Media coverage of the latest round of negotiations in Cairo involving Hamas and other Palestinian factions focused on their agreement to “restrict and store heavy weapons under the authority of the National Committee”, a position later confirmed by leaders within the Palestinian movement.
The news shocked supporters of the Palestinian resistance and prompted gloating from some of its opponents, particularly after several media outlets presented the development broadly as a “surrender of weapons”.
Even without the exaggeration surrounding the issue and the way it was framed, the Palestinian resistance signing any provision concerning its weapons remains shocking. It reflects a severe crisis and a profound imbalance of power, especially when the occupation that committed, and continues to commit, genocide faces no comparable pressure.
The main motivation behind Hamas and the other Palestinian factions accepting such a provision is not difficult to understand. Since the ceasefire, their priorities have been to prevent the resumption of the war and bring it to a complete end, while also improving humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip.
The occupation has not fulfilled its obligations under the first phase of the agreement. On the contrary, it expanded the areas under its occupation and continued its assassinations, bombardment and other violations, exploiting Gaza’s humanitarian crisis to maintain pressure on the Palestinian negotiating side.
The key questions, therefore, are whether Hamas and the Palestinian resistance factions have surrendered, or will surrender, their weapons, and whether such a step would amount to capitulation.
Storage Is Not the Same as Surrender
First, the document signed by the factions, led by Hamas, does not provide for handing weapons to the Israeli occupation or to any other external party.
According to the published texts, which have been confirmed by public statements, it refers instead to restricting heavy weapons and placing them under the authority of a Palestinian body, the National Committee expected to administer the Gaza Strip.
In other words, the agreement concerns the “storage” of weapons rather than their “surrender”, and places them under Palestinian authority rather than Israeli control.
The provision is also limited to “heavy weapons”. Although the term has not been defined in detail in writing, it appears to refer to weapons such as rockets, which have not been used during the later months of the war and are increasingly difficult to deploy under current conditions in Gaza, given the expansion of occupied areas and the severe overcrowding along the coastal strip.
The proposed text does not address other forms of weaponry, particularly individual firearms. Nor has it so far included any reference to the broader principle, project or legitimacy of resistance.
Obligations Imposed on the Occupation
The approved text also makes this step conditional upon obligations to be fulfilled by the occupation, including withdrawal, the entry of humanitarian aid and the opening of crossings.
Most of these conditions were already part of the requirements of the first phase and are meant to be implemented simultaneously under a step-for-step formula.
The purpose, therefore, is to address the humanitarian situation in Gaza, which remains the most powerful pressure point being used against the Palestinian side.
Perhaps more importantly, there are no guarantees that the occupation government will approve the proposal, let alone honour and implement it.
Hamas may be seeking to place the responsibility back on the occupation, remove its excuses and reinforce the argument that the Palestinian side is not obstructing the agreement.
The movement may also be calculating that it can agree to a measure that will never be implemented in practice. However, as will be discussed, that wager may not succeed.
Three Ways to Understand the Palestinian Position
The Palestinian approval, and Hamas’s position in particular, can be understood from three perspectives: the priority of ending the war amid a severe imbalance of power, the expectation that the proposal will not be implemented because the occupation will reject it, and the belief that implementation would have little practical effect if it did occur.
This is not an attempt to justify the decision or present it more favourably than it deserves.
The weakness of the Palestinian resistance position cannot be denied. It has been left largely alone both on the battlefield and politically, aside from limited and ineffective exceptions. It lacks meaningful pressure cards against the occupation state, faces an Arab and regional environment that is largely hostile to it, and remains burdened by the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.
The decision itself also carries serious dangers.
It is not in the Palestinian interest to ignore the risks of the resistance signing any document that implies relinquishing even part of its weaponry, regardless of the context or whether the provision is implemented.
Such a matter was, and should have remained, among the prohibitions and red lines for as long as the occupation continues to exist.
The Risk of a New Negotiating Ceiling
The greatest danger is that the previous negotiating pattern will be repeated.
Benjamin Netanyahu’s government could reject the proposal, only for mediators to convert it into a new ceiling for future negotiations, while seeking an even lower threshold and further concessions from Hamas and the other factions.
This is a genuine concern given the negotiating approach followed since the beginning of the war.
That pattern has repeatedly involved negotiations, Palestinian acceptance and compliance, Israeli evasion of its obligations, and then the resumption of talks from the point already conceded by the Palestinian side.
The latest development also provides further evidence that similar flexibility from Hamas and the resistance factions at an earlier stage would probably not have ended the war.
Netanyahu’s government would not have accepted such concessions as an alternative to implementing its existing plans for Gaza and the Palestinian cause more broadly.
Hamas Must Reassess Its Negotiating Strategy
Hamas is required to reconsider the entire negotiation process and conduct a serious review of the previous phase, including both its positive and negative aspects.
At the same time, there is no benefit in spreading an atmosphere of defeat and capitulation, particularly when this narrative is promoted by known parties seeking to vindicate the Oslo process and the disasters that followed it by claiming, “You have reached the same point we reached.”
The current situation remains far removed from the Oslo path, which included recognition of the occupation, the rejection of resistance under the label of “terrorism”, and direct action against it.
Most importantly, the aggression continues, as does the genocide, even if at a lower intensity.
The last thing Palestinians need today is mutual blame and political point-scoring, which is different from necessary criticism, review and correction.
Their duty and responsibility remain to work through every available means, each from their own position, to achieve national objectives and protect the Palestinian people, particularly in Gaza, from the catastrophic outcomes the occupation seeks to impose upon them.
