Tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv in Syria can no longer be described as a political dispute that can be contained through statements alone. Since the Israeli attack on Abu al-Duhur military airport east of Idlib on 18 August, relations between the two sides have entered a more dangerous phase.
The question now is whether Türkiye and Israel are approaching a direct military clash, even if limited, and what could prevent such a confrontation from occurring.
The answer begins in Syria, which, following the fall of the former regime, has become a point of collision between two competing regional projects. Türkiye is betting on a centralised Syrian state led by a government friendly to Ankara, while Israeli actions indicate a preference for a weak and divided Syria that cannot develop into a future threat.
Syria: The Direct Line of Friction
Abu al-Duhur airport itself was not a major military target in the strict sense. The facility had been out of service for years, and the attack caused no casualties. According to reports from Syria, the damage was limited to buildings and runways.
Its political significance, however, far exceeded its military impact.
According to the Israeli justification, the attack was intended to prevent a possible Turkish military deployment there. The message therefore extended beyond the airport itself: any substantial Turkish military deployment in Syria could become a target, even before it develops into an established presence on the ground.
Damascus and Ankara were quick to deny that any such deployment was planned.
More importantly, the attack was not an isolated incident. It was preceded by several other strikes, reflecting a recurring Israeli pattern of responding to any indication of Turkish military expansion inside Syrian territory, even when such moves remain at the planning stage rather than actual implementation.
According to Turkish sources that discussed the issue, existing understandings with Damascus allowed Ankara to operate north of the T-4 airbase, east of Homs in central Syria. From the Turkish perspective, the attack on Abu al-Duhur therefore amounted to an Israeli challenge to an arrangement reached between Ankara and Damascus.
Israel, meanwhile, maintains an advanced military presence in southern Syria, including areas beyond the buffer zone established under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, in addition to its continuing control of the occupied Golan Heights.
The two sides therefore do not occupy equivalent positions on the ground.
Israel occupies actual positions, monitors developments, intervenes and carries out attacks wherever it sees an interest in doing so. Türkiye, by contrast, is seeking political and indirect military influence through its support for the new Syrian army and efforts to rebuild it.
This difference in the nature of their respective presence is precisely what makes Syria more likely to become an arena of military friction than a battlefield for a direct war between two armies.
If a clash occurs, it is more likely to take the form of pre-emptive Israeli strikes against an advanced Turkish position than a direct air or ground confrontation between the two militaries. That threshold has not yet been crossed.
The Balance of Power: Why Does Israel Hesitate?
Any assessment of the likelihood of escalation must take into account the differences in the balance of power between the two sides.
Türkiye is dozens of times larger than the Israeli occupation entity in geographic size and has a population around nine times greater. Its ground forces number close to 400,000 regular soldiers, in addition to a substantial reserve force and significant air and naval capabilities, despite the fact that it does not yet possess the F-35 fighter jets operated by Israel.
Military power, however, cannot be measured simply by troop numbers or geography.
Israel’s advantages in air power, intelligence and technological capabilities differ fundamentally from the balance of land power and demography, which strongly favours Türkiye.
More importantly, Türkiye is a member of NATO.
That gives Ankara a political and security umbrella that would make any direct confrontation with it fundamentally different from every major confrontation Israel has fought in the region, from the 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt to its most recent aggression against Iran.
Those wars took place under entirely different political circumstances and balances of power. A clash with Ankara, however, would place Washington in an especially difficult position between its strategic ally Israel and its NATO partner Türkiye.
This helps explain repeated warnings inside Israel itself against sliding into an uncontrolled escalation.
Some Israeli analysts have described the idea of entering into confrontation with Türkiye as an “act of madness”, arguing that Ankara must be treated as a major regional power.
Alliances Further Complicate the Picture
The causes of Israeli concern cannot be understood solely through developments on Syrian territory. They are also tied to broader regional shifts taking place beyond Syria.
From Tel Aviv’s perspective, the signing of a mutual defence agreement between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in Mecca signalled the possible emergence of a new regional security architecture in which Israel could find itself on the opposing side.
Israel had previously hoped to become part of such a regional structure through the stalled normalisation process with Riyadh.
In response, the occupation entity has sought to build a parallel regional axis by strengthening relations with Greece and Cyprus. This culminated at the end of last year in the announcement of a joint rapid intervention force involving the three sides, a development widely interpreted as a direct message to Ankara, particularly given the sensitivity of the Cyprus issue for Türkiye.
Amid this rivalry, the American position remains a decisive factor in controlling the pace of escalation.
Washington, whose officials have described the strike on Abu al-Duhur as an “unnecessary escalation”, is working, according to public statements by its ambassador in Ankara, to establish a mechanism aimed at preventing direct military friction between Türkiye and Israel in Syria.
Yet while the American role may be effective in restraining a severe escalation, it does not appear likely to offer Syria much assistance in the process of reconstruction or in restoring full national sovereignty over its own decision-making.
Three Possible Scenarios
Against this backdrop, three main scenarios appear most likely to shape relations between Türkiye and Israel in the coming period.
1. Contained Rivalry and Continued Limited Friction
This is the scenario closest to the current situation.
Israel would continue striking any indication of an emerging Turkish military position in Syria, while Türkiye would confine its response to political and diplomatic protest rather than direct military retaliation.
Ankara would instead continue expanding its influence through Syrian state institutions and the new Syrian army, giving it more durable leverage than any immediate military response could provide.
2. Unintended Escalation
The second possibility is an accidental incident that forces both parties into a response they did not initially seek.
This could involve an Israeli strike mistakenly hitting Turkish personnel or their allies, or an engagement between a Turkish air defence system and an Israeli aircraft.
Such an incident could place both sides in a position where avoiding retaliation becomes difficult, even if neither originally wanted a broader confrontation.
3. US-Backed Negotiated De-escalation
The third scenario would involve a negotiated calming of tensions supported by Washington.
This would build on existing channels of communication between Israel and Syria, including undeclared meetings between security officials from both sides under American sponsorship.
Such talks could eventually produce broader understandings that more clearly define the limits of Turkish military deployment in Syria that Israel would tolerate, reducing the possibility of an accidental escalation.
A de-escalation of this kind would not end the underlying rivalry. It would merely establish rules designed to prevent that rivalry from turning into a direct military confrontation.
Syria Would Pay the Highest Price
Whatever path ultimately prevails, Syria itself would bear the greatest cost of the continuing confrontation.
Every new Israeli attack delays efforts to rebuild Syrian institutions, while any uncontrolled Turkish-Israeli escalation risks turning the country into an arena where Syrian sovereignty is tested not because Damascus is an active participant, but because its territory has become the stage for a struggle for influence between two regional powers.
This leaves Damascus with a difficult calculation.
Its most viable option may be to maintain a strategic partnership with Ankara without allowing Syrian territory to become an arena for settling regional scores in which Damascus itself has no effective veto over the decisions of others.
Ultimately, neither Türkiye nor Israel appears to want an open war.
The calculations of both sides, along with the presence of a shared American ally, continue to favour containment over comprehensive escalation.
Yet the growing number of friction points, particularly in Syria, but also across the eastern Mediterranean and as far as Somalia, means the space separating cold rivalry from an actual military confrontation is narrower than at any time since the fall of the Assad regime.
