Several weeks ago, Palestinian writer Abdullah Marouf attended an academic discussion on the Israeli elections and was struck by the optimism surrounding what some participants regarded as the approaching end of Israel’s current crisis.
For them, the crisis was essentially Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, and the supposed solution had a name: Gadi Eisenkot.
Marouf argues that some circles linked to official Arab and regional governments have begun looking towards Eisenkot almost as a political “saviour” who could restore the supposed days of Yitzhak Rabin. In his view, this reflects an overly simplistic reading of Israeli politics and an eagerness to attach hopes to a figure whose military record and nationalist outlook hardly place him in Israel’s dovish camp.
That does not mean an Eisenkot victory would carry no political significance.
If the Moroccan-descended former chief of staff became prime minister, he would be the first Mizrahi Jew to hold the office in Israel’s history. Israel has historically been dominated at the highest levels by Ashkenazi political elites. Eisenkot’s rise would therefore represent a notable precedent in the composition of the country’s leadership. Contemporary reporting likewise notes that Israel has never had a Mizrahi prime minister.
The Israeli military broke a similar barrier decades earlier when Moshe Levi, who came from an Iraqi Jewish family, became chief of staff in 1983.
But Marouf’s central argument is that Eisenkot’s background should not be mistaken for evidence of a fundamental change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.
The Israeli Right Is Bigger Than Netanyahu
The first reason concerns the depth of the Religious Zionist movement’s influence across Israeli political and security institutions.
Marouf argues that the movement has built substantial power inside institutions that operate primarily within Israel and the occupied West Bank, while creating an increasingly organised and armed political base among settlers.
From this perspective, replacing Netanyahu would not automatically reverse the ideological transformation that has taken place within the Israeli system.
Any government seeking to significantly roll back the influence of the Religious Zionist current would face a far broader confrontation than an ordinary change of coalition. It would require sustained political will, institutional restructuring and considerable public support.
Marouf argues that such an effort could produce severe internal confrontation because Israel’s political culture has itself moved steadily to the right over recent decades.
That shift is particularly important when assessing the war on Gaza.
The argument is that the principal disagreement inside Israeli politics has often not been whether military force should be used against Gaza, but rather over its scale, objectives, duration, conduct and political consequences.
Changing the prime minister, therefore, does not necessarily mean changing the assumptions that shape Israeli policy towards Palestinians.
Eisenkot’s Mizrahi Background Does Not Guarantee Political Change
A second part of Marouf’s argument concerns Eisenkot’s position as a Mizrahi Jew within a state whose political establishment was historically dominated by Ashkenazi elites.
The article raises a broader political hypothesis: members of historically marginalised groups who reach the highest levels of an established system may sometimes demonstrate particularly strong identification with that system rather than challenge it.
That argument cannot establish Eisenkot’s personal motives, but Marouf uses it to question the assumption that his Moroccan family background would make him more inclined towards a fundamental change in Israeli foreign or security policy.
Eisenkot himself has publicly played down the political importance of his Mizrahi identity, saying that a prime minister should be chosen on the basis of capabilities, record, vision and ability to govern rather than family origin.
For Marouf, the more important evidence lies in Eisenkot’s military doctrine and stated political positions.
The Architect Associated With the Dahiya Doctrine
Eisenkot is closely associated with what became known as the “Dahiya Doctrine”, developed following Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon.
The doctrine advocates the use of overwhelming and disproportionate force against areas and infrastructure from which armed organisations operate, with extensive destruction forming part of the deterrence strategy.
In a 2008 interview while serving as head of Israel’s Northern Command, Eisenkot said that what Israel had done to Beirut’s southern Dahiya district would be applied to other areas from which Israel came under fire, describing a strategy involving disproportionate force and extensive destruction.
Marouf argues that the doctrine is particularly important when assessing expectations that Eisenkot could represent a fundamentally softer Israeli security policy.
In his analysis, the large-scale destruction inflicted on Gaza after 7 October reflects many of the same principles associated with the doctrine, even though Eisenkot was no longer chief of staff.
The point is not simply that Eisenkot has a military background. It is that his security thinking has historically been associated with overwhelming force as an instrument of deterrence.
His Position on a Palestinian State
Eisenkot’s recent political statements also complicate attempts to portray him as a straightforward alternative to Israel’s right.
He has explicitly rejected the idea of pursuing a Palestinian state under present conditions.
In August 2026, Eisenkot said that anyone still considering a two-state solution after 7 October was “delusional”. At the same time, he criticised the E1 settlement project, describing it as a mistake because of the international political cost it imposed on Israel.
This distinction is central to Marouf’s argument.
Eisenkot’s objection to E1 does not necessarily amount to opposition to settlement itself. Eisenkot has publicly expressed support for settlement in the occupied West Bank while opposing particular initiatives when he believes they damage Israel’s strategic or diplomatic interests.
This places him in a different political tradition from figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, but not necessarily on the opposite side of the Palestinian question.
The difference, according to the article, lies partly in justification.
The Religious Zionist movement frequently presents territorial control through religious, messianic and biblical arguments. Eisenkot tends to frame similar questions through security, state interests, international legitimacy and strategic calculation.
Personal Loss and the Gaza War
The article also examines the profound personal losses Eisenkot suffered during the Gaza war.
His son, Gal Eisenkot, was killed in Jabalia on 7 December 2023 during an Israeli military operation. Another nephew, Maor Cohen Eisenkot, was killed the following day, and a second nephew, Yogev Pazy, was killed in northern Gaza in November 2024.
Marouf suggests that these losses, when combined with Eisenkot’s longstanding military outlook, could reinforce an already hardline approach towards the Palestinians.
That remains an interpretation rather than a demonstrable account of Eisenkot’s personal motives. What is verifiable is that his rejection of Palestinian statehood has hardened in the post-7 October political environment.
Different From Religious Zionism, but Not Its Opposite
There are nevertheless important differences between Eisenkot and Israel’s Religious Zionist leadership.
Eisenkot has criticised settler violence and attacked the roles given to Ben Gvir and Smotrich, arguing that their policies have damaged Israel’s interests and international standing.
He does not publicly display the same messianic religious politics associated with the most ideological elements of the Religious Zionist movement.
Marouf points out that Eisenkot has generally avoided making Al-Aqsa Mosque and the activities of Temple movement groups a defining feature of his political identity.
This ambiguity is viewed by some as evidence of relative moderation.
Marouf, however, cautions against reading silence as opposition. His argument is that Eisenkot appears to subordinate religious questions to the strategic interests of the Israeli state rather than reject the nationalist religious framework altogether.
The source recalls that Eisenkot was chief of staff during the 2017 crisis surrounding electronic gates installed at the entrances to Al-Aqsa Mosque, which were ultimately removed following intense Palestinian opposition and security concerns. It does not claim to know what role Eisenkot personally played in that decision.
The article also cites comments attributed to Eisenkot’s religious Moroccan mother in 2014, saying that she had once hoped he would become a rabbi and that he maintained a rabbinical authority whom he consulted.
Marouf interprets Eisenkot’s limited public discussion of religion as consistent with the outlook of a disciplined military figure who prefers to keep personal religious considerations subordinate to state interests.
The Real Difference May Be Method, Not the Palestinian Question
This is ultimately the distinction at the heart of the argument.
Eisenkot can reasonably be described as an opponent of the most radical Religious Zionist current on questions such as the structure of the state, the judiciary, settler violence and the political influence of Ben Gvir and Smotrich.
But that does not make him its complete opposite on Palestine.
He currently rejects Palestinian statehood, prioritises Israeli security and control, and supports settlement in the occupied West Bank, even while disagreeing with specific settlement projects that he believes carry excessive diplomatic costs.
Where the difference becomes clearer is in the political language used to justify those positions.
The Religious Zionist right often grounds its programme in biblical entitlement, religious redemption and permanent territorial possession.
Eisenkot instead presents his positions through the language of security, realism, state interests and Israel’s international standing.
For those hoping that replacing Netanyahu with Eisenkot would mark a wholesale reversal of Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, that distinction matters.
The argument advanced by Marouf is therefore not that Eisenkot and the Religious Zionist right are identical. It is that opposition to Netanyahu, Ben Gvir and Smotrich should not automatically be confused with opposition to the broader structures of Israeli occupation, settlement and military dominance.
Eisenkot may carry an olive branch in the language of statecraft, the article concludes, but his record gives little basis for describing him simply as a dove.
