The Makkah Mutual Defence Agreement can be viewed as the point at which the foundations of a new regional security and political order began to take shape. It moves the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani relationship from an alignment of interests towards interconnected deterrence, and from a network of bilateral and multi-track cooperation towards an institutionalised trilateral defence commitment.
This does not necessarily mean the emergence of a complete regional system or the creation of an alternative to existing alliances and security structures. Rather, it adds another layer of cumulative deterrence that, if supported by effective institutional and operational mechanisms, could contribute to reshaping regional balances of power and redefining the security and political centre of gravity across the Arab and Islamic worlds.
The significance of this shift becomes clearer when viewed through the complementary sources of power possessed by the three states. Saudi financial, economic and diplomatic depth is combined with Türkiye’s military and defence-industrial capabilities and Pakistan’s military and strategic weight within a structure whose value increases through the interdependence of its components.
This should not be understood as a mathematical equation in a literal sense, but as an analytical model for explaining how separate national capabilities can be transformed into a composite power structure. The agreement’s strategic value does not result simply from adding together the capabilities of its members, but from the multiplying effect created when the strengths of one party compensate for the weaknesses or gaps of the other two.
From Security Arrangement to Institutional Commitment
The fundamental difference between the period before and after the agreement does not lie in the existence of cooperation, since bilateral relations between the three states are longstanding and deeply rooted.
The change lies in the transition from flexible, multi-track arrangements to a treaty-based commitment under which an armed attack against one party is regarded as an attack against all.
This type of commitment, which broadly resembles the logic of collective defence found in defence treaties, shifts the relationship from coordination to extended deterrence.
The transformation is therefore qualitative rather than merely quantitative.
A state considering an attack against one member of the agreement must now factor in the possible responses of the other two. The new balance of power is consequently shaped not only by the combined military, economic and political capabilities of the three states, but also by the uncertainty created in an adversary’s calculations regarding the scale, scope and tools of any collective response.
For Pakistan, this expansion adds a new layer of strategic value. Islamabad can no longer be viewed solely as one of two competing nuclear powers in South Asia, but also as a participant in a defence architecture linking South Asia with the Gulf and the Middle East.
The Iranian Dimension and a New Escalation Calculus
The timing of the agreement cannot be separated from the deeply unstable regional environment created by the consequences of the US-Iran confrontation since the beginning of 2026, the repositioning of Iranian regional arms, growing threats to maritime routes, and the activation of multilateral security arrangements in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab.
In this environment, the agreement raises the relative cost of any potential escalation against one of its members.
The calculations of an opposing state are no longer limited to the expected response of the country directly targeted, but must also account for the possibility that a confrontation could expand into a broader trilateral framework.
Pakistan’s inclusion carries particular significance because of its status as a nuclear power.
Its participation in a collective defence commitment gives the agreement a strategic dimension extending beyond conventional capabilities, particularly given the calculated strategic ambiguity surrounding the possible place of nuclear capabilities within a mutual defence equation in the event of an extreme threat.
Strategic ambiguity itself can serve a deterrent function.
An adversary does not need certainty that maximum capabilities will be used. It is enough that it cannot completely rule out that possibility.
In this sense, Pakistan’s strategic capabilities broaden the range of calculations an adversary must consider without requiring the assumption that a formal nuclear umbrella has been established, since none has been officially declared by the parties.
Pakistan Between Regional Engagement and South Asian Priorities
For Islamabad, the agreement represents the institutional culmination of a historic strategic relationship with Riyadh while also opening the door to a wider role in regional security arrangements beyond South Asia.
That expansion, however, involves careful calculations because Pakistan’s security doctrine will remain closely tied to its relationship with India and the nuclear deterrence equation on the subcontinent.
Pakistan’s participation should therefore not be interpreted as a comprehensive redefinition of its defence priorities.
Rather, it represents a calculated expansion of its strategic sphere whose most immediate effects are likely to be visible in the Gulf, the Red Sea and the broader Arab and Islamic environment, without diminishing the centrality of South Asia in Pakistani security calculations.
At the same time, this broader role gives Islamabad additional strategic weight.
Pakistan is no longer viewed only as one of two rival nuclear powers in South Asia, but also as an actor within a defence structure connecting South Asia with the Gulf and the Middle East.
This expands its geopolitical reach and potentially increases its influence in international affairs.
Türkiye: From Defence Supplier to Institutional Partner
For Ankara, the agreement represents the institutional expression of a trajectory that has developed over recent years through growing military cooperation and expanding Turkish defence exports to the region.
The key shift is Türkiye’s movement from being primarily a supplier of military technology and defence systems to becoming an institutional partner within a structured defence framework.
This position offers Ankara a dual strategic advantage.
On one side, it maintains its membership and ties within NATO. On the other, it gains a formal position within an emerging Arab-Islamic security architecture.
This strengthens Türkiye’s ability to operate as a bridge between the Atlantic sphere and the Arab-Islamic sphere, rather than having its strategic movement confined entirely to one of them.
The significance of Türkiye’s role lies precisely in the fact that its sources of power differ from those of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
The value of the agreement is not based on similarity between the three states, but on the complementarity of their capabilities.
When Saudi political, economic and diplomatic capacity is combined with Türkiye’s military-industrial base and Pakistan’s military and strategic weight, a form of composite power emerges that none of the parties could generate independently.
From a Trilateral Agreement to a Wider Security Framework
The announcement that the agreement may be opened to other regional states carries implications beyond the three founding parties.
It potentially transforms the Makkah Agreement from a trilateral framework into an expandable nucleus, and from a defence pact among three states into a possible foundation for a broader regional security architecture.
The importance of this feature lies in the possibility that the founding states may do more than establish an alliance.
If the structure develops in this direction, they may begin defining the criteria for accession, the scope of obligations and the operational rules governing participation.
Saudi Arabia’s hosting of the agreement, combined with Makkah’s symbolic status and the complementary political and strategic weight of the three states, gives the initiative significance beyond protocol.
It provides the basis for a defence partnership built on consensus and the integration of roles in shaping future strategic trajectories.
If the agreement eventually becomes a platform attracting additional states, its significance would extend beyond simply increasing membership.
The founding countries would begin moving from being actors operating within an existing balance of power to becoming participants in defining the rules of that balance.
This is where the agreement could mark the beginning of a gradual shift from a regional order whose security arrangements are often shaped from outside the region towards one in which regional powers increasingly produce security rules from within.
From Deterrence by Commitment to Deterrence by Capability
The strategic value of the agreement does not end with the establishment of a mutual political and legal commitment.
Its deeper significance lies in the possibility of building a joint defence capability capable of turning that commitment into an effective deterrent.
The agreement therefore represents a starting point for institutionalising defence cooperation among the three states and linking the various elements of their national power within a more coordinated and integrated framework.
The mechanisms developed under the agreement will be particularly important.
These may include consultation and decision-making structures, intelligence sharing, joint defence planning, military exercises, crisis-response coordination, and improvements in interoperability between the armed forces and military systems of the three states.
Such mechanisms could gradually move the relationship from coordination between separate national capabilities towards the creation of a collective defence capability that can be activated when required.
The agreement therefore represents the beginning of a transition from deterrence based primarily on mutual commitment to deterrence based increasingly on shared capability.
The deeper institutional cooperation becomes, and the more integrated its operational tools are, the greater the credibility of the defence commitment and the higher the cost to any adversary considering testing it.
For this reason, the agreement should not be judged only by what its provisions state, but also by the cumulative pathway it opens for transforming Saudi, Turkish and Pakistani capabilities into an interconnected deterrent structure.
The Limits of Cohesion and the Scope of Alliance Commitments
The agreement brings together three states whose security interests extend across several strategic arenas.
Their major interests overlap, but their geographic priorities remain broad and distinct.
Saudi security interests are primarily tied to the Gulf, the Red Sea and the wider Arab sphere.
Türkiye’s strategic calculations extend from the Middle East to the Black Sea and the European-Atlantic space.
Pakistan’s defence doctrine, meanwhile, continues to place the Indian front at the centre of its security calculations.
This geographic spread gives the agreement a wide geopolitical scope while also making the definition of commitments and activation mechanisms essential to its long-term cohesion.
For the agreement to remain sustainable, there must be clarity over what constitutes an attack requiring collective activation, the limits of the response, consultation mechanisms, and the geographic and operational scope of obligations.
The clearer these rules become, the stronger cohesion among the parties is likely to be, while still preserving the level of strategic ambiguity necessary towards potential adversaries.
A Possible Nucleus for a New Regional Security Order
Ultimately, the strategic value of the Makkah Mutual Defence Agreement should not be measured solely by its explicit commitments, but also by the security and political possibilities it creates.
Its significance extends beyond that of a conventional defence treaty towards the establishment of a composite deterrence equation in which each member moves from acting independently to operating as an integrated component within a wider structure.
Within this framework, Saudi economic and diplomatic power, Türkiye’s industrial and military base, and Pakistan’s military and strategic weight become mutually reinforcing.
The deeper significance of the Makkah Agreement is that it reflects a shift in the position of regional powers from being subjects of externally shaped security arrangements towards becoming participants in producing those arrangements.
Its importance lies not only in the amount of power the three states add to one another, but in the emergence of a regional will to organise that power and connect it to shared interests.
This increases the region’s capacity to influence its own security environment rather than merely adapting to changes imposed by surrounding powers and rivalries.
From this perspective, the agreement may signal the beginning of a phase in which regional security is generated increasingly from within, without necessarily requiring separation from existing international alliances and partnerships.
The central transformation lies not in replacing one system with another, but in redistributing the roles involved in producing security within the existing order.
Regional powers would gradually shift from receiving security arrangements and balances to participating directly in shaping them.
It is in this sense that the Makkah Agreement can be read as a potential nucleus for a new regional security and political order.
