The latest appointments made by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, have attracted widespread attention and sparked debate over what they may signal for the trajectory of the war and confrontation with the United States.
The New York Times reported that Khamenei’s recent changes suggest Iran is preparing for war both at home and abroad, arguing that his appointment of hardline figures to senior positions points to preparations for either a prolonged war or a confrontation with domestic opposition.
After nearly six months out of public view, Khamenei has begun revealing his vision for governing the country by appointing a number of veteran hardline military commanders to senior security positions.
According to the newspaper, the sweeping reshuffle carried out this month signals an intention to keep the country on a state of high alert, with analysts saying it is designed both for an open confrontation with the United States and for suppressing domestic opposition among Iranians already suffering under the economic burden of the conflict.
The appointments also reflect a leadership still struggling to formulate a sustainable strategy for deterring Washington, as Tehran seeks to end the war without relinquishing the strategic leverage it has gained, particularly its control over the Strait of Hormuz.
New Security Leadership Faces an Uncertain Conflict
Iran’s newly appointed security leadership must first navigate a period of uncertainty and ambiguity in the conflict.
Although the intensity of large-scale clashes has declined, neither Washington nor Tehran appears willing to make the concessions needed to reach an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz. The 60-day deadline set for reaching an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme has also expired.
The resulting stalemate has left the region in a state of uncertainty that could erupt into a full-scale war at any moment.
Among the appointments made by Ayatollah Khamenei was Mohsen Rezaei, who commanded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps during the Iran-Iraq War. He was named head of the Supreme National Security Council.
Hossein Taeb, a cleric and former intelligence chief, was appointed to lead the Basij forces, a powerful paramilitary network frequently used to suppress protests.
The reshuffle also included a new General Staff of the Armed Forces, a new commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and a new commander of the IRGC Navy, a particularly significant post given the growing importance of the Strait of Hormuz.
Sina Toossi, an expert on Iranian affairs at the Center for International Policy in Washington, said: “I would describe this primarily as Mojtaba Khamenei’s imprint on Iran’s national security structure.”
For many Iranians, however, that imprint looks familiar.
A Return to the Old Guard
The New York Times said that most of those appointed by Ayatollah Khamenei belong to an older generation of Iranian leaders who participated in the revolution that established the Islamic Republic in 1979 and later held command positions during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s.
During that war, Ayatollah Khamenei developed close relationships with some of them, including Rezaei, who was his commander, and Taeb, who served in his battalion.
Omid Memarian, an Iran analyst at the Middle East Democracy Center in Washington, said: “These appointments suggest that Mojtaba, after the enormous gaps exposed by the war, still trusts the old guard more than anyone else.”
Some of the appointees, particularly Rezaei, have historically pursued more extreme military objectives.
Rezaei unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Iranian leadership to extend the war with Iraq rather than accept a ceasefire, believing Iran could have secured greater gains and a more favourable settlement.
A similar debate is now unfolding inside Iran over how to end the war with the United States.
Moderates in government, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, believe Iran should use its effective control over the Strait of Hormuz as leverage to reach an agreement.
Hardliners, by contrast, want to hold their position in order to secure further concessions. They favour maintaining a firm posture that they believe would deter the United States from launching further military interventions.
They point to the two most recent wars launched by the United States and Israel, in June 2025 and February of this year, both of which began while Iran was engaged in negotiations with the Trump administration.
They also cite the nuclear agreement Iran reached with Washington in 2015, from which President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018.
Hadi Borhani, a political commentator and professor of Israeli studies at the University of Tehran, said: “The hardliners have gained considerable momentum with an argument, and history appears to be on their side, that the West is fundamentally untrustworthy.”
He added that hardliners would also argue that the only language the West understands is “resistance, military deterrence and making any Western intervention in our region extremely costly”.
Tehran Searches for a New Deterrence Strategy
Beyond their hostile positions, Abdolrasool Divsallar, an expert on Iranian affairs at the Catholic University of Milan, said the appointments reflect Tehran’s determined effort to find a new approach to deterrence against Washington.
Most of those appointed, including Rezaei, supported returning to the short-term memorandum of understanding signed with the Trump administration in June.
That document was intended to pave the way towards an agreement over Iran’s nuclear programme.
However, they also insisted that Iran would return to the vaguely worded agreement only if it were implemented according to Tehran’s interpretation of its provisions, particularly by allowing Iran to retain control over the Strait of Hormuz until a final agreement is reached rather than surrendering that leverage first.
Divsallar said: “At the heart of this is a kind of pragmatism and a willingness to search for a solution. It is a desire to guarantee their security.”
Observers say Ayatollah Khamenei has surrounded himself with figures who appear willing to negotiate if they believe the conditions are favourable, but who are equally prepared to prolong the war if they are not.
This represents a departure from the approach of his father and predecessor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
A More Confrontational Approach Than His Father
The elder Ayatollah Khamenei, who was killed in the first wave of US-Israeli strikes on 28 February, was cautious about negotiations with the United States but also restrained when it came to direct military confrontation with Washington.
Under the former Ayatollah, Iran threatened missile strikes in response to the Trump administration’s assassination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020.
Tehran also issued a warning before retaliating after US warplanes joined Israeli strikes against Iran last year.
Some analysts believe Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei has shown a greater willingness to initiate conflict with Washington, pointing to Iran’s decision to begin the latest round of military clashes.
He also used hostile language when announcing his latest appointments, including calling on Rezaei to prepare for “strong offensive operations against the enemy”.
Toossi said this “does not mean Iran is abandoning diplomacy with the United States, but it does indicate a tougher approach to diplomacy”.
He added: “Iran is prepared to enter negotiations to end the war, but it is also prepared for a prolonged conflict rather than accepting an incomplete or temporary settlement that would leave it vulnerable to renewed US pressure or attacks.”
The Domestic Cost of Prolonged Confrontation
Iran’s leadership appears to be betting that it can sustain the economic consequences of the conflict for longer than President Trump can withstand the political consequences of the war inside the United States.
That strategy carries serious implications for roughly 90 million people in Iran, who are enduring a collapsed economy while living under the threat of a return to full-scale war.
Dire economic conditions had already triggered widespread protests before the war, which Iranian security forces suppressed with lethal force. The risk of further protests continues to loom as the economy remains under severe strain.
Memarian said: “A strategy of confrontation abroad becomes much easier to sustain if the leadership believes it can suppress the political consequences at home.”
That is why Taeb’s appointment as head of the Basij forces has drawn particular attention.
He has long been one of Ayatollah Khamenei’s closest allies and accumulated considerable influence during his time as head of the IRGC intelligence organisation.
When announcing Taeb’s appointment last week, Ayatollah Khamenei called on him to strengthen the Basij’s “public intelligence network”, a move experts believe indicates that the forces will assume an expanded role in domestic surveillance and repression.
Memarian said: “Mojtaba may be prepared to take risks in confronting the United States, a risk even his father avoided in his later years. The question is whether Iran’s political system, and more importantly Iranian society, can absorb the consequences of that gamble.”
