Iran has increasingly focused its attacks on Bahrain and Kuwait, a shift that reflects a strategy of applying selective pressure while avoiding a wider regional war, according to a report published by Foreign Policy.
The report, written by Rob Geist Pinfold and Dania Thafer, argues that Tehran is exploiting divisions among Gulf states and uncertainty in Washington’s regional strategy to advance its objectives. It also stresses that the current security environment highlights the growing importance of collective regional defence.
Gulf States Caught in an Unwanted Conflict
The report notes that since the United States and the Israeli occupation launched attacks on Iran in late February, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have found themselves on the frontline of a conflict they neither initiated nor sought.
According to the authors, the continuing escalation between Washington and Tehran demonstrates the failure of the 8 April ceasefire and the subsequent memorandum of understanding to restore stability.
Although Iranian strikes against Gulf states continued after the ceasefire, their focus shifted. Rather than concentrating primarily on the United Arab Emirates, Tehran redirected its operations towards the smaller Gulf states of Bahrain and Kuwait.
A New Strategic Objective
Foreign Policy argues that Iran has consistently viewed the Gulf as Washington’s primary regional power base, both before and after the ceasefire.
However, the strategic purpose of its attacks has evolved.
Instead of seeking maximum disruption to the global economy in order to force an end to hostilities, Tehran now appears focused on demonstrating resolve and delivering deterrent messages without triggering another full scale war. This change helps explain the increased targeting of Bahrain and Kuwait.
The report adds that this outcome was not inevitable. Divisions within the GCC and the absence of a consistent US regional strategy created favourable conditions for Iran to apply pressure selectively.
It also argues that the lack of a decisive American or Gulf response to repeated Iranian attacks paved the way for the current escalation.
Why Bahrain and Kuwait?
According to the report, Bahrain and Kuwait share several strategic vulnerabilities.
Both countries depend entirely on the Strait of Hormuz for their trade, possess relatively small populations and territories, and are positioned between larger regional rivals, making them susceptible to becoming battlefields or even targets of invasion.
Both also have sizeable Shia communities, raising concerns that Tehran could seek to exploit sectarian divisions to undermine internal stability.
In addition, neither country enjoys the level of international influence possessed by other Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia’s economic weight, the UAE’s global commercial presence, or Qatar’s diplomatic influence.
Opposite Policies, Same Outcome
The report emphasises that neither Bahrain nor Kuwait can be accused of lacking a coherent policy towards Iran. Rather, they represent two contrasting approaches within the Gulf.
Bahrain has maintained a hardline stance towards Tehran.
Kuwait, by contrast, has pursued a pragmatic policy centred on engagement and improving relations with Iran while maintaining its rejection of normalisation. The report notes that Kuwait even temporarily closed its airspace to US aircraft during Washington’s Operation Freedom Project in May, which was launched to secure the Strait of Hormuz.
Despite these contrasting approaches, neither country succeeded in shielding itself from Iranian attacks before the ceasefire, although their relatively limited strategic importance temporarily reduced the intensity of targeting.
At that stage, Iran’s objective was to create sufficient global economic disruption to force de escalation. This, the report argues, explains why individual Gulf strategies failed to contain Tehran and why approximately half of Iran’s missiles and drones were directed at the UAE, the region’s most interconnected commercial hub.
Limited Escalation, Calculated Pressure
Following the ceasefire, Iran continued its attacks without seeking a return to full scale conflict.
Instead, Foreign Policy argues that Tehran has employed military force to demonstrate that it remains defiant while strengthening its negotiating position.
Since Iran now seeks limited and carefully controlled disruption to deter its adversaries, Bahrain and Kuwait have become ideal targets.
Compared with their more influential neighbours, both states are important enough for attacks against them to carry strategic messaging, yet not central enough to guarantee an overwhelming American military response.
The Failure of Collective Security
The report states that Bahrain and Kuwait’s inability to deter Iran independently is unsurprising given their size.
The greater failure, however, lies in the collective security system.
According to the authors, the strategic logic behind both the GCC and its close partnership with Washington is that neither country should have to confront such threats alone. Effective collective defence should deny Tehran the ability to choose and target weaker states individually.
Questions Over American Commitments
The report argues that Iran’s continued attacks have forced a reassessment of long held assumptions regarding Gulf security.
Both Bahrain and Kuwait are major non NATO allies of the United States.
In 2023, Bahrain signed the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Washington, effectively creating a bespoke mutual defence framework.
Despite these arrangements, Iran repeatedly attacked both countries after the ceasefire came into effect and continued doing so into early July, while the American response remained limited to diplomatic condemnation.
According to the report, this has fuelled growing regional and international concerns over whether the Trump administration is prepared to abandon its allies.
Iran Raises the Stakes
After the United States responded in mid July, Iran intensified its attacks against Bahrain and Kuwait while also striking Qatar, Oman and Jordan.
According to Foreign Policy, this represents the same strategy of selective coercion, but at a higher level of escalation.
The report argues that Tehran continues to dictate both the pace and scope of the conflict by targeting countries important to Washington, but not sufficiently important to make a decisive American military response unavoidable.
This suggests that Iran still seeks to avoid open war while continuing to use military pressure to strengthen its position in negotiations.
It also places Washington back in the dilemma it has faced for months. Either it refrains from responding, damaging its credibility, or it escalates and risks dragging the region back into a broader war that no side wants.
Divisions Within the Gulf
The report warns that the absence of a unified GCC response is becoming increasingly dangerous.
Where previous Iranian attacks generated regional solidarity, there is now growing speculation that some Gulf states may seek separate understandings with Iran and its allies.
Although the report notes there is no evidence that such agreements currently exist, it points out that Bahrain and Kuwait continue to suffer economically from ongoing attacks.
Moody’s downgraded Bahrain’s outlook from Stable to Negative in April, while Kuwait failed to export a single barrel of oil during the same month for the first time since the 1990 Gulf War.
The Consequences Extend Beyond Two States
According to Foreign Policy, the consequences of events in Bahrain and Kuwait will not remain confined to those countries.
Iran’s expansion of its campaign to include Qatar and Oman, along with attacks on vessels flying Saudi and Emirati flags, demonstrates how geographically interconnected the Gulf states are and how difficult it is for them to absorb a prolonged conflict on their doorstep.
The report argues that any separate bilateral agreement with Iran would therefore amount to little more than a temporary remedy for a far deeper strategic problem.
More concerning, it says, is Tehran’s effectiveness in applying a “divide and rule” strategy by exploiting differences among GCC members.
Collective Security Remains the Only Sustainable Option
The report concludes that the strength of the Gulf states ultimately depends on the strength of their weakest members.
As demonstrated by the situations facing Bahrain and Kuwait, neither accommodating Iran while opposing Israel nor adopting confrontation and joining the Abraham Accords has proved to be a comprehensive solution.
According to Foreign Policy, both approaches face the same structural limitations.
The report argues that a collective regional strategy remains the most effective option, even if it requires compromises affecting national sovereignty and broader strategic priorities. As long as Iran can continue targeting the weakest Gulf states without facing a unified regional response, every member of the GCC will remain vulnerable.
