Over the past decade, Türkiye’s defence industry has become one of the channels through which Ankara conducts foreign policy. The process often begins with a presidential visit or military cooperation agreement, then extends into procurement, training, maintenance and local production.
This model gives Türkiye recurring access to defence ministries, armed forces and procurement institutions in importing countries, while in some cases developing into broader security and economic partnerships that outlast the initial contract.
State institutions manage this export expansion alongside a network of companies whose capabilities span unmanned aircraft, electronics, missiles, naval systems and armoured vehicles.
The strategy has gained greater weight as Türkiye rose to 11th place among the world’s largest exporters of major arms during 2021 to 2025, according to a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on 9 March 2026.
Türkiye accounted for 1.8 per cent of global arms exports, while the volume of its exports increased by 122 per cent compared with 2016 to 2020. Pakistan received 16 per cent of Turkish arms exports, the UAE 12 per cent and Ukraine 8.4 per cent.
Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached US$10.05 billion in 2025, according to the Presidency of Defence Industries. The sector includes more than 3,500 companies and employs over 100,000 people.
This growth is closely linked to the industry’s need for foreign markets capable of financing development programs and keeping production lines active.
In a May 2024 report, the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded that the continuation of Türkiye’s defence industrial expansion had become increasingly dependent on exports and international cooperation, while challenges remained in advanced technologies, components and supply chains.
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP, similarly argued in a 2024 study that Ankara uses arms exports strategically to expand its networks and enter markets that some other Atlantic states are reluctant to engage with.
The political results of that strategy vary according to the nature of Türkiye’s relationship with the importing country and the depth of military and industrial cooperation involved.
How Türkiye Turns Arms Deals Into Influence
The Turkish state occupies a central position in directing the defence industry towards foreign markets.
The Presidency of Defence Industries, SSB, reports directly to the presidency and oversees armament, development, contracting and production programs.
The Defence Industry Executive Committee represents the highest decision-making level in the sector. Its members include the president, vice-president, ministers of treasury, interior, defence and industry, the chief of the General Staff, and the head of the Presidency of Defence Industries.
The committee has authority over decisions involving defence exports, industrial offset arrangements and countertrade, while also coordinating institutions and financing training programs.
This means political, military and industrial considerations can be integrated into export strategy from the stage at which a target market is selected.
The state’s direct role is also evident through ASFAT, the state-owned Military Factory and Shipyard Management company operating under Türkiye’s Ministry of National Defence.
ASFAT markets the capabilities of Turkish military factories and shipyards and implements overseas design, construction, modernisation, training and logistical support projects.
This structure allows Ankara to enter long-term contracts led by a government institution but involving shipyards, engineering companies and suppliers of systems and components.
Within this broader framework, private company Baykar specialises in unmanned aerial systems and produces the Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akıncı.
ASELSAN manufactures defence electronics, including radar, communications, sensing and targeting systems.
Roketsan specialises in missiles and guided munitions.
STM works in warship design, systems integration and logistical support, while FNSS Defence Systems produces armoured vehicles and conducts local production and modernisation programs in partner countries.
The model was visible during President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Jeddah in July 2023, when a cooperation plan between the Saudi and Turkish defence ministries was accompanied by defence contracts.
The political visit therefore opened the way for a wider industrial program extending beyond the original procurement deal.
Türkiye’s presence continues after weapons are delivered through training, maintenance, spare parts, ammunition, upgrades, service centres and production lines.
Warships require years of design, construction, testing and crew preparation, while unmanned aircraft depend on control stations, sensors, software, munitions and operator training.
At this stage, the original procurement contract develops into a regular institutional relationship between Turkish companies and foreign armed forces, defence ministries and domestic industrial bodies.
This allows existing programs to be monitored and new projects to be opened.
Its political significance increases when cooperation expands from training and maintenance into joint manufacturing, permanent military committees and, eventually, broader security or economic arrangements.
Saudi Arabia: Arms Cooperation Consolidates Reconciliation
Saudi-Turkish defence cooperation developed within a broader reconciliation process in which high-level visits reopened relations between the two countries.
In July 2023, the Saudi Ministry of Defence signed two contracts with Baykar to acquire Bayraktar Akıncı heavy combat drones.
The agreements were concluded alongside a cooperation plan between the two defence ministries and other agreements covering energy, investment and communications.
The two contracts were followed by localisation agreements linking Baykar with Saudi Arabian Military Industries, SAMI.
Saudi Arabia’s National Company for Mechanical Systems also entered arrangements with ASELSAN and Roketsan to localise the production of sensors and munitions used by the drones.
After the Baykar contracts were signed, Saudi localisation institutions moved quickly to transfer parts of production, testing, training and technical support into the kingdom.
On 25 July 2025, FNSS expanded the Turkish industrial presence by signing an agreement with SAMI Land Systems, a subsidiary of Saudi Arabian Military Industries, to manufacture new-generation eight-wheel armoured vehicles inside Saudi Arabia.
The signing took place under the sponsorship of defence and industrial officials from both countries.
These contracts gave Ankara access to the Saudi localisation program and connected several Turkish companies directly with the kingdom’s defence and industrial institutions.
They also added long-term interests involving production lines, testing, munitions and training to the wider political reconciliation.
During the same period, the bilateral agenda expanded into major economic projects.
These included agreements to build two solar power plants in Sivas and Karaman with a combined capacity of 2,000 megawatts and investments worth approximately US$2 billion.
Investment and power purchase agreements were signed on 20 February 2026, as economic and defence relations expanded simultaneously and created a broader network of shared governmental and industrial interests.
Turkish influence in Saudi Arabia therefore has the character of reinforcing political rapprochement.
Turkish companies gained access to a large market and a position inside Riyadh’s localisation strategy, while Ankara secured a permanent institutional channel with the Saudi Ministry of Defence and industrial bodies.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is using the same arrangements to strengthen its domestic capabilities and diversify its suppliers.
This means Türkiye’s long-term position will depend on whether its companies can continue providing new technologies, products and programs as Saudi domestic production expands.
Saudi regional policies will continue to be shaped by the kingdom’s own calculations, alliances and interests.
Defence cooperation nevertheless adds common industrial and security interests that can help stabilise the reconciliation and reduce the likelihood of a return to severe tensions between the two countries.
Pakistan: A Partnership Reaching Deep Into the Military Establishment
Pakistan represents a deeper model of Turkish access to a foreign military institution.
On 13 February 2025, the Türkiye-Pakistan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council held its seventh meeting in Islamabad under the chairmanship of Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
The joint declaration stated that Turkish defence products would receive priority in Pakistani procurement, while Pakistani products would receive similar consideration in Turkish procurement.
It also called for joint projects, research and development and industrial localisation.
This cooperation continued through the Türkiye-Pakistan High-Level Military Dialogue Group, which held its 20th session at Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence in Rawalpindi on 7 April 2026.
Political-military and defence industry working groups reviewed existing projects and new areas of cooperation in a meeting covering regional security, training, capacity building and military-industrial cooperation.
The regularity of these meetings gives Ankara access to the process through which Pakistan evaluates military requirements and modernisation programs.
The Turkish MILGEM warship program forms the centrepiece of this relationship.
In 2018, the Pakistan Navy signed a contract with ASFAT for four warships, with two to be built in Türkiye and two at Karachi Shipyard under a technology transfer arrangement.
STM provided engineering solutions and propulsion system integration within a project bringing together shipyards, suppliers and engineers from both countries.
The program built on the experience accumulated through the PNS Moawin fleet tanker project, designed by STM and constructed at Karachi Shipyard.
The Moawin project included training for crews and shipyard personnel, as well as technical and logistical support.
It also allowed around 20 Turkish companies to participate in the supply chain.
Cooperation later expanded into ship maintenance, submarine modernisation, spare parts and technical services.
The result has been repeated institutional Turkish access to Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence, military headquarters, navy and naval industry through programs lasting several years.
China’s dominance of Pakistan’s arms imports nevertheless places a clear ceiling on the scale of Turkish influence.
SIPRI reported in March 2026 that Pakistan had become the world’s fifth-largest importer of major arms during 2021 to 2025 and that China supplied 80 per cent of those imports.
Türkiye’s position is therefore concentrated mainly in selected naval and aerial sectors.
Ukraine: From Procurement to Security Partnership
Ukraine represents a case in which Turkish defence cooperation has developed into a broader security and industrial partnership.
The naval relationship began with a contract signed between the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence and STM on 17 December 2020 for the construction of two Ada-class warships with technology transfer.
Construction of the first vessel began in April 2021 with the cutting of steel for its hull.
It was launched in October 2022 and entered sea acceptance trials in May 2024.
The second ship was launched in August of the same year and is scheduled for delivery in 2027.
The program continued throughout the war, preserving naval cooperation between the two countries despite operational and economic risks.
On 3 February 2022, the Turkish and Ukrainian governments signed a framework agreement covering cooperation in advanced technology, aviation and space.
It included the development, production and operation of Bayraktar systems and the participation of Ukrainian engineers in manufacturing, maintenance, modernisation and training.
The agreement created an aerial and industrial track combining Baykar’s expertise in unmanned aircraft with Ukrainian capabilities in engines and components.
In September 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Baykar chief executive Haluk Bayraktar discussed plans to establish a company factory in Ukraine and produce new systems using Ukrainian components.
Bayraktar announced in February 2024 that construction had begun on the facility near Kyiv, which was expected to create around 500 jobs.
This shifted the aerial partnership from development agreements into long-term industrial investment inside Ukraine.
On 13 March 2025, Zelenskyy described Türkiye as a strategic partner, particularly in relation to security guarantees, during a meeting with Turkish government officials and business representatives.
He linked participation in guaranteeing Ukraine’s security with priority access to reconstruction projects and referred to Bayraktar supplies and Kyiv’s desire to expand cooperation in drone production.
These remarks placed defence, reconstruction and investment within a single political framework and gave Turkish companies a potential role in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
The two countries continued expanding their relationship in 2026.
Following a meeting with Erdoğan in Istanbul on 4 April, Zelenskyy announced agreement on new steps in security cooperation and joint defence industry projects.
He also spoke of Ukraine’s ability to support Türkiye with expertise, technology and battlefield experience.
On 14 July 2026, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the free trade agreement originally signed between the two countries on 3 February 2022.
Türkiye’s Foreign Ministry described the decision as an important step towards strengthening economic and investment cooperation.
Defence exports have therefore helped move Türkiye from the position of supplier to that of security and industrial partner in Kyiv.
This role is reinforced by Ankara’s authority over the passage of warships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, its position in the Black Sea, its relationship with Moscow and its role in hosting negotiations.
The partnership also works in both directions.
Ukraine receives military systems, investment and cooperation with a NATO member, while Türkiye benefits from Ukrainian engines, components and technical expertise.
A June 2025 study published by the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies, a research network coordinated by SWP, concluded that Turkish-Ukrainian defence cooperation could form a foundation for future Black Sea security arrangements.
The Saudi, Pakistani and Ukrainian cases therefore demonstrate different returns from Turkish defence exports.
Military cooperation helped consolidate reconciliation with Riyadh and open its localisation program to Turkish companies.
It gave Ankara extensive access to the Pakistani military establishment and naval industry.
In Ukraine, it elevated Türkiye’s position within discussions concerning security, reconstruction and trade.
The scale of the political return depends on the pre-existing relationship with each country, the depth of industrial partnership and the extent to which operating the systems remains dependent on Turkish support.
Poland and Albania: Military Access With Limited Political Weight
Poland and Albania represent another level of Turkish defence engagement.
In both countries, Turkish companies gained access to military markets and institutions, while the wider political and security impact of the deals remained more limited.
On 24 May 2021, Warsaw signed a contract for four sets of Bayraktar TB2 drones, comprising 24 armed unmanned aircraft together with control stations, radars, simulators, munitions, spare parts, training programs and logistical support.
The contract included technology transfer allowing maintenance and repair of engines, control stations and cameras to be conducted inside Poland.
Deliveries began in October 2022.
The agreement gave Baykar its first operational presence inside the armed forces of a NATO member and opened channels for training, maintenance and industrial cooperation with one of Eastern Europe’s largest militaries.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies argued that defence cooperation with Ankara supported Warsaw’s efforts to strengthen NATO’s eastern flank and expand coordination concerning Ukraine and the Black Sea.
Poland views Türkiye as a military partner within the Western security structure, while its broader defence strategy remains centred on NATO, the European Union and major procurement agreements with the United States, South Korea and European suppliers.
Albania presents a similar model on a smaller scale.
Tirana introduced Bayraktar TB2 drones into its armed forces, with operators receiving training in Türkiye.
In March 2025, Albanian Defence Minister Pirro Vengu announced that the drone squadron had become fully operational and was capable of conducting night missions, monitoring borders and coastlines, and supporting civil protection operations.
This Turkish presence operates from Kuçova Air Base in Berat County in south-central Albania.
NATO modernised the base as a centre for air operations and training, while the Albanian minister described it as a strategic NATO facility.
The drones and training provided Ankara with a channel for operational cooperation and supply within the Albanian military.
Albania’s broader security policy, however, remains firmly tied to NATO and the United States.
The Polish and Albanian cases demonstrate that the entry of Turkish weapons into a foreign military opens doors for training, maintenance and military-to-military communication, but the scale of the political effect remains dependent on the importing country’s alliance structure and its other sources of military equipment.
Localisation and Technology Transfer: Influence Versus Independence
Another limitation appears in localisation and technology transfer programs.
During their initial stages, production lines require Turkish designs, components, specialists, training programs and technical support.
This increases the intensity of interaction between Turkish companies and local military and industrial institutions.
As expertise accumulates, however, the importing state becomes more capable of carrying out maintenance, production and development domestically, giving it greater leverage in negotiations and greater freedom to choose suppliers.
Saudi Arabia is using agreements with Baykar, ASELSAN, Roketsan and FNSS to advance its military industrial localisation objectives under Vision 2030.
Pakistan is developing expertise in warship design, construction and program management at Karachi Shipyard.
Ukraine contributes engineers and components to the development of aerial systems.
Localisation therefore deepens the relationship during the establishment of production lines and the transfer of expertise, but over time also increases the buyer’s capacity to manage systems independently.
Türkiye’s continued influence consequently depends on whether its companies can keep introducing new products, technologies and projects and preserve an advantage that local partners cannot easily replace.
Supply Chain Dependence and the T129 Lesson
Ankara’s ability to fulfil export contracts also depends on the degree of independence within its own industrial base and supply chains.
The T129 ATAK attack helicopter provides a clear example of this constraint.
Developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries under a program based on an Italian-British design, the helicopter uses an engine from the LHTEC T800 family whose export requires US approval.
Pakistan signed a contract in 2018 for 30 helicopters, but deliveries stalled when the required engine export licence was not granted.
Islamabad subsequently moved towards the Chinese Z-10ME helicopter.
The episode demonstrated that reliable delivery depends on the supplier controlling critical components and the licences required to export them.
When deliveries fail, competitors can enter the market and the Turkish supplier’s ability to build a long-term relationship is weakened.
Greater Turkish independence in engines, electronics and advanced materials is therefore essential to sustaining the influence Ankara is seeking to build through defence exports.
From National Independence to Influence Abroad
Ultimately, defence exports have given Türkiye regular access to foreign defence ministries, armed forces and industrial institutions while placing Turkish companies inside modernisation programs lasting many years.
Maintenance, training, ammunition supply and joint manufacturing repeatedly return Turkish firms to the negotiating table, while military councils and dialogue mechanisms give Ankara greater knowledge of foreign militaries’ requirements and future plans.
Türkiye’s defence industrial project originally emerged from an effort to reduce the influence of foreign suppliers over its own military decision-making.
As exports expand, Turkish companies are now giving Ankara a position inside the procurement and modernisation decisions of other states.
At the same time, importing countries are using Turkish technology to diversify their options and strengthen their domestic industries.
The political value of each deal, and the duration of Türkiye’s influence abroad, are therefore determined by the balance between Ankara’s attempt to establish a lasting presence and the importing state’s effort to increase its own strategic and industrial independence.
