Israeli political and security circles continue to closely monitor the Mecca Agreement as the prospects of Saudi normalisation with Tel Aviv recede, amid calls to reduce Pakistani and Turkish influence over Riyadh in favour of Washington and Israel.
Shai Gal, founder and director of the international strategy firm Line of State, which works with governments, institutions and decision-makers on strategy, security, risk and complex decision-making, argued that the Mecca Agreement had brought Türkiye and Pakistan “into the heart of Saudi Arabia”, giving them access to markets, capital, production, maintenance, status and influence in exchange for security guarantees.
He said the three countries do not share a common enemy. India is not an enemy of Saudi Arabia, while Ankara and Islamabad are not participating in Riyadh’s confrontation with Iran and both need relations with Tehran.
In an article published by the Israeli website Walla and translated by Arabi21, Gal argued that Tel Aviv and Riyadh instead share a common front against Iran and its allies, including the Houthis, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Hezbollah.
He said that only days after the agreement, the Houthis resumed attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Under a previous defence agreement with Riyadh, Pakistan remained outside the war when Saudi Arabia was struck by hundreds of missiles and drones from Iran and its allies.
Gal noted that under the new agreement, an attack on one party is defined as an attack on all, but assistance remains subject to consultation.
Israel’s Existing Security Role
Gal claimed that Riyadh already benefits from Israeli military and intelligence capabilities without formal diplomatic relations or public Israeli symbols.
He said Israel is integrated into the regional warning and defence architecture and within the US Central Command system, exchanges intelligence with Saudi Arabia, and contributes to a broader network of radars, sensors, aerial imagery and secure communications.
He also claimed that Türkiye itself is subject to intelligence reporting regarding its activities alongside forces viewed as threatening Saudi national security.
According to Gal, other layers of cooperation operate behind these systems, and merely revealing them would undermine their purpose.
He described Saudi Arabia as the major Arab power with which Israel has yet to establish open relations, noting that the kingdom possesses the energy resources, capital, geographic position and Arab legitimacy required for a broader regional order.
He said that on the eve of 7 October, negotiations were underway over an agreement combining Saudi recognition of Israel with a US security framework, economic components and a major civilian element.
A month before the attack, he added, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, or IMEC, was launched at the G20 summit in New Delhi, linking India to Europe through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus and Greece.
Competing Regional Corridors
Gal contrasted IMEC with the Middle Corridor linking China and Central Asia through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye and Europe.
He argued that closing the route running from India through the Gulf and Israel would increase the strategic value of Türkiye’s geographic position and raise the importance of its own corridor.
He also noted that in November 2025 Washington added Kazakhstan to the Abraham Accords, despite Kazakhstan having maintained relations with Israel since 1992, arguing that normalisation was therefore no longer required in the traditional sense.
Gal said the Abraham Accords were designed to transform hostility into strategic relationships and argued that Saudi Arabia could use them to reshape the regional map.
Riyadh, he noted, has made a path towards a Palestinian state a condition for normalisation, while Türkiye supports Hamas politically, provides it space to operate and maintains rhetoric hostile to Israel.
Normalisation Framed as a Strategic Realignment
Gal claimed that normalisation should not be viewed as a prize Riyadh would give Israel.
Instead, he argued, it would replace Saudi dependence on Türkiye and Pakistan with a US security pillar, Israeli strategic depth, Indian weight and European connectivity through IMEC.
He linked such a shift to Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 strategy of diversifying the economy away from oil and transforming the kingdom into a hub for investment, industry and logistics.
Gal also argued that a Saudi civilian nuclear facility operating under American supervision would serve Israeli interests.
In his assessment, the strategic exchange would involve drawing Saudi Arabia further into a US-Israeli-led regional framework while reducing Turkish and Pakistani influence inside the kingdom.
