Whenever friction between Turkey and Israel intensifies, one factor continues to limit the risk of the confrontation developing into direct war: the scale of the costs each side is capable of imposing on the other.
Israel possesses a clear advantage in air power, intelligence and precision-strike capabilities. Turkey, however, commands a large conventional military, substantial geographic and industrial depth, and the capacity to sustain a prolonged confrontation. It is also a member of NATO and maintains extensive military ties with the United States and Europe.
This balance makes Turkey fundamentally different from Iran in Israeli strategic calculations.
In recent years, Tel Aviv has developed and tested an offensive model against Tehran based on penetrating deep into Iranian territory, suppressing air defences and striking command centres and strategic facilities.
A confrontation with Turkey would raise broader questions from the first strike: Ankara’s ability to retaliate and sustain operations, the potential expansion of the battlefield into Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, and the response of the United States and NATO if escalation moved beyond control.
Syria provided the first practical test of these limits during 2025 and 2026. Israeli forces struck Syrian bases that Turkey was considering using, after which Ankara and Tel Aviv entered talks aimed at preventing a collision.
The same danger resurfaced in August 2026 following the strike on Abu al-Duhur airbase. Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey and regional envoy for President Donald Trump, said Ankara detected Israeli aircraft heading north without prior warning and that Turkish preparations to respond had been a credible possibility.
The incident ended with American efforts to strengthen a deconfliction mechanism, illustrating the deterrence dynamic at work. Israel can use military force, but the next step may trigger a confrontation whose trajectory becomes difficult to control.
Turkey Is Not Iran: A Different Type of Threat
Over several years, Israel’s military and security establishment built a relatively clear operational concept for confronting Iran.
The Iranian threat was concentrated around the nuclear programme, long-range missiles, command centres, military infrastructure and the network of armed forces aligned with Tehran. Israel subsequently developed the capacity to penetrate Iranian territory, strike those assets and then contend with waves of missile retaliation.
An analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on 10 October 2025 concluded that the Israeli Air Force achieved air superiority over Iran in less than four days during the June war of that year.
The opening phase of the new US-Israeli war that began on 28 February 2026 relied on surprise and long-range munitions, including Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles and American Tomahawk missiles.
Those campaigns established an offensive model beginning with surprise, intelligence superiority and suppression of air defences before expanding into a sustained campaign inside the adversary’s territory.
Turkey imposes additional calculations on Israeli military planners from the outset because it possesses a conventional military capable of simultaneously operating air, naval, missile, drone and air-defence forces, all connected to a broad NATO and US security structure.
Syria gives the Turkish factor particular immediacy in Israeli calculations. Ankara can deploy radars, air-defence systems, aircraft, drones and military trainers into a theatre close to the airspace where Israeli forces operate.
For this reason, recent Israeli studies have increasingly focused on the possibility of a permanent Turkish military presence in Syria.
Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies has warned that the deployment of advanced Turkish air-defence systems in Syria could restrict the Israeli Air Force’s freedom of action.
This concern emerged on the ground during 2025, when Israeli forces struck Syrian bases that Turkish teams had inspected as part of possible deployment plans.
According to an analysis by Turkish researcher Ömer Özkizilcik published by the Stimson Center in January 2026, a Turkish plan involving three bases in central Syria was halted after the strikes occurred before Turkish forces had established themselves there. Talks subsequently began in Azerbaijan to prevent further friction.
Two Israeli Approaches to the Turkish Challenge
Two schools of thought have emerged within Israel over how to assess these developments.
The Nagel Committee, appointed by the Israeli government to examine military force-building requirements in early 2025, warned of a scenario in which expanding Turkish influence in Syria could develop into an advanced strategic threat and called for preparations for a possible future confrontation.
The report reflected an approach that seeks to incorporate Turkey into Israeli military planning at an early stage, before Ankara’s capabilities expand further or political tensions develop into direct military confrontation.
Galia Lindenstrauss, a senior researcher specialising in Turkey at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, presented a different assessment in a study published on 18 November 2025 under the title “Turkey Is Not Iran, but It Is a Threat”.
Lindenstrauss linked the distinct nature of the Turkish case to Ankara’s NATO membership and its relationship with the United States. She argued that Washington has both an interest and the capacity to reduce friction and prevent it from turning into military confrontation.
Michael Milshtein, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center, reached a similar conclusion in the summer of 2026.
He focused on the danger of shifting Turkey from the category of a “strategic challenge” into that of an enemy against which Israel prepares for comprehensive war, noting that such planning would involve confronting one of NATO’s largest militaries and a state with deep military ties to Washington.
Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has similarly focused on Syria as the most immediate area of friction, particularly the possibility of Turkey establishing military bases or deploying systems capable of restricting Israeli air operations.
Ryan Gingeras, professor of national security affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School, warned in May 2026 against treating Turkey’s future weapons projects as if they were already fully operational.
He pointed to the continuing development of the KAAN fighter jet, the Kızılelma unmanned combat aircraft and several missile systems, while also noting continuing gaps in Turkish air defence.
At the same time, he argued that redirecting Turkish military modernisation towards a possible confrontation with Israel could fuel an arms race and increase the risk of friction over time.
Turkey’s Western Military Links Add Another Layer
Turkey’s relationship with the West adds further weight to these calculations.
Exports by Turkey’s defence industry exceeded US$10 billion in 2025, with approximately US$5.6 billion going to Europe and the United States.
This growth coincides with the expansion of Turkish defence companies into European markets, while several advanced Turkish programmes continue to rely on Western engines, components and technologies.
Any military confrontation would therefore intersect with a broad network of weapons production, supply relationships and defence-industrial partnerships.
Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, director of the Turkey project at the Brookings Institution, concluded in a study published on 16 June 2026, based on interviews with senior Turkish officials and diplomats, that Washington continues to view Ankara as an important regional power that should remain firmly anchored within NATO.
Managing Turkish-Israeli competition, in this reading, has therefore become an American interest before the rivalry reaches the military stage.
This illustrates the central distinction between Turkey and Iran.
Israel has been able to confront Tehran through an offensive model that it has tested inside Iranian territory, focusing on destroying strategic capabilities and establishing broad freedom of action in the air.
With Turkey, the Israeli calculation instead centres on preventing an advanced Turkish military presence from taking shape in Syria, striking potential positions before Turkish forces establish themselves, imposing red lines and keeping communication channels open.
Preventing war thus becomes part of managing the threat itself.
Military Power Without a Quick Victory
Israel retains a clear qualitative advantage in several of the most sensitive areas of aerial warfare.
The confrontation with Iran during 2025 and 2026 demonstrated its ability to integrate stealth aircraft, intelligence, long-range munitions, electronic warfare and suppression of air defences in a single campaign.
Tel Aviv is also expanding its fleets of F-35 and F-15 aircraft and increasing domestic munitions production in an effort to preserve that advantage in the coming years.
Turkey’s deterrent power rests on different foundations.
The country covers a large territory, possesses numerous military installations and bases, and has an industrial sector capable of producing drones, munitions, vehicles, radars, warships and electronic warfare systems.
This infrastructure gives Turkish forces greater room to relocate units, repair damaged facilities, compensate for part of their losses and sustain operations beyond the opening days of a war.
Turkey’s military presence in northern Syria also gives it an advanced position from which part of this force could be deployed close to the areas where Israeli forces operate.
Can Kasapoğlu, a defence specialist at the Hudson Institute, summarised the importance of this industrial base by arguing that modern wars have demonstrated the importance of “industrial depth and sustainability” alongside the quality of individual military platforms.
By May 2026, Turkish shipyards were working on more than 40 naval vessels, while Aselsan, Turkey’s largest defence electronics company, had accelerated production of radars, electronic warfare systems and components for the country’s Steel Dome air-defence project.
Turkey nevertheless continues to face capability gaps.
Ankara is still working to complete a domestically produced multilayered air-defence architecture and continues development of the KAAN fighter and unmanned combat aircraft, while remaining dependent on Western technologies, engines and fighter aircraft in several areas.
The confrontation with Iran in 2026 also demonstrated the importance of NATO air-defence infrastructure to Turkey when Iranian missiles entered Turkish airspace.
At its current level of military power, Turkey can increase the cost of Israeli operations and deploy radars, air defences, aircraft and drones in nearby theatres, while Israel retains an advantage in precision strikes and aerial penetration during the opening stages of a confrontation.
A Long War Would Present a Different Calculation
Israel’s ability to sustain a prolonged war depends heavily on American military supply and cooperation.
In January 2025, the Israeli Defence Ministry signed contracts with Israeli company Elbit Systems to expand domestic production of heavy bombs and raw materials as part of an effort to reduce wartime dependence on imports.
Yet Israel’s core air power continues to rely on American fighter aircraft, spare parts, munitions and interceptor systems provided through its extensive military relationship with Washington.
The wars with Iran demonstrated the importance of this dependence.
CSIS concluded during 2026 that intensive use of American THAAD interceptors and long-range strike missiles placed parts of US inventories under pressure, with some categories potentially requiring years to replenish.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies similarly pointed to the US and Israeli need to rebuild missile-defence inventories after large numbers of interceptors were expended.
The duration of a war therefore becomes a critical consideration in any scenario involving Turkey, as a sustained campaign would require a continuous flow of munitions, interceptors and spare parts.
This is where the core of the deterrence equation emerges.
Israel can reach targets inside Turkey and inflict significant damage. Yet Turkey’s size, the number of its military facilities and the depth of its defence industry make the prospect of rapidly eliminating its capacity to fight extremely costly.
Ankara could widen the confrontation into Syria and the eastern Mediterranean while employing air, naval, missile and drone forces. Israel, meanwhile, would retain advantages in aerial and intelligence capabilities, particularly in the opening stages.
The absence of a common land border further narrows options for decisive military action.
Scenarios discussed in strategic studies therefore concentrate on air and missile strikes, electronic warfare, air defence, naval engagements and Syria.
These capabilities can inflict substantial losses, but converting those losses into a decisive political result would require a longer and more attritional war.
This explains the emphasis in Israeli studies on deterrence, deconfliction and managing friction.
The Iranian experience itself offers a warning against equating air superiority with decisive victory. Despite the scale of US and Israeli strikes, the confrontation continued into early September 2026 and imposed significant costs in munitions and interceptor missiles.
That experience carries additional significance in Turkey’s case, where greater geographic depth, a larger industrial base and institutional links to NATO and Western defence economies all enter the equation.
What Keeps the Confrontation Below the Threshold of War?
Turkey’s NATO membership adds substantial political and strategic costs to any confrontation with Israel, although its impact would depend on where and how an armed clash occurred.
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all, while each member determines the form of assistance it considers necessary.
Article 6 defines the geographic scope of that commitment, including Turkish territory and, under the treaty’s specified conditions, the Mediterranean.
NATO membership therefore does not mean that every military encounter involving Turkish forces would automatically produce a war between Israel and the alliance.
This distinction is particularly important in Syria, the most likely arena for direct friction.
Turkish forces operating there are deployed outside Turkish territory and outside the immediate geographic scope defined by Article 6.
If Turkish soldiers were killed in an Israeli strike inside Syria, Ankara could request NATO consultations under Article 4, exert political pressure and decide on a national response, while the incident would remain outside the direct application of Article 5.
Even so, the killing of Turkish military personnel would sharply increase the cost of containing escalation and raise questions about state deterrence and the credibility of the Turkish military.
The calculation becomes more sensitive if confrontation moves into the Mediterranean or Turkish territory.
Article 6 covers vessels and aircraft belonging to NATO states in the Mediterranean under the treaty’s provisions, while Turkish territory clearly falls within NATO’s geographic area.
Even in such circumstances, the form of any NATO response would remain a political decision for the alliance and its individual members. But the crisis would move to a broader NATO level, increasing pressure on Washington and European capitals to contain it.
Washington Sits at the Centre of the Equation
The United States has extensive military ties with Turkey through NATO while simultaneously providing Israel with major military financing, weapons and defence cooperation and formally maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge.
A Turkish-Israeli confrontation would therefore place Washington in a crisis involving both a NATO ally and one of its principal military partners in the Middle East.
This helps explain Washington’s direct interest in containing escalation before it expands.
Alper Coşkun, a former Turkish diplomat and researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote on 8 July 2025 that Turkish-Israeli competition required American management to prevent it reaching the military stage, identifying Syria as the principal theatre in need of deconfliction arrangements.
That role became visible after the Abu al-Duhur strike in August 2026, when Washington announced efforts to establish a stronger deconfliction mechanism between Turkey, Israel and Syria after the incident came close to provoking a Turkish response.
On 27 August 2026, an analysis by Carmit Valensi and Amal Hayek at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies recommended combining limited military deterrence with dialogue and mechanisms designed to prevent direct collision.
The recommendation reflected a recognition within parts of Israel’s security establishment that strikes on Turkish interests in Syria become substantially more dangerous as Turkish forces move closer to targeted locations.
Keeping communication channels open reduces the risk that a limited strike will be interpreted as the opening move in a broader confrontation.
The most dangerous threshold is the transition from striking sites that Turkey may use to striking Turkish forces that are already physically deployed there.
During 2025 and again at Abu al-Duhur in 2026, Israeli strikes occurred before Turkish forces had established themselves at the targeted locations, allowing both sides to keep escalation within certain limits.
The death of Turkish soldiers in an Israeli strike, the downing of a Turkish aircraft, or damage to a Turkish vessel in the eastern Mediterranean would significantly increase the pressure for retaliation and heighten the sensitivity of the crisis within NATO.
An attack on Turkish territory would represent the highest threshold, shifting the confrontation onto a broader NATO agenda.
The deterrent importance of NATO and Washington therefore lies not in guaranteeing a predetermined military response, but in raising the cost of the next step and creating channels through which escalation can be contained.
Syria remains the arena where these limits are most likely to be tested.
If a potential Turkish deployment there becomes a permanent presence involving Turkish personnel and operational systems, the space for manoeuvre that has so far allowed Ankara and Tel Aviv to manage their rivalry without sliding into war will become significantly narrower.
