates the possibility of redistributing and rearranging the population in a particular area, which gives an opportunity to plant collaborators in locations Israel wants to penetrate.”
He added that some Israeli attacks in particular areas could create disorder that subsequently allows the environment to be reorganised in ways more favourable to Israeli intelligence activity.
“Sometimes the occupation carries out an attack in an area that appears difficult to understand, creating a state of chaos,” he said. “The area can then be rearranged in a way that allows penetration through different tools.”
Abu Amer argued that this can amount to reshaping the social and physical environment on the ground to facilitate surveillance of officials and suspected resistance cadres.
He also said communication and coordination may exist between collaborators inside Gaza and those operating east of the Yellow Line.
According to Abu Amer, information may be exchanged between them, while certain points may be designated for the movement of collaborators into Israeli-controlled areas to carry out intelligence assignments targeting resistance members.
He said such activity could also be used to provide cover for Israeli special forces and facilitate their movement inside Gaza.
The limited geographical space in which Palestinians are now concentrated, he added, has also made surveillance and communication easier.
“There is a diversity of tools available to collaborators for monitoring and surveillance within a very restricted geographical area,” Abu Amer said.
Although transportation remains difficult across Gaza, he said individual collaborators can operate within designated areas using whatever resources are available to them.
Abu Amer concluded that Gaza had entered a complex security phase in which the human intelligence factor was becoming increasingly important, particularly collaborators operating either inside the Strip or behind the Yellow Line.
He described the Israeli-controlled area beyond the line as providing a protective zone for collaborators who face exposure.
“If a collaborator feels threatened or is exposed, he can contact his handlers and flee to that area controlled by Israeli forces,” Abu Amer said.
For that reason, he argued, the collaborator network now plays a significant role in Israeli efforts to target resistance commanders.
An Ongoing Security Struggle Inside Gaza
The struggle has also played out through direct operations on the ground.
An Israeli special forces unit previously abducted Muin al-Arabid, an officer in Gaza’s security services, before withdrawing from the area after its presence was discovered, with support from Israeli aircraft.
In another case highlighting the alleged involvement of armed militias cooperating with Israel and based east of the Strip behind the Yellow Line, Gaza security sources said collaborators had managed to “abduct a resistance fighter from central Gaza”.
The sources said the identities of those responsible had been determined.
According to the Radaa platform, Gaza security services praised residents who handed over belongings associated with those involved in the abduction and provided important information about the circumstances and details of the incident.
Security authorities also said what they described as “collaborator gangs” had continued attempting to abduct Palestinians.
In one incident, members of an allied militia allegedly raided a displacement shelter near the Yellow Line and abducted 16 people.
The raid occurred amid intensive Israeli aircraft activity, according to the security account, which alleged that militia members were receiving direct instructions over radio communications from an Israeli intelligence officer.
Security sources also reported the arrest of a collaborator described as being close to senior figures within the armed groups on 4 August 2026 with assistance from local residents. Weapons and money found in his possession were confiscated, according to the sources.
They said Gaza’s security services had also foiled several attempted abductions in different areas of the Strip, including an attempt to abduct a member of the Al-Quds Brigades in al-Qarara, Khan Younis, and another attempt in Jabalia.
Security authorities also cited confessions by an alleged collaborator identified only as “M”, whom they accused of contributing to the assassination of Qassam Brigades commander Izz al-Din al-Haddad. According to their account, the man admitted having links with Israeli intelligence since November 2023.
The security services also disclosed details from investigations concerning the killing of 37-year-old Saed Warsh Agha near his home close to the Beit Lahia Club in northern Gaza.
“According to investigations with a number of collaborators, it was established that while the gang of collaborator Ashraf al-Mansi was blowing up two homes belonging to the Hamouda family near the Beit Lahia Club, collaborator Shafiq K. executed citizen Saed Warsh Agha,” the security services said.
Israel’s Persistent Eye Over Gaza
Gaza security authorities also highlighted the role of Israel’s Tzofit aircraft, describing it as an “eye that never leaves Gaza’s skies”.
They said the aircraft’s role extends beyond aerial photography and forms part of an ISTAR system for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.
According to their account, the aircraft uses electro-optical and electronic sensors and transmits information for analysis while missions are under way.
They said the principal threat posed by the system comes from its ability to collect intelligence from the air and then integrate it with information obtained from other intelligence sources, producing a more detailed picture of activities and movements on the ground.
