Renewed military escalation between Iran and the United States has revived fears that confrontation could spread across the region, particularly to the Lebanese-Israeli front.
Despite the political and diplomatic efforts of Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, including his visit to the United States, meetings with President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the announcement that implementation of so-called “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon would begin, concerns over renewed escalation have not subsided.
Fears remain that Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance could enter another confrontation with the Israeli enemy, particularly as the Israeli occupation of substantial areas of Lebanese territory continues.
There are also growing concerns that implementing the pilot zones project could trigger an internal Lebanese confrontation, especially between the Lebanese Army and the resistance, potentially pushing the country towards a broad civil war amid intensifying domestic disputes and pressure by Lebanese security agencies against some supporters of the resistance.
Studies Assess the Risk of Renewed War
Several Lebanese and foreign research centres, alongside Arab and Western diplomatic bodies operating in Lebanon, have prepared studies examining the possible developments ahead and the options available to the Lebanese authorities, Israeli forces and resistance movements.
Among the most significant is a private study prepared by a research centre close to Hezbollah. It assesses the possibility of a renewed Israeli war against Lebanon in the coming weeks, coinciding with the start of the pilot zones project and President Joseph Aoun’s return from Washington.
The study is based on private information, Israeli sources and an assessment of the internal atmosphere within Hezbollah. It concludes that the current truce may not last long and that the Israeli enemy could return to military escalation in response to the resistance’s growing capabilities.
It also points to the Lebanese Army’s failure to achieve the central objective of the agreement between Lebanon and “Israel”, namely the disarmament of Hezbollah, while the resistance continues reorganising its position in preparation for all possible scenarios.
The study addresses several major issues, including US and Israeli military resupply, the resistance’s ability to rebuild its capabilities ahead of another confrontation, Israel’s internal political situation and its need to return to military escalation, regional conditions and the Syrian and Turkish roles, the collapse of the US-Iranian agreement, and the strong likelihood of renewed escalation.
US Military Support for Israel
The first section emphasises the scale of US military support for “Israel”, arguing that it has been one of the principal factors enabling the occupation state to sustain the wars it has fought over the past three years.
This support has prompted internal debate in “Israel” over the risks of excessive dependence on the United States for military requirements.
However, should “Israel” decide to wage another large-scale war, it would still depend heavily on US military support. This remains a major factor in any future conflict.
Hezbollah’s Efforts to Rebuild Its Capabilities
The second section examines the importance of the resistance’s efforts to restore its capabilities and how this could shape an Israeli decision to return to war.
Should Israeli officials obtain substantial evidence that Hezbollah has succeeded in rebuilding its military capacity, the likelihood of renewed war would increase, as “Israel” seeks to preserve the gains it believes it achieved during previous years of fighting.
Israel’s Internal Political Calculations
The third section reviews Israel’s domestic political position and its influence on any decision to resume the war.
The prevailing tendency within the current ruling coalition remains more supportive of continuing military operations on the northern front under the stated objective of preserving earlier security gains and preventing a return to the conditions that existed before 8 October.
The Syrian and Turkish Roles
The fourth section assesses the regional situation, particularly the possible roles of Syria and Türkiye in a future confrontation.
Although there has been discussion of Syria playing a role in preventing the resistance from rebuilding its capabilities, the expectation that either Türkiye or Syria would directly confront Hezbollah is considered inaccurate, particularly given Turkish concerns over Israel’s expanding regional role.
If the United States succeeds in pushing Syria to play a more active role in containing Hezbollah, the perceived need to resume military operations on the northern front could decline.
The Impact of US-Iranian Negotiations
The fifth section examines how US-Iranian negotiations could affect military decisions in Lebanon, as well as the relationship between Hezbollah’s expanding role and Iran’s regional position in light of the outcome of those negotiations.
The apparent collapse of the US-Iranian agreement has strengthened expectations that regional fronts could once again become interconnected.
Why Escalation Remains Likely
The sixth section outlines the main indicators pointing towards renewed military escalation, despite ongoing Lebanese-Israeli negotiations under US sponsorship and the beginning of the pilot zones project.
The study argues that US and Israeli decision-makers do not expect the Lebanese Army to achieve the central objective assigned to it, namely disarming Hezbollah.
This makes the Lebanese-Israeli agreement fragile, weak and incapable of full implementation according to the American and Israeli vision.
Based on these factors, the study considers renewed military escalation in the coming period to be likely. It calls for preparation for all possible scenarios and for examining how to confront a new Israeli strategy aimed at establishing a security zone between the border and the “yellow line”, preventing residents from returning to border villages and maintaining military operations deep inside southern Lebanon.
A Fragile Deterrence That Could Collapse
The decision to return to war on the Lebanese front is no longer governed solely by direct military calculations. It now depends on a complex combination of political, security and military factors.
The Lebanese front is therefore expected to remain under a condition of fragile deterrence, with the potential for escalation to erupt at any time.
In light of these developments, fears of renewed escalation in Lebanon, as well as on other regional fronts, will remain central to the calculations of decision-makers in Lebanon and across the region unless a ceasefire is reached on the Iranian-American front and the parties return to the Islamabad agreement or a similar arrangement.
