The war with Iran has exposed limits in the United States’ ability to sustain a prolonged missile campaign at the same intensity, after five months of fighting marked by a ceasefire and repeated resumptions of major operations.
US forces have used almost the entire globally available stock of long-range land-attack missiles from the ATACMS and Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM, families, while consuming slightly less than half of the country’s Tomahawk inventory.
The depletion has also extended to air and missile defence systems. Patriot interceptor stocks have fallen by around 65 per cent, while the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence, or THAAD, inventory has declined by at least 38 per cent, according to estimates that informed government sources said align with internal US data.
The figures show how the war consumed in a matter of months munitions accumulated over years, including weapons originally allocated for broader US deployments beyond the Iranian theatre.
Washington entered the conflict expecting a campaign lasting weeks. Major operations continued until the ceasefire on 8 April before hostilities resumed in July, turning what had been expected to be a short campaign into a war that drew down global inventories and forced the Pentagon to reconsider armament plans across several theatres.
The significance of the losses lies partly in the weapons involved.
ATACMS, PrSM and Tomahawk missiles allow US forces to strike distant targets without exposing aircraft and crews to the same degree of risk, while Patriot and THAAD systems protect bases, airfields and command centres from ballistic missiles.
These capabilities are directly tied to Washington’s plans for a possible confrontation with China in the western Pacific and to its ability to reinforce forces in Europe during a broader crisis with Russia.
During the war, US Central Command was forced to replenish its stocks with munitions drawn from other regions, while air defence systems and naval assets were transferred from Europe and East Asia.
Replacing the missiles will take years, from securing funding and expanding manufacturing capacity to delivering new batches to operational units.
What Did Five Months of War Consume?
The war began on 28 February 2026 with an intense tempo of strikes and interceptions.
On 6 April, US Central Command, responsible for the Middle East, announced that its forces had struck more than 13,000 targets.
The White House also said more than 700 ballistic missile threats and more than 1,000 attack drones had been intercepted during the first phase of the war.
The campaign therefore combined heavy consumption of long-range offensive munitions with simultaneous depletion of defensive interceptor missiles.
The sharpest depletion occurred in the Army Tactical Missile System, ATACMS, and the Precision Strike Missile, PrSM, which the US Army has begun introducing as ATACMS’ successor.
Sources familiar with stockpile data told Reuters on 4 August that US forces had used “virtually all” globally available stocks of the two missile types.
The precise breakdown between ATACMS and PrSM, and the number remaining in each category, remain classified.
PrSM entered the war with limited stocks because of how recently it entered service.
In April, the Center for Strategic and International Studies cited a US Army official as saying the entire PrSM inventory had been used during the first phase of fighting, although other officials said small quantities remained.
CSIS at the time estimated that hundreds of shorter-range ATACMS variants might still have been available.
By August, however, reporting indicated that most of the combined PrSM and ATACMS stockpile had been consumed during subsequent phases of the conflict.
More Than 1,000 Tomahawks Fired
The depletion also affected the sea-launched Tomahawk land-attack missile produced by Raytheon, part of RTX.
More than 850 Tomahawks were launched during the first month of the war.
The number exceeded 1,000 by the April ceasefire, and by August total consumption had reached slightly less than half of the entire US global inventory, according to a source familiar with stockpile data.
The scale of use becomes clearer when compared with procurement and production rates.
Between fiscal years 2015 and 2026, the United States purchased an average of around 86 Tomahawks annually.
Recent annual production, across different contracts and customers, remained below 200 missiles.
The first phase of the war alone therefore consumed in a matter of weeks a quantity approaching a decade’s worth of average US purchases.
Sea-based launch platforms impose an additional constraint.
US destroyers and cruisers carry Tomahawks in vertical launch cells that are also required for air-defence, anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles.
These ships generally need access to a suitable port to reload once their magazines are depleted.
Patriot and THAAD Stocks Under Pressure
Defensive depletion centred on the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement interceptor and the THAAD system, both produced by Lockheed Martin.
Patriot interceptors are designed to destroy ballistic missiles within the atmosphere, while THAAD provides a higher and more distant interception layer for the defence of bases, airfields and command centres.
After fighting resumed in July, CSIS estimated that fewer than 1,000 Patriot interceptors remained and that approximately 65 per cent of the pre-war inventory had been consumed between February and July.
Informed government sources said that estimate was consistent with internal data.
Ballistic missile engagements can require more than one interceptor to be fired against the same incoming target in order to increase the probability of destruction.
This means the number of interceptors used can substantially exceed the number of threats that the administration says were successfully intercepted.
For THAAD, CSIS estimated that around 250 interceptors remained by late July, representing a decline of at least 38 per cent from the level available at the start of the war.
The loss is particularly significant because of the small size of the overall force.
The US Army operates only eight THAAD batteries, and before the war at least two were deployed in Guam and South Korea.
Interceptor production and deliveries had also remained limited in previous years.
Why Long-Range Missiles Were Used So Heavily
The intense offensive use of long-range missiles reflected an operational choice aimed at reducing the exposure of aircraft and aircrews to Iranian air defences.
ATACMS, PrSM and Tomahawk missiles allowed US forces to strike Iranian targets from distant land and sea platforms, reducing the need to expand manned flight operations inside Iranian airspace.
On the defensive side, Patriot and THAAD batteries carried much of the burden of protecting bases from ballistic missile attacks.
Naval vessels capable of employing Standard Missile interceptors were positioned at relatively greater distances from a number of US facilities inside the Gulf.
As the conflict continued, the rate of missile expenditure surpassed the quantities stored within the Central Command theatre and those carried aboard ships and launch systems.
A source familiar with the issue told Reuters on 4 August that Central Command had replenished its inventories using US military supplies distributed around the world.
The war therefore shifted from a campaign relying principally on regional stocks into an operation drawing from reserves assigned to other commands and theatres.
How the War Changed US Weapons Deployment Worldwide
The effects of the war were not limited to munitions leaving storage facilities.
The Pentagon also redistributed weapons systems, missiles and naval assets from Europe and East Asia towards the Middle East.
The most significant documented movements included transfers of Patriot capabilities from Germany, the withdrawal of interceptors from European positions, movement of equipment and munitions associated with South Korea, and the redeployment of two destroyers from Japan to the Arabian Sea.
The impact was also visible in delayed deliveries and reduced reinforcement margins in other theatres.
A THAAD battery remained in South Korea, and there was no confirmed evidence that a battery had been withdrawn from Guam.
Europe Loses Interceptors and Faces Delivery Delays
The European impact combined the removal of existing stocks with delays to future deliveries.
US defence officials told the Associated Press on 20 March that Patriot inventories in Europe were declining as interceptors were sent towards the Middle East.
General Alexus Grynkewich, commander of US forces in Europe, acknowledged that air-defence capabilities had been transferred from the European theatre, while detailed quantities and locations remained undisclosed for operational reasons.
On 16 and 17 April, US officials informed European governments that previously contracted deliveries could be delayed because American forces required the munitions in the Middle East.
The defence ministries of Estonia and Lithuania confirmed receiving warnings, while other affected markets included countries in the Baltic and Scandinavian regions.
The consequences therefore extended beyond US units stationed in Europe to countries facing Russia that were attempting to build their own stockpiles according to agreed delivery schedules.
Ukraine Competes for the Same Patriot Production
Ukraine is competing for output from the same Patriot production lines.
Kyiv relies on Patriot PAC-3 missiles to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, while US forces and Gulf states employ the same interceptor against Iranian attacks.
In March, the Pentagon considered redirecting interceptors associated with supplies intended for Ukraine towards the Middle East.
NATO maintained that shipments whose funding had already been completed would continue.
The greater pressure concerns future deliveries, as Patriot production must now be divided among rebuilding US inventories, protecting forces in the Gulf, arming Ukraine and fulfilling orders from other countries operating the system.
East Asia: Ships Move, but Core Defences Remain
East Asia also experienced movements in naval and defensive assets, while several critical systems remained in place.
General Xavier Brunson, commander of US Forces Korea, told the Senate on 21 April that the principal THAAD battery remained on the Korean Peninsula.
However, some radar components had previously been deployed forward during an earlier US operation, while munitions associated with the system had been prepared for movement.
In Japan, the redeployment of two destroyers from Yokosuka to the Arabian Sea coincided with pressure on Tokyo’s planned acquisition of Tomahawk missiles.
Japan had expected around 400 missiles by March 2028 as part of efforts to develop a long-range counterstrike capability.
Bloomberg reported on 3 April that Washington had informed Tokyo of disruption to the delivery schedule because of US consumption in the Iran war.
No official replacement timetable was announced.
Guam and the Indirect Cost of Global Depletion
Guam illustrates the indirect consequences of the depletion.
US air-defence units on the island continued their missions throughout 2026, and no public evidence showed that a THAAD battery had been transferred from Guam to the Middle East.
Nevertheless, lower global inventories of THAAD and Patriot interceptors reduce the number of missiles that could be rapidly sent to Guam during a simultaneous crisis.
This is crucial to US plans for protecting air bases, ports and command centres from Chinese missile attacks.
The Pentagon also redistributed assets larger than individual missile batteries.
A 21 May report from the Department of Defense Inspector General concluded that the war had forced a “major realignment” of forces towards the Gulf.
This included moving the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group away from missions under US Southern Command.
The shift demonstrated that the war was consuming not only missile stocks but also the ability to maintain aircraft carriers, destroyers and support aircraft in simultaneous missions elsewhere.
Why This Matters for a Potential War With China
These movements directly affect US requirements in the Pacific.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress on 22 April that successful operations depend on having munitions pre-positioned in the right locations and logistical networks capable of surviving attack.
Moving inventories from the Pacific to the Middle East makes it more difficult and time-consuming to return them during a crisis, particularly given China’s ability to strike bases, ports and supply routes.
The weapons consumed against Iran would also perform essential roles during the opening weeks of a conflict in the western Pacific.
ATACMS and PrSM provide ground forces with the ability to strike airfields, ships and radar systems.
Tomahawks allow submarines and destroyers to attack targets inside Chinese defensive networks.
Patriot and THAAD systems protect airfields and ports against ballistic missiles.
The effect of shortages is therefore measured not simply by how many missiles remain, but by how many days or weeks US forces could sustain a high rate of fire before slowing operations or turning to more vulnerable alternatives.
Can Washington Replace the Losses Before the Next War?
Budget allocations do not mean missiles will arrive quickly.
Several years can separate procurement funding from delivery to operational forces.
As of 5 August 2026, the Pentagon had not published a complete accounting of annual deliveries of PrSM, Tomahawk, Patriot and THAAD missiles.
The available picture therefore relies on contract schedules, the most recent published production data and announced plans to expand factories.
Current timelines suggest that the four missile families will recover at different rates, but most projections depend on three conditions: major wartime consumption must stop, deliveries must remain on schedule, and manufacturers must successfully reach their planned production rates.
PrSM: The Fastest Recovery Path, but Still Years Behind
PrSM represents the relatively fastest route to replenishment because the US Army continues producing it as the successor to ATACMS, whose large-scale production has declined as the transition to the newer missile progresses.
Lockheed Martin announced on 25 March that it had reached an agreement with the Pentagon to increase PrSM production capacity fourfold.
The company did not disclose the initial production rate or when the expanded capacity would be fully achieved.
Budget schedules nevertheless reveal the long gap between funding and delivery.
Missiles financed during fiscal year 2026 are scheduled for delivery in 2029.
CSIS estimated on 27 May that replacing the PrSM missiles used in the first phase of the war could take between several months and one year.
That estimate preceded the July resumption of operations and subsequent reports that “virtually all” of the combined PrSM and ATACMS stock had been consumed.
The actual replenishment period is therefore likely to be longer.
Tomahawk: Recovery Could Stretch to 2030
The gap is wider for Tomahawk missiles.
More than 1,000 were used during the first phase alone, while recent production remained below 200 annually across all contracts and customers.
RTX, which owns Tomahawk manufacturer Raytheon, announced on 4 February a plan to increase capacity to more than 1,000 missiles annually.
The agreements could extend for as long as seven years and include expansion of facilities and the supplier base.
Delivery schedules show that the effects of this expansion will still take time.
The US Navy requested 785 Tomahawks in its 2027 budget, but deliveries from that batch are scheduled to begin in March 2030 after a manufacturing cycle estimated at roughly 34 months.
CSIS estimated that the pre-war Tomahawk inventory might be restored around the end of 2030, based on use recorded through May and the production plans available at the time.
That estimate was made before additional missiles were fired following the resumption of fighting.
Patriot: A Three-Year Recovery at Best
Missile defence faces an even more sensitive gap because interceptors remain necessary to defend US bases and allied countries.
Lockheed Martin delivered 620 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles during 2025, the most recent full-year production figure publicly announced by the company.
In July, it signed an agreement aimed at raising annual production capacity to approximately 2,000 missiles by the end of 2030.
Large batches intended to rebuild the Patriot inventory are expected to begin arriving in 2029.
CSIS estimated that returning to pre-war stockpile levels would require three years or more.
That period becomes harder to achieve after the reported consumption of approximately 65 per cent of the inventory, particularly because production must be divided among US forces, Ukraine, allies and other states with contracts for the system.
THAAD: Small Production Base, High Strategic Cost
THAAD begins from a much smaller production base of approximately 96 interceptors per year.
Expansion plans aim to raise that rate to around 400.
Large orders are expected to begin arriving in mid-2029.
Estimates placing full stockpile recovery near the end of the same year depend on a halt in major expenditure and successful execution of production contracts.
That forecast has become increasingly fragile after the THAAD inventory fell by at least 38 per cent by July.
Factories Cannot Expand Overnight
The constraints are not limited to final assembly lines.
Higher missile output requires more solid-fuel rocket motors, seekers, guidance systems, electronics, propellants and specialised castings.
It also requires new facilities, trained workers, qualified suppliers and certification of additional manufacturing lines.
US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth summarised the challenge before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 30 April, saying that replacing the weapons used would take “months and years”, depending on the system.
A Four-Way Competition for the Remaining Stockpile
The delay leaves the Pentagon facing competing priorities.
It must protect forces and bases in the Gulf, rebuild depleted US stockpiles, retain sufficient reserves for a possible conflict with China, and meet commitments to Ukraine and other allies.
That trade-off has already appeared through the withdrawal of interceptors from Europe, consideration of diverting Ukraine-related supplies, and pressure on Tomahawk deliveries to Japan.
The shortage could also alter the way any new phase of the Iran war is conducted.
US forces relied heavily on long-range missiles to reduce the exposure of aircraft and crews to Iranian air defences.
As those stocks shrink, Washington may be forced to rely more heavily on shorter-range weapons or higher-risk manned sorties.
That would raise the operational cost of future strikes even if the United States retains the ability to carry them out.
Washington has the financial capacity to place massive new orders and expand its factories.
The problem is time.
Most of the additional production will not reach operational forces before 2029 or 2030.
Until then, the Pentagon will have to divide what remains between the Iran war, defence of its global bases, preparation for a possible conflict with China and its commitments to allies.
