Months after taking office as Iran’s Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei has begun a broad reshaping of the country’s military and security leadership through a series of appointments that, according to the analysis, signal a new approach to managing confrontation with the United States and Israel.
The emerging strategy centres on greater military command centralisation, stronger deterrence, and closer integration of military, economic, diplomatic and security tools.
Mohsen Rezaei Returns to a Central Security Role
The appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as secretary-general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stands out as one of the clearest signs of this shift.
Rezaei led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for 16 years and was instrumental in building Iranian military institutions and capabilities whose influence endured for decades.
His position during the Iran-Iraq War is also significant. At the time, Rezaei opposed ending the war before Iran had acquired greater leverage to impose its own terms for a settlement. His return to a central security role comes as Tehran reassesses the conditions under which it would be prepared to end another costly confrontation.
The move does not necessarily indicate a rejection of negotiations. Rather, it points to an Iranian desire to negotiate from a stronger position.
According to an analysis published by Foreign Policy, the new approach is based on the view that diplomacy should not replace deterrence, but instead serve as a tool for securing a lasting settlement while allowing Tehran to retain the ability to impose significant costs on its adversaries.
Military Command Becomes More Centralised
The same approach is reflected in several other appointments.
Ali Abdollahi has been appointed chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, with responsibility for integrating the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters into the General Staff. The change is intended to strengthen command centralisation and improve coordination during wartime.
Khamenei also confirmed Ahmad Vahidi as commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and instructed him to achieve the “highest levels of deterrence”, while maintaining readiness to carry out “powerful offensive operations against the enemy”.
At the same time, Ali Azmaei took command of the IRGC Navy as the Strait of Hormuz has become one of Iran’s most important sources of leverage against Washington.
His responsibilities focus on increasing combat readiness, strengthening intelligence capabilities and improving coordination between naval forces.
Meanwhile, Tehran is negotiating with Oman over new arrangements for navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, without agreeing to restore the conditions that existed before the war.
Hussein Taeb Returns to a Prominent Internal Role
On the domestic front, Khamenei returned Hussein Taeb to a prominent position by appointing him head of the Basij forces.
Taeb has been tasked with strengthening the intelligence network, expanding the use of modern technologies and consolidating organisation at neighbourhood level.
Taken together, the appointments reveal a broader Iranian concept of security that extends beyond the military front.
According to the same analysis, maritime control, intelligence, domestic mobilisation, economic resilience and military capabilities are increasingly being treated as interconnected elements of a strategy aimed at improving Iran’s ability to withstand pressure and preventing a repeat of what Tehran sees as a failure of deterrence.
Lessons From the Post-2018 Period
This assessment is rooted partly in Iran’s experience following the United States’ withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018.
Tehran subsequently pursued what became known as “strategic patience”, often avoiding large-scale responses to sanctions, assassinations and Israeli attacks in the hope of preserving room for diplomacy.
However, the prevailing view within Iran’s security establishment now, according to the analysis, is that this approach may have encouraged Washington and “Tel Aviv” to conclude that Tehran was weak and that attacking it would carry limited costs.
This has led to a shift towards a more offensive form of deterrence.
The objective is not only to possess greater military capabilities, but also to demonstrate a willingness to use them in a way that makes the cost of any future confrontation significantly higher for Iran’s adversaries.
Economy Becomes Part of the War Strategy
The economy also occupies an important place in this strategy.
According to the analysis, Tehran does not want to rely solely on a “resistance economy”. It wants any war to end under conditions that allow it to build a sustainable economic future.
At the same time, Iran’s experience with the nuclear agreement and the latest memorandum of understanding has deepened doubts about the reliability of sanctions relief when it remains tied to concessions that can later be reversed by a US administration or Congress.
This is where the Strait of Hormuz becomes a source of leverage extending beyond its military importance.
Iran’s insistence on new arrangements for the Strait, and its refusal simply to return to the previous situation in exchange for promises of sanctions relief, reflect an attempt, according to the analysis, to convert gains achieved during the war into long-term economic and regional influence.
Rezaei Sets Out Tehran’s Conditions
This direction has been reflected clearly in Rezaei’s recent statements.
During his first meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Iran, Rezaei said the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed until Washington ended the war, released frozen Iranian funds and responded to other Iranian conditions conveyed through mediators.
He also demanded an end to the wars in Lebanon and Gaza, conditions that go beyond those contained in the previous memorandum of understanding.
The return of Rezaei and Khamenei’s new appointments therefore do not appear to represent an abandonment of diplomacy. Rather, they point to a redefinition of the conditions under which Iran is prepared to negotiate.
Under this approach, Tehran wants to enter any future negotiations with greater leverage while retaining the capacity to endure a prolonged war and raise its costs for its adversaries.
