The decision to move US President Donald Trump away from his aircraft in Ankara was only one episode in a much broader picture.
The warning that his presidential aircraft could be targeted originated from Israel. US intelligence questioned the information, while Türkiye found nothing to substantiate it. Nevertheless, the warning prompted the US Secret Service to take exceptional measures to protect the president.
What happened in Ankara, however, raises a wider question beyond the security of a presidential journey: how do Israeli warnings concerning Iran, some of which Washington itself doubts, move into American decision-making circles? And how do they become part of the information heard by a president who sees the threat as directed personally against his life before his administration decides to go to war?
Intelligence Washington Could Not Confirm
The Ankara episode was not an isolated case. It was one of a series of Israeli warnings delivered to Washington over the past year.
Reuters reported that the United States had received several warnings from Israel claiming that Iran intended to assassinate Trump.
According to the agency, the scenarios included the possibility of Trump being targeted by a sniper, the recruitment of an individual to attack him with a knife during a large public event, and even an attempt to strike him with a shoulder-fired missile.
Reuters said the warnings began shortly before the 12-day war in June 2025 and intensified before Washington decided to enter the war against Iran in February 2026.
While these reports were being passed to US intelligence agencies, Reuters said Israeli officials also conveyed some of them directly to senior White House officials, including personnel in the Situation Room.
The significance of these warnings, however, lies not only in whether they were substantiated, but also in the fact that they remained present within the administration despite doubts surrounding some of them.
Reuters reported that the Central Intelligence Agency was unable to confirm some of the specific threats shared by Israel. In several instances, the CIA assessed Israeli intelligence concerning alleged Iranian threats, including purported plans to assassinate Trump, with “low confidence”.
Such an assessment does not necessarily mean that the information is false. Rather, it indicates that the available evidence does not support a high level of confidence in the conclusion, or that questions remain regarding the sources and evidence on which the intelligence is based.
In the Ankara case specifically, The Washington Post reported that CIA analysts did not find the Israeli intelligence convincing. It quoted a US official describing the information as “derived from Israel rather than US-originated intelligence” and saying it was viewed with “low confidence”.
Nevertheless, the Secret Service chose to exercise caution.
A Direct Channel Amid Intelligence Turmoil
Intelligence normally follows an institutional process. Information reaches specialised agencies, is analysed and assessed, and conclusions are then forwarded to decision-makers.
What Reuters revealed adds a more sensitive layer.
Some Israeli warnings were delivered directly to senior White House officials rather than passing solely through the normal analytical channels.
This occurred at a time when the US intelligence system itself was experiencing disruption.
Reuters reported that the CIA had stopped working on joint assessments with the National Intelligence Council, the body intended to reflect the collective view of the US intelligence community, amid tensions with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The number of National Intelligence Council assessments concerning Iran had also declined, partly because of staff dismissals.
When Intelligence Enters the Calculations of War
The question therefore extends beyond whether a particular piece of intelligence is confirmed. It concerns what happens once that information enters the decision-making environment.
Reuters reported that Trump took Israeli intelligence about alleged Iranian attempts to assassinate him into consideration before launching the war against Iran in February.
Less than 48 hours before the attack began, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke with Trump by telephone and, according to Reuters, urged him to exploit an opportunity to kill Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Among Netanyahu’s arguments was the idea of taking “revenge for previous Iranian attempts to assassinate Trump”.
This does not prove that Israeli warnings created the decision to go to war.
Reuters stressed that it could not determine how much influence Netanyahu’s argument had on the US president, nor did it claim that Israel forced Trump into the war.
What matters is that the alleged assassination plot became part of a complex decision-making environment in which intelligence assessments, perceived personal threats, military considerations and political calculations intersected.
Washington Did Not Accept Every Israeli Claim
Within the US administration, Israeli intelligence was not always treated as established fact.
The New York Times described a meeting in the White House Situation Room on 11 February in which Netanyahu presented a proposal for attacking Iran and discussed the possibility of regime change.
According to the newspaper, CIA Director John Ratcliffe described some of the regime-change scenarios as “ridiculous”.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dan Caine reportedly said the Israelis were “overselling” their case and that their plans were “not always well thought through”.
He added that Israel knew it needed the United States and was therefore “pushing hard”.
Trump, however, did not reject the Israeli proposal in its entirety.
He remained interested in objectives that his own agencies considered achievable, particularly striking Iran’s leadership and military capabilities.
The doubts extended beyond the accuracy of some intelligence to the motives behind sharing it.
The Washington Post quoted a former official as saying that some Israeli reporting appeared designed “to shape presidential decision-making as much as to inform it”.
In Congress, Democratic Senator Chris Van Hollen said he had “no doubt” that Iran wanted to get rid of Trump, but questioned whether the Israeli intelligence was “credible and independently verifiable”, adding that some of it “seems a little fantastical”.
Democratic Representative Adam Smith said it was easy to see why Israel would want to “stiffen Trump’s resolve” and make him more willing to confront Iran aggressively.
Opposition to the war was not limited to Democrats.
Conservative media figure Tucker Carlson, one of the most prominent voices associated with the “America First” movement, opposed the war and visited the Oval Office more than once to warn Trump that a conflict with Iran would “destroy his presidency”.
Steve Bannon expressed similar concerns during the June 2025 war, warning that Israel “doesn’t just want us to defend, they want us to attack”.
Israel, for its part, denies using intelligence to influence US policy.
Reuters quoted a spokesperson for the Israeli embassy as saying that “the same people who claim Israel is attempting to influence US policy through alleged intelligence sharing would accuse Israel of withholding critical information if that served their agenda”.
The Question of How Intelligence Is Used
Questioning some Israeli warnings does not mean that concerns in Washington about threats against Trump have no basis.
The US Department of Justice has announced charges in cases in which it said Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was involved in plots targeting Trump. In one case, a man was convicted after authorities said he had acted under its direction.
Tehran, however, denies planning to kill Trump.
US investigators also found no evidence that Iran was involved in the two assassination attempts against him during the 2024 election campaign.
The central issue, therefore, is not simply whether a threat exists.
It is how that threat reaches the president, how it is framed, and how it is presented at a moment when decisions of war are being made.
The available evidence does not establish that Israel created the decision to go to war. It does, however, show how unresolved intelligence, when supplied by a close ally and delivered to a president who believes he is personally being targeted, can become part of the calculations shaping his decisions.
