Israeli political and military circles have been closely preoccupied with reports of a possible US-Saudi nuclear agreement that would proceed without normalisation between Riyadh and the occupation state. From an Israeli perspective, this could produce the worst possible outcome: an unprecedented security risk without any corresponding political gain.
Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher and head of the Gulf Programme at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, as well as the former head of the Iran and Gulf Department at the National Security Council, said “Israel” should be concerned about a nuclear agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
He warned that the occupation state could find itself facing the growing danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East while failing to secure the political achievement of normalisation with the most influential Arab state.
In an article published by the Israeli website Walla and translated by Arabi21, Guzansky wrote that for years it had been clear that Washington’s willingness to meet Saudi demands in the nuclear field was not an end in itself, but part of a broader regional agreement.
The original idea was straightforward: Riyadh would receive security guarantees and an advanced civilian nuclear energy programme, while “Israel” would gain a historic normalisation agreement. However, the connection between the two issues now appears to be weakening.
Israeli Reactions
The emerging development suggests that if Washington grants Saudi Arabia what it wants without securing progress towards normalisation with the occupation state, “Israel” would bear the risks alone without receiving any strategic return.
The principal concern is not civilian nuclear power itself, as many countries operate reactors for peaceful purposes. The question troubling decision-makers in Tel Aviv is whether Riyadh will also be permitted to enrich uranium.
If so, Israeli officials believe it would establish a precedent with far-reaching regional implications for the occupation state.
Israeli reactions have been divided. The governing coalition has largely remained silent, apparently out of concern over a confrontation with Washington, while opposition leaders have led public criticism of the agreement.
Former prime minister Naftali Bennett, considered one of Benjamin Netanyahu’s rivals in the next election, said: “This agreement means joining a series of diplomatic failures that Israel has witnessed in recent years. It represents a serious strategic failure that threatens our national security and causes Israel to lose influence over its own fate.”
Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and a former defence minister, claimed: “We must understand that the Saudi nuclear programme will end with a nuclear weapon and a mad arms race throughout the Middle East. Israel must make clear that it firmly opposes it, and the government must work forcefully in Congress to thwart this path.”
Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats party and a representative of the centre-left, accused Netanyahu of doing “the unbelievable” by losing normalisation with Saudi Arabia while enabling it to become a nuclear state.
“We have lost one of the incentives for normalisation, and Israel was not a partner in this step,” he said.
Yaakov Nagel, a former head of the National Security Council, also argued that any enrichment of uranium on Saudi territory would be a mistake.
“Any uranium enrichment, of any kind, on Saudi soil is a mistake, regardless of who carries it out or how it is supervised. This was my position before 7 October within the normalisation package, and my position has not changed,” he said.
Expected Israeli Steps
Israeli discussions now point to several possible courses of action.
One would involve reviving talk of a gradual political process in the Palestinian arena with clear American support, although such a move would be difficult during an intense election season.
Another possibility would be a trilateral agreement that serves Israeli interests alongside those of the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The occupation state cannot simply oppose the agreement and risk seeing it signed regardless. It may instead seek to reshape the deal in a manner that reduces nuclear risks while restoring normalisation as a central objective.
The Israeli conclusion from the accelerating Saudi-US negotiations is divided between concern over the consequences of the agreement and fear that “Israel” may be unable to influence the outcome.
If the deal moves forward, Israeli anxiety will centre on whether its risks can be reduced and whether the agreement can avoid producing a situation in which Saudi Arabia receives everything while the occupation state receives nothing.
At the same time, “Israel” has no interest in turning the issue into an open confrontation with the Trump administration or the Saudi leadership.
Because of the sensitivity of the matter, Israeli research and analytical circles have recommended intensive and confidential dialogue with Washington. The primary goal would be to minimise risks through stricter inspection mechanisms, adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, restrictions on uranium enrichment and reprocessing, and guarantees that nuclear fuel will be supplied from external sources.
Distancing Saudi Arabia From China and Russia
There is broad Israeli agreement that a US-Saudi accord may be intended to entrench civilian nuclear cooperation for decades while limiting Chinese and Russian influence in the Kingdom.
However, the absence of strict restrictions on uranium enrichment could undermine the regional balance and expose the occupation state to a more dangerous strategic environment.
The agreement is viewed as an American attempt to reshape the strategic balance in the Middle East. At the same time, Israeli analysts see it as a high-risk gamble over how much nuclear freedom can be granted to Riyadh without triggering a regional arms race.
Professor Uzi Rabi, an expert in security and strategic affairs, expressed concern that the Trump administration might separate nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia from the condition that Riyadh first normalise relations with “Israel”.
That option had previously been discussed as a means of deepening the strategic alliance with Washington, escalating joint pressure on Iran, and bringing Riyadh and Tel Aviv closer in the future. However, the emerging agreement reportedly contains no Saudi commitment to normalisation.
In an article published by Walla and translated by Arabi21, Rabi wrote that, from an Israeli perspective, separating normalisation from nuclear cooperation would allow Saudi Arabia to secure a major strategic gain without having to change its relationship with “Israel” at this stage.
He added that the danger, from the Israeli viewpoint, does not arise solely from Riyadh’s current intentions, but from the precedent the agreement would establish.
The deal could alter the regional balance of power, he argued, which in itself represents a gamble.
Israeli analysts widely acknowledge that if the US administration is determined to proceed with the agreement, attempts to cancel it may fail.
In that case, it may be more practical for “Israel” to try to influence the terms, particularly by restoring normalisation to the centre of the arrangement. Rather than merely rejecting the agreement, the occupation state could seek to turn it into a form of political leverage.
The Risk of a Regional Arms Race
From another perspective, no less dangerous than the previous concerns, the occupation state believes it may soon face a regional reality in which nuclear expertise, infrastructure and the ability to approach the threshold of nuclear weapons are no longer limited to Iran.
Major Arab states may also demand a similar path.
If Saudi Arabia is granted lenient terms, countries such as Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates could demand comparable treatment.
The United States is attempting a delicate manoeuvre by strengthening Saudi capabilities as a means of containing Iran. However, that strategy could turn Saudi empowerment into the beginning of a nuclear arms race.
At best, the move could establish a Saudi nuclear programme under American supervision. At worst, it could create a precedent that regional states later exploit when confidence in Washington declines.
Such a development could ultimately deprive the occupation state of its monopoly over nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
