The project of establishing an independent Kurdish entity in the Arab world no longer enjoys the political and territorial space its supporters sought in recent years, as rapid political and security shifts have once again reinforced the unity of the states in which Kurdish populations live.
The announcement by Mazloum Abdi that the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF, would be dissolved and integrated into Syrian state institutions, alongside the process of disarming the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, in Turkey and Iraq, stands out as one of the clearest indications that the armed separatist project is receding.
This does not mean that the Kurdish issue, or demands related to cultural and political rights, have disappeared. Rather, it reflects a shift in how the issue is being addressed, away from armed entities and autonomous projects and towards political and legal arrangements within the borders of existing states.
SDF Closes the Chapter on Armed Independence
In the latest development, Mazloum Abdi, the former commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, announced on Tuesday that the force’s mission as an independent military organisation had ended and that its integration into Syrian state institutions had begun.
The announcement was made during a press conference at the People’s Palace in Damascus, according to the Syrian Arab News Agency, SANA.
Abdi described the move as a “historic moment” in which Syria was closing one chapter of its history and opening another centred on peace, stability and reconstruction.
He said the next phase should move the country “from battlefields to construction sites, and from the age of weapons to the age of peace”.
The announcement came as part of a series of understandings between Damascus and the SDF, following an agreement announced by the Syrian government on 29 January 2026 that provided for a ceasefire and the beginning of a military and administrative integration process, alongside arrangements for the return of displaced people to their areas.
It was also preceded by a decree issued by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in January affirming that Syrian Kurdish citizens are an integral part of the Syrian people and that their cultural and linguistic identity forms part of Syria’s diverse national identity.
These developments carry particular significance for the future of the project built by the SDF during the years of war in Syria, after it evolved from a US-backed local force into an actor controlling large areas of north-eastern Syria.
Turkey: ‘No State in Northern Syria’
The developments in Syria cannot be separated from the changes taking place in Turkey regarding the PKK, which fought an armed conflict with the Turkish state for decades.
In this context, an earlier statement by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has returned to attention.
In 2015, Erdogan said: “Whatever the cost, we will never allow the establishment of a state in northern Syria and southern Turkey.”
Following the announcement that the SDF would be dissolved and integrated into the Syrian state, Erdogan wrote on X on Tuesday: “Everyone should be reassured and at ease… the Republic of Turkey does not compromise on its principles or national interests. We do not leave any friend or brother who trusts us halfway.”
Ankara regards any armed formation linked to the PKK along its borders as a threat to its national security.
Its position towards developments in northern Syria and Iraq has therefore been closely tied to rejecting the emergence of an armed Kurdish entity that could develop into an independent political and military base.
The Post-PKK Phase
In another sign of the ongoing transition, the Turkish parliament approved the “Strengthening National Solidarity and Social Integration” law earlier this month as part of the “Terror-Free Turkey” process.
The legislation passed with the support of 468 of the 562 MPs present.
The law regulates procedures related to investigations, trials and convictions involving PKK members. Some measures will enter into force after it is verified that the organisation and affiliated formations have ended their effective presence and surrendered their weapons and ammunition.
Erdogan described parliament’s approval of the law as a “historic step”.
He said achieving a “Terror-Free Turkey” and a “terror-free region” was a major priority for the country.
Turkey, he added, was working through the combined efforts of the state and society to close a chapter that had cost it “tens of thousands of lives and 40 years of the country’s history”.
The process reflects Ankara’s move from managing an armed conflict towards trying to close it through legal, political and security arrangements.
It also raises new questions over the future of PKK-linked organisations in Syria, Iraq and Iran.
Washington: Their Role Is Over
The shift in the US position represents another factor behind the SDF’s declining ability to maintain an independent project.
US Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barrack said on Tuesday that the dissolution of the SDF and its integration into Syrian state institutions represented “a truly historic event”.
Writing on X, Barrack said US President Donald Trump’s Middle East plan was making progress towards integrating a former partner within a national framework and towards the emergence of “a unified Syria for all”.
Barrack had said in January 2026 that the greatest opportunity for Kurds in Syria lay under the new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa.
He argued that the SDF’s original mission as a principal force in fighting Islamic State had effectively ended on the ground.
At the time, he also said Washington did not seek a long-term US military presence in Syria and that the new phase offered a path towards integration into a unified Syrian state while guaranteeing citizenship rights.
He further explained that the United States did not support separatist or federalist tendencies in Syria and was focused instead on defeating the remnants of Islamic State, strengthening national unity and advancing reconciliation.
This shift is highly significant because the SDF relied for years on US military and political support, both in fighting Islamic State and in preserving its influence across north-eastern Syria.
From Military Force to Component of the State
The Syrian Democratic Forces were established in October 2015 in the city of al-Malikiyah in Hasakah province.
The formation included predominantly Kurdish units alongside Arab, Syriac and Turkmen factions.
It quickly became a major US partner in the war against Islamic State and, over the following years, extended its control across large areas of north-eastern Syria, including parts of Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo provinces.
According to the Jusoor Center for Studies, areas controlled by the SDF accounted for around 25.6 per cent of Syrian territory by 2019.
The circumstances that enabled that level of influence have since changed substantially.
Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in December 2025, a new central authority emerged in Damascus, and Washington began reassessing its military and political presence in Syria.
As a result, the SDF lost much of the political environment that had helped it build an administrative and military model separate from Damascus.
Baghdad: A Major Obstacle to the Kurdish Project
The transformation is not limited to Syria and Turkey.
Iraq remains one of the most important arenas in reshaping the relationship between the state and armed Kurdish organisations.
A study by Turkey’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ORSAM, said ending the PKK’s armed presence in northern Iraq could open a new phase in Turkish-Iraqi relations, after the group’s presence since the 1980s became one of the main sources of tension between the two countries.
The study noted that Baghdad designated the PKK a banned terrorist organisation in April 2024, a step that strengthened security cooperation with Ankara.
ORSAM does not view disarmament merely as a military measure.
It describes it as a multidimensional process requiring political, social and civilian arrangements to dismantle the organisational structure and manage the transitional phase.
The PKK’s withdrawal from areas where it operates in northern Iraq could also reshape the balance of power within the Kurdistan Region, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
The departure of armed groups could also allow residents to return to hundreds of villages evacuated because of the conflict, while strengthening the authority of Kurdistan Regional Government institutions over areas previously influenced by armed organisations.
Development Road: Security Becomes an Economic Interest
The future of the PKK issue is also connected to economic calculations that go beyond security.
Stability in northern Iraq is an important factor for the strategic Development Road project, which links the Grand Faw Port in southern Iraq to the Turkish border and aims to establish a transport and trade corridor connecting Iraq with Turkish and European markets.
According to the ORSAM study, ending security threats linked to the PKK could improve the project’s security and attractiveness to regional and international investors, particularly investors from the Gulf.
Greater security could also help Turkish-Iraqi economic relations move towards the goal of raising bilateral trade to around $30 billion.
That outcome, however, is not automatic.
Difficult issues remain, including the status of areas such as Sinjar and Makhmour, the future of local groups linked to the PKK, and the need to strengthen Iraqi government authority in areas that previously witnessed armed activity.
The Iraqi Kurdistan Independence Referendum
The 2017 referendum in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq remains a pivotal event for understanding the current decline of the separatist project.
On 25 September 2017, around 92.7 per cent of participants voted in favour of separating from Iraq.
The referendum was held across Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok and Halabja provinces, as well as disputed territories including Kirkuk.
The regional leadership hoped the result would pave the way for negotiations leading to an independent Kurdish state, relying on what it regarded as the right to self-determination and the role played by Peshmerga forces in fighting Islamic State.
The project, however, faced broad rejection from Baghdad, opposition from Turkey and Iran, and insufficient international support.
In October of the same year, Iraqi federal forces regained control of disputed territories, including Kirkuk and its oilfields.
The Kurdistan Regional Government later stepped back from the referendum’s outcome and returned to calls for dialogue within the framework of the Iraqi constitution.
The experience demonstrated that military power or territorial control alone were not enough to secure recognition for an independent Kurdish state in a region where the interests of four major states intersect: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran.
Iran: The Unresolved Front
The situation in Iran remains somewhat different, particularly because of the continuing activity of the Kurdistan Free Life Party, commonly known as PJAK.
According to the ORSAM study, the organisation gave a limited welcome to the PKK’s decision but rejected abandoning its weapons in Iran, citing what it describes as political closure and exclusionary policies towards Kurds.
This shows that dismantling the PKK’s armed structure does not necessarily mean the end of all organisations linked to it or influenced by its ideology across the region.
The broader trend, however, suggests that the regional environment that previously allowed these groups to operate militarily has become more restrictive, as all four states emphasise sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Looking at developments in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the region appears to be moving towards a redefinition of the Kurdish issue.
In Turkey, efforts are focused on ending armed conflict through the “Terror-Free Turkey” process.
In Iraq, pressure is increasing to end the PKK’s armed presence and strengthen state authority.
In Syria, the SDF has moved towards dissolving its military structure and integrating into state institutions, while Damascus has simultaneously affirmed Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights.
This creates a central paradox: the decline of the separatist project does not necessarily mean the decline of Kurdish demands.
The Syrian decree affirming that Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian people and guaranteeing their cultural and linguistic rights offers a different model based on recognising distinct identity within the state rather than establishing a separate entity outside it.
The period in which Kurdish autonomous administrations and armed entities expanded in Syria and Iraq therefore appears to be approaching its end.
In its place, a new phase centred on political and institutional integration is emerging, while Kurdish national and cultural rights remain a sensitive issue that will help determine how durable this transformation ultimately becomes.
