Although US President Donald Trump declared at the beginning of the aggression against the Islamic Republic that the war’s principal objectives were to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and to eliminate what he described as imminent threats to Americans from the Iranian government and its so-called proxies, subsequent developments suggested a broader objective.
Trump’s call for the Iranian people to “take back” their country and assume control of their government, together with earlier statements concerning Iran’s missile programme, military capabilities and regional allies, as well as his acknowledgement that the Kurds had been armed, all pointed towards an objective extending beyond those publicly stated goals. The broader strategy appeared aimed at attempting to overthrow the Iranian government through a carefully constructed combination of direct and indirect methods.
Up to this point, however, the Islamic Republic has managed to withstand this multifaceted campaign. During the latest aggression, Tehran imposed its own tempo on the confrontation, eventually leading to the signing of the widely discussed memorandum of understanding that many Western analysts regarded as an American acknowledgement that the offensive had failed and that the balance of power between the two sides had shifted.
That development did not bring the war to an end or move the two sides towards understandings and a controlled peace based on a final agreement. Instead, the United States recycled the instruments of its campaign against the Islamic Republic and began rebuilding its strategy around objectives that differ in form from its original aims but remain fundamentally consistent with what Washington has long sought.
Washington Turns Towards a War of Attrition
In recent days, the United States has begun promoting a different set of mechanisms for confronting Iran.
These include an economic blockade discussed by the US Treasury Secretary, periodic limited strikes referenced by Trump, and repeated statements about the US Navy controlling the Strait of Hormuz and ensuring that oil continues to pass through it normally.
At the same time, American officials have not concealed that these mechanisms are unlikely to produce a rapid victory.
That leads to one central conclusion: the defining feature of the current phase will be attrition.
The question, therefore, is not only how much pressure Tehran can withstand, but also whether Iran can impose its own war of attrition on the United States by testing Washington’s ability to sustain a prolonged conflict and protect its regional assets.
Examining the maximum outcome that these mechanisms could realistically achieve suggests that they are unlikely to overthrow the Iranian government.
Instead, Washington’s attainable objective appears to be forcing the Islamic Republic back to the negotiating table under conditions defined by what the United States considers acceptable.
Having failed to secure a military victory, Washington is therefore shifting towards a battle of wills designed to confine the Islamic Republic within conditions where the cost of confrontation becomes increasingly difficult to bear.
From the American perspective, that pressure could eventually force Tehran to accept a new strategic reality defined by restrictions on Iranian capabilities and a diminished regional position and role.
Air Strikes Are Not the Main American Bet
Public attention has focused heavily on the recurring US air strikes against the Islamic Republic, while the impact of Iran’s response has been downplayed despite Tehran’s retaliation becoming faster, more intensive and more precise.
Yet Washington’s principal bet does not appear to rest on these strikes.
The previous offensive, despite being vastly larger in scope and scale, failed to establish the effectiveness of air power alone. American officials stated that more than 13,000 strikes were carried out against the Islamic Republic over a period of 40 days.
The central focus of the current phase is instead economic pressure.
Washington appears to calculate that reducing Iranian oil exports, preventing foreign financial transfers into Iran, restricting Tehran’s access to international trade and cutting it off from the technology required to sustain its weapons production cycle could eventually force the Islamic Republic into submission.
The critical question, however, is how long such a strategy would require.
Both history and experience have demonstrated Iran’s ability to withstand sanctions for prolonged periods. Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the country has been subjected to multiple forms of American sanctions, with more than 7,000 sanctions measures registered by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control.
The effectiveness of the current strategy will therefore depend heavily on whether third countries comply.
The fewer states that participate in the sanctions regime, the longer the confrontation is likely to continue.
If Iran’s allies refuse to comply, the strategy could fail altogether.
French compliance, for example, would have little practical effect if countries such as China, Russia, Pakistan or India refused to follow the same course.
Iran Is Not a Passive Opponent
Iran is not an opponent without the capacity to take the initiative.
The Islamic Republic has demonstrated that its strategy is not limited to neutralising American actions or merely attempting to frustrate Washington’s plans. It has also shown an ability to manoeuvre and create pressure independently.
Iran has demonstrated its ability to hold the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic card and to disrupt navigation there whenever it chooses.
It has also repeatedly and effectively targeted US military bases in the Gulf, reinforcing the equation that either security exists for everyone or there will be security for no one.
Nor should it be overlooked that Tehran was itself among the first to adopt a strategy aimed at exhausting the United States in the region.
Iran also benefits from an international environment that is far from uniformly hostile towards it.
This was evident at the recent Shanghai summit in Bishkek, where it became clear that Tehran was not isolated and that the powers gathered in Kyrgyzstan were not prepared to abide by unilateral American sanctions.
Which Side Can Sustain the Pressure Longer?
The confrontation is therefore taking place between two sides with fundamentally different relationships to prolonged conflict.
The Islamic Republic has lived under blockade and sanctions for extended periods and has adapted to persistent confrontation. It has succeeded in establishing its own deterrence equations, while its military doctrine has evolved towards what is increasingly described as an offensive posture.
It also possesses an important psychological dimension for sustaining confrontation, both through its international relationships and through a domestic perception of the war as an existential struggle and a defence of national sovereignty.
The United States, by contrast, evaluates the war partly through its financial cost and its impact on domestic American politics.
Democrats have increasingly attacked the war as a failure that is damaging the United States’ global position and imposing costs on American citizens without offering a clear future gain.
The real outcome of Washington’s strategy of attrition will therefore not be determined by repeated speeches from Trump and his administration.
It will be determined by developments on the ground.
So far, those developments suggest a possible advantage for the Islamic Republic.
Oil prices continue to rise, while polling inside the United States shows a sharp decline in support for Trump and the Republican Party, reflecting growing public perceptions that Washington’s confrontation with Iran has failed to produce the results it promised.
