On 1 August 2026, US President Donald Trump returned to a pattern that has recurred at several stages of the US-Iranian war: escalating his rhetoric and threatening to target Iranian infrastructure or launch wide-ranging strikes against Iran, before retreating from the most extreme scenario and turning once again to diplomatic channels.
This latest cycle of threats and retreat is not an exception. The same approach has been used repeatedly over recent months, suggesting that Trump is employing it primarily as an instrument of psychological and political pressure intended to change Iran’s behaviour and force concessions, rather than as preparation for a return to full-scale confrontation, at least for the time being.
The exchange of threats and the failure of the “maximum pressure” approach, which pushes warnings to their highest possible level, reflect a profound difference between how the United States and Iran understand power, escalation and deterrence. They also expose the limitations of military strength when war itself becomes a complex political and strategic equation.
Different Interpretations of Threats
The central problem facing the Trump administration is that Iran does not receive threatening messages in the way Washington expects.
The United States views escalation as a means of forcing Iran to retreat and make concessions. Tehran, however, believes that yielding under pressure would encourage further attacks and undermine the deterrence capabilities it has built over months of war.
From Iran’s perspective, demonstrating an ability to expand the conflict into other countries in the region, including Jordan recently, is a strategic tool for restoring balance against overwhelming US military superiority that cannot easily be matched through direct confrontation.
Iran therefore relies on what can be described as “horizontal escalation”. This involves widening the costs of confrontation with the United States across multiple parties and arenas, with the aim of changing the stronger side’s calculations and convincing it that continuing the pressure would be more costly than containing the conflict.
The initial US and Israeli assessments that the Iranian government would collapse quickly, or that greater military pressure would force Tehran to retreat, have consequently proven mistaken.
Recent months have shown that the Iranian leadership prepared for every possible scenario. It also benefited from the vulnerabilities exposed during the first confrontation in June 2025 and from its experience in dealing with attempts to destabilise the country internally, which are once again being threatened.
Statements by Trump in April 2026 sparked widespread controversy after he said the United States had delivered weapons to Iranian opposition groups through Kurdish intermediaries.
Israeli reports and statements also spoke of an Israeli role in supporting anti-government mobilisation inside Iran. These efforts did not bring down the government, however, and are not expected to succeed if attempted again now.
Different Assessments of Time
Iran’s approach is based on the belief that the ability to endure is itself a source of power.
This position assumes that conflicts are not always decided by direct military superiority, but by each side’s ability to absorb costs and sustain confrontation over a prolonged period.
Iran has demonstrated an ability to continue the confrontation and move from reacting to events towards taking the initiative, despite the intense pressure it faces.
The two sides also differ sharply in how they assess the role of time in the conflict.
US decision-making is heavily influenced by domestic political and economic considerations, as well as the need to demonstrate tangible results within a defined period ahead of this year’s midterm elections. Washington’s policy towards Iran is expected to become one of the issues debated in the domestic political arena.
Iran, by contrast, is more prepared to treat the confrontation as a long-term process. It is betting on changes in regional and international conditions, as well as the gradual erosion of its adversaries’ willingness to bear the cost of continuing the conflict.
Competing Strategic Priorities
Another important factor is the difference in how the two sides rank their priorities.
The United States views many Middle Eastern crises as part of a broader system of global challenges, forcing it to divide its resources and attention across several regions.
This was reflected in a Pentagon statement addressing how the depletion of missile stockpiles could affect a potential confrontation with China.
Iran, however, views its conflict with the United States as a matter directly connected to its national security, survival and regional position.
Its willingness to accept risks and absorb costs is therefore considerably greater.
The real challenge in the ongoing US-Iranian war, which is currently continuing at a lower level of intensity, does not concern the management of military power alone. It also involves the management of competing perceptions.
Each side has a different understanding of deterrence, a different measure of success and a different interpretation of escalation.
As long as the gap between these two perspectives continues, reaching a stable end to the conflict or establishing sustainable security arrangements in the region will remain difficult for the foreseeable future.
